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Since the beginning of free movement, the right of EU citizens to live in the 
host Member State with their family members has been regarded as a key precondition 
for intra-European mobility. Yet, over the past decade, this approach has given rise to 
considerable tensions between the Union and the Member States who started to 
complain about the perceived abuse of family reunion rights. At the heart of their 
concerns have been the so-called marriages of convenience between mobile EU 
citizens and third-country nationals, allegedly contracted to help the latter circumvent 
restrictive domestic immigration provisions. Over the years immediately preceding the 
Brexit referendum, the UK had been voicing particularly strong concerns about the 
issue, which ultimately resulted in regulatory changes both at the EU and national 
level.  
Against this background, this thesis pursues two interrelated aims. First, it 
evaluates the compatibility of the EU-level measures addressing perceived marriages 
of convenience with EU free movement law by focusing on the Citizenship Directive, 
the key instrument in the field. Second, it examines the regulation of the issue in UK 
law and its compliance with EU law in so far as it concerns the exercise of  free 
movement rights by EU citizens and their family members.  
This thesis argues that, notwithstanding its deficiencies, EU law offers mobile 
Member State nationals a relatively high level of protection against state interference 
in their family life. British marriage control practices, on the other hand, frequently 
violate EU law and target a much broader group of couples than those whose 
circumstances fit the definition of a marriage of convenience under the Directive. The 
study concludes that such measures may lead to the disruption of families and hinder 
EU citizens from exercising their Treaty rights, a situation that is expected to further 
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‘Normally, people cannot remember the exact date 
they first met. I say to them, “Go home, pretend that 
you are a movie director and write a detailed script 
based on facts. Let’s say, it was 2 o’clock on the 5th 
of March, it was rainy, you were at the bus station, 
and she walked past”. I want them to write 
everything together, read it every day, and then 
when they go for an interview, they will tell the same 
things’.1 
 
1. Background and aim of the study 
 
The European Union, commonly described as the largest and most successful 
voluntary integration project in the contemporary history of mankind,2 is experiencing 
challenging times. The past two decades have witnessed two contradictory 
developments taking place across the continent: on the one hand, the transformation 
of the EU from an economic to a political community. On the other, the rise of 
nationalist and Eurosceptic sentiments in several Member States.  
In the area of free movement of persons, the former process has most clearly 
manifested itself in three interrelated ways: the extension of the personal scope of 
Treaty rights to non-economic actors, the introduction of EU citizenship, as well as the 
creation of a general right to permanent residence for EU citizens3 and their family 
members. Moreover, during this period, the Union underwent the most significant 
expansion in its history: over the nine years from 2004 to 2013, it was acceded by 13 
new, predominantly Central and Eastern European Member States.4 This led to a 
 
1 Interview with David Tang, principal solicitor at David Tang & Co (London, 20 February 2019).  
2 See for instance an interview with Federica Mogherini, (now former) High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in Mark Leonard, ‘Shaping Europe’s Present and Future’ 
(European Council of Foreign Relations, 11.01.2019) 
 <www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_shaping_europes_present_and_future> accessed 27 July 2020.  
3 For the sake of brevity, throughout the thesis, EU, EEA and Swiss citizens are referred to collectively 
as ‘EU citizens’, unless specified otherwise.  
4 In 2004, the EU was joined by ten countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, as well as Malta and Cyprus. They were followed by Bulgaria and Romania 





significant increase in intra-European mobility. Within a decade following the 2004 
enlargement, five million EU-12 nationals relocated to EU-15 Member States,5 with 
the UK becoming their principal destination – not least because it immediately opened 
its labour market to workers from countries that joined the Union in 2004.6 Over this 
period, the number of EU-12 nationals residing in the UK increased more than tenfold, 
from 113,200 in 2004 to 1.5 million in 2014.7  
Although the rise in free movement provided a significant contribution to EU-
15 economies,8 the public and political debate in some Western European Member 
States soon began to increasingly focus on the perceived negative effects. In several 
receiving states, the significant numbers of EU-12 arrivals within a short period 
triggered the fear of losing control, particularly in light of the recession that hit the 
global economy in 2008 and 2009. Certain groups of mobile EU citizens9 were now 
regarded as a threat to the security and economic prosperity of the host Member States, 
providing a platform for populist and racialised discourses about poor or otherwise 
undesirable Eastern Europeans who ‘take jobs’ from the locals or are involved  in the 
so-called welfare or benefits tourism or criminality.10  
Frequently employed in the nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric of the 
Conservative party and further reinforced by local media outlets, such narratives 
gained particular prominence in the UK, whose electorate has long been amongst the 
most Eurosceptic in the EU.11 Over the past decade, the UK authorities have 
consistently raised concerns about the perceived abuse of free movement and made 
 
5 Agniezska Fihel and others, ‘Free Movement of Workers and Transitional Arrangements: Lessons 
from the 2004 and 2007 Enlargements’ (Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw 2015) 21. 
6 Other Member States fully opened their labour markets to this group only in 2011 (except Sweden and 
Ireland which followed the UK approach). 
7 Fihel and others (n 5) 88. 
8 See for instance, Commission, ‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2011’ (DG EMPL 
2012) 274-75.  
9 By ‘mobile’ the author refers to EU citizens who have exercised their free movement rights. By 
contrast, the term ‘static’ is used in the thesis to designate Member State nationals who find themselves 
in purely internal situations. For an overview of the distinction between the two categories in the context 
of the present study, see Chapter 2.  
10 For a general discussion on the implications of such discourses, see among others, Sandra Mantu, 
‘Alternative Views on EU Citizenship’ in Carolus Grütters, Sandra Mantu and Paul Minderhoud (eds), 
Migration on the Move (Brill 2017); Jean-Michel Lafleur and Elsa Mescoli, ‘Creating Undocumented 
EU Migrants through Welfare: A Conceptualization of Undeserving and Precarious Citizenship’ (2018) 
52 Sociology 480.  
11 See for instance, Deanna Demetriou, ‘Discourse on Immigration in the UK: Representations and 
Evaluations of Romanians and Bulgarians as “Benefit Tourists”’ (Dphil Thesis, Canterbury Christ 
Church University 2018); Noah Carl, James Dennison and Geoffrey Evans, ‘European but not European 





regular attempts to persuade EU institutions and other Member States to massively 
restrict Treaty rights, ultimately threatening to leave the EU altogether. Although the 
Union finally succumbed to the British demands,12 this did not affect the outcome of 
the 2016 Brexit referendum where the majority cast their vote in favour of leaving the 
EU.13 Following a lengthy negotiation process, the UK officially ceased to be a  
member of the Union on 31 January 2020, effectively becoming the first country in 
the Union’s nearly 70-year history to exit from the bloc.  
Along with the narratives of ‘poverty migration’ and criminality which 
contributed to the negative perception of free movement among British voters, a 
further major point of contention between the EU and the UK relates to the generous 
family reunion rights enjoyed by mobile EU citizens under EU law. Since the inception 
of the EU, the possibility for mobile EU citizens to live in the host Member State with 
their third-country national (TCN) family members has been considered an essential 
precondition for intra-European mobility. Yet, over the past decade, the EU approach 
started to come into considerable tension with domestic family reunification policies 
in (predominantly Western European) Member States. Aiming to reduce the number 
of family migrants who could not be selected based on the same criteria as the foreign 
labour force, a number of governments made family reunification of their own 
nationals subject to the fulfilment of conditions which are most commonly associated 
with economic migration, such as high income thresholds, integration conditions, and 
language tests.14 By contrast, applying additional requirements to family members of 
mobile EU citizens is precluded under Directive 2004/38/EC15 (further referred to as 
the ‘Citizenship Directive’). This directive is the principal instrument codifying EU 
law on the freedom of movement of Union citizens and their family members, which 
lies at the heart of the present study.  
Due to the growing dichotomy between the two sets of rights, family reunion 
in EU law began to pose a significant challenge to mainstream theories of European 
 
12 See Chapter 2, Section 3.5.  
13 For a discussion on the nexus between the negative perception of free movement and the Brexit vote, 
see for instance, Sara B. Hobolt, ‘The Brexit Vote: a Divided Nation, a Divided Continent’ (2016) 
23 Journal of European Public Policy 1259. 
14 For a discussion, see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.   
15 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 





integration, centred on the idea that that the readiness of national governments to 
comply with EU-set rules largely depends on the perceived or real benefits they 
receive.16 For some Member States, the gains from the facilitation of free movement 
through the right to family reunion were no longer viewed as outweighing the loss of 
sovereignty in migration matters. The growing number of TCN family members 
claiming Treaty rights began to be seen as a route enabling unwanted foreigners to 
sidestep restrictive national immigration provisions and was commonly denounced as 
an abuse of free movement rights. 
At the heart of Member States’ anxieties have been the so-called marriages of 
convenience, allegedly contracted between mobile EU citizens and third -country 
nationals in order to enable the latter to regularise their status. At the European level, 
several Member States have repeatedly claimed that such arrangements constitute a 
serious problem and called for limitations on the right to family reunion under the 
Citizenship Directive. The UK authorities have typically been the most concerned 
about the issue. From the mid-2000s, the topic of marriages of convenience involving 
mobile EU citizens started to gain significant prominence on the British political and 
media agenda. At the core of this discourse lay gendered and racialised narratives of 
female nationals of EU-12 Member States who, often guided by facilitators, marry 
male migrants from the Indian subcontinent for financial gain. Such anxieties have 
ultimately found expression in a set of legislative measures adopted in the UK in recent 
years. At the very same time, the pressure exercised by Member States prompted EU 
institutions to respond to their concerns by developing a position on the issue and inter 
alia adopting two soft-law instruments, aimed at assisting governments in tackling 
alleged marriages of convenience. 
The significance of these developments cannot be overstated. State-exercised 
controls aiming to determine the authenticity of marriage may significantly impact the 
position of EU citizens whose close ones have not been fortunate enough to possess 
the nationality of one of the Member States. First, such measures may come into 
tension with the objective of protecting the right to family reunion as an intrinsic 
component of free movement, which is consistently highlighted in CJEU case-law.17 
 
16 See for instance, Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer, ‘Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory 
Compliance? An Empirical Analysis of EU Directives 1978—99’ (2007) 8 European Union Politics 
180, 185-86.  





Second, they may pose a challenge to the protection guaranteed to families under 
European human rights law, particularly Article 8 of the ECHR18 and Article 7 of the 
EUCFR19 (the right to respect for private and family life) and Article 12 of the ECHR 
and Article 9 of the EUCFR (the right to marry and to found a family). Last but not 
least, the concept of marriages of convenience for residence purposes may not be easily 
compatible with the regulation of marital relationships in family law, an area that falls 
within the exclusive competence of Member States and incorporates a separate set of 
rights and obligations.  
Despite the importance of the issue, the regulation of marriages of convenience 
in EU free movement law and its impact on national legal systems has been 
significantly under-studied. In the academic literature, the notion of marriages of 
convenience has been addressed from various disciplinary perspectives, such as 
political science, sociology, anthropology, and gender studies, with most of the authors 
engaging in criticism of the normative division between acceptable and not acceptable 
marriages for residence purposes. A major limitation of this scholarship, however, is 
that it predominantly looks at the issue from a domestic perspective, with the EU-
dimension being largely neglected.20 The same refers to the relevant legal literature, 
 
18 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No.005 
(04.11.1950) (ECHR). 
19 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01 (EUCFR). 
20 For non-legal literature focusing on the UK, see, Katharine Charsley and Michaela Benson, 
‘Marriages of Convenience and Inconvenient Marriages: Regulating Spousal Migration to Britain’ 
(2012) 26 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 10; Natasha Carver, ‘Displaying 
Genuineness: Cultural Translation in the Drafting of Marriage Narratives for Immigration Applications 
and Appeals’ (2014) 3 Families, Relationships and Societies 271; Anne-Marie D’Aoust, ‘A Moral 
Economy of Suspicion: Love and Marriage Migration Management Practices in the United Kingdom’ 
(2018) 36 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 40; Georgie Wemyss, Nira Yuval-Davis 
and Kathryn Cassidy, ‘Beauty and the Beast’: Everyday Bordering and “Sham Marriage” Discourse’ 
(2018) 66 Political Geography 151; Daniel Nehring and Clive Sealey, ‘Intimate Citizenship and the 
Tightening of Migration Controls in the United Kingdom’ (2020) 54 Social Policy & Administration 
427. On Austria, see, Irene Messinger, Schein oder nicht Schein: Konstruktion und Kriminalisierung 
von ‘Scheinehen’ in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Mandelbaum 2012). On Belgium see, Maïté Maskens, 
‘Bordering Intimacy: The Fight against Marriages of Convenience in Brussels’ (2015) 33(2) The 
Cambridge Journal of Anthropology 42; Mieke Vandenbroucke, ‘Legal-Discursive Constructions of 
Genuine Cross-Border Love in Belgian Marriage Fraud Investigations’ (2020) 17 Critical Discourse 
Studies 175. On Finland, see, Saara Pellander, ‘“An Acceptable Marriage”: Marriage Migration and 
Moral Gatekeeping in Finland’ (2015) 36 Journal of Family Issues 1472; Saara Pellander, ‘Buy Me 
Love: Entanglements of Citizenship, Income and Emotions in Regulating Marriage Migration’ (2019) 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. On France, see, Hélène Neveu Kringelbach, ‘“Mixed 
Marriage”, Citizenship and the Policing of Intimacy in Contemporary France’ (2013) University of 
Oxford: International Migration Institute Working Paper No 77 
<www.migrationinstitute.org/publications/wp-77-13> accessed 29 July 2020. On the Netherlands, see, 
Saskia Bonjour and Betty de Hart, ‘A Proper Wife, a  Proper Marriage: Constructions of “Us”  and 
“Them” in Dutch Family Migration Policy’ (2013) 20 European Journal of Women’s Studies 61; 





which primarily considers the subject within the framework of domestic family 
reunification provisions.21 The only studies specifically devoted to regulation of 
marriages of convenience in EU free movement law have been conducted by Betty de 
Hart22 and Marcello Di Filippo.23 Both have attempted to critically examine the 
applicable legal framework by focusing on the soft law adopted by the Commission in 
recent years. Yet, whilst representing an important contribution to the field, their 
research is limited in its scope and does not address all the critical issues raised by the 
relevant legal instruments. Furthermore, their studies fall short of providing a 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the development of the concept of marriages 
of convenience in EU law and its relationship with other relevant provisions in the area 
of free movement of persons.  
The present thesis aims to contribute to filling this gap. Situated at the complex 
intersection between EU free movement, human rights, domestic immigration, 
 
Marriages: Beyond the “Sham”/“Genuine” Dichotomy’ (2019) Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies. On Norway, see, Wencke Mühleisen, Åse Røthing and Stine H. Bang Svendsen, ‘Norwegian 
Sexualities: Assimilation and Exclusion in Norwegian Immigration Policy’ (2012) 15 Sexualities 139; 
Helga Eggebø, ‘A Real marriage? Applying for Marriage Migration to Norway’ (2013) 39 Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies 773. For comparative or non-country specific research, see, Anne-Marie 
D’Aoust, ‘In the Name of Love: Marriage Migration, Governmentality, and Technologies of Love’ 
(2013) 7 International Political Sociology 258; Federica Infantino, ‘Bordering “Fake” Marriages? The 
Everyday Practices of Control at the Consulates of Belgium, France and Italy in Casablanca’ (2014) 1 
Etnografia e ricerca qualitativa 27.  
21 For legal literature focusing on the UK, see, Helena Wray, ‘An Ideal Husband? Marriages of 
Convenience, Moral Gate-keeping and Immigration to the UK’ (2006) 8 European Journal of Migration 
and Law 303; Lisa Pilgram, ‘Tackling “Sham Marriages”: The Rationale, Impact and Limitations of the 
Home Office’s “Certificate of Approval” Scheme’ (2009) 23 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Law 24; Helena Wray, ‘The “Pure” Relationship, Sham Marriages and Immigration 
Control’ in Joanna Miles, Perveez Mody and Rebecca Probert (eds) Marriage Rites and Rights (Hart 
2015). On Austria, see, Daniela Digruber and Irene Messinger, ‘Marriage of Residence in Austria’ 
(2006) 8 European Journal of Migration and Law 281; Irene Messinger, ‘There is Something about 
Marrying… The Case of Human Rights vs. Migration Regimes using the Example of Austria’ (2013) 2 
Laws, 376 
<https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jlawss/v2y2013i4p376-391d29258.html> accessed 29 July 2020. On 
Belgium, see, Marie-Claire Foblets and Dirk Vanheule, ‘Marriages of Convenience in Belgium: the 
Punitive Approach Gains Ground in Migration Law’ (2006) 8 European Journal of Migration and Law 
263. On Denmark, see, Helena Wray, ‘Regulating Spousal Migration in Denmark’ (2013) 27 Journal 
of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 139. On the US, see, Kerry Abrams, ‘Immigration law and 
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elaboration of the topic. See, Chiara Berneri, ‘Marriages of  Convenience: the Limitations of the UK 
legislation’ (2015) 29 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 372.   
22 Betty de Hart, ‘The Europeanization of Love. The Marriage of Convenience in European Migration 
Law’ (2017) 19 European Journal of Migration and Law 281. 
23 Marcello Di Filippo, ‘Can EU Free Movement Rights be Abused? Critical Remarks on the “Marriages 
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residence24 and family law, this research aims to specifically explore the concept of 
marriages of convenience in so far as it concerns the exercise of Treaty rights by EU 
citizens and their non-EU family members. With this view, the study is structured 
around two main research questions: first, it looks at how the concept of marriages of 
convenience is addressed in EU free movement law and, secondly, explores how the 
issue is regulated in UK law. The selection of this country as the case-study is rooted 
in the fact that, amongst the EU Member States, the UK has consistently been voicing 
the strongest concerns about the issue which ultimately led to significant regulatory 
changes both at the EU and the domestic level. The first part of this thesis will 
correspondingly (a) look at the degree to which the Union’s institutions have 
accommodated Member State demands and (b) critically examine the compatibility of 
measures developed to address perceived marriages of convenience with EU free 
movement law, by focusing on the Citizenship Directive.  The second part of the study 
will then proceed to determine if , and to what extent, the relevant UK domestic 
legislation, jurisprudence and control practices for marriages of convenience comply 
with EU law, in so far as it concerns the enjoyment of free movement rights by EU 
citizens and their family members. To develop a comprehensive understanding of the 
subject, the thesis will also assess the level of protection guaranteed to couples under 
European human rights law and discuss its interplay with the Citizenship Directive.  
 
2. Limitations  
 
This study has two principal limitations. First, it does not intend to offer an 
exhaustive analysis of the concept of marriages of convenience in EU law and only 
focuses on the area of free movement of persons. Therefore, other instruments 
addressing this notion, most notably Directive 2003/86 on family reunification of 
third-country nationals,25 are not discussed in the present thesis. Likewise, when 
performing an analysis of UK domestic law, the author’s focus lays on the marriage 
control instruments targeting couples that consist of a mobile EU citizen and a third -
country national. A thorough evaluation of measures directed to other groups is outside 
 
24 For the sake of precision, a distinction between ‘immigration’ and ‘residence’ law is made here to 
separate the domestic legal instruments covering the position of third-country nationals from those 
applicable to mobile EU citizens, respectively.  
25 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ 




the remit of this research; the thesis will touch upon these only where it is necessary 
to ensure the coherence of  the author’s argument or where the two settings overlap.  
The second major limitation of this study relates to the consequences of the UK 
decision to leave the EU. Following the official end of its membership, the UK entered 
a transition period scheduled to end on 31 December 2020. Before this date, free 
movement continues to operate as usual; this is the reason why, throughout the thesis, 
the author talks about the position of EU citizens in the UK in the present tense. In 
March 2019, the UK opened the so-called EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS), requiring 
all EU citizens and their family members who reside in the country by 31 December 
2020 to register in order to continue living there. However, due to its limited scope 
and time constraints, this thesis engages with the relevant post-Brexit developments 
only briefly. Hence, while the study does provide a concise overview of the Settlement 
Scheme, its principal focus lies on other admission confirmation procedures for the 
family members of EU citizens (such as residence cards and EEA family permits) that 
were in place before (and will continue to operate alongside) the new scheme, at least 
until the end of the transition period. With EUSS as the only exception, the analysis of 
the relevant EU and UK-level regulation offered by this thesis reflects the situation up 
until 30 June 2020.  
 
3. Sources  
 
Aiming to examine the subject of research from different angles, this thesis 
relies on a variety of legal and non-legal sources. First, to explore the development of 
the concept of marriages of convenience within the general framework of EU free 
movement law, the author draws heavily on EU primary legislation, as well as 
Directives, Regulations and several non-binding instruments specifically addressing 
the issue, such as Council Resolutions and Commission Guidelines. A significant part 
of the analysis rests on CJEU case-law. The dialogue between the EU institutions and 
Member States is further reflected in different types of Council documents; 
Commission communications and reports; Member State letters to the Commission 
and the Presidency; as well as in the minutes of the meetings of the Commission expert 
group on the right to free movement of persons (FREEMO). In addition, several 
Commission-funded studies and Europol reports offer a more in-depth insight into the 




particularly where it concerns the perceived link between the phenomenon and 
organised crime. Furthermore, to add a human rights dimension to the study, the author 
refers to the main instruments of European human rights law, most notably ECHR and 
EUCFR, and the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence.  
An analysis of the regulation of the issue in UK law is primarily based on legal 
instruments belonging to two principal categories: UK immigration legislation and 
measures implementing EU free movement law (a further category dealt with in this 
thesis, albeit to a lesser degree, is family law). The key instruments employed in this 
context are Acts of Parliament, Regulations, Immigration Rules, and non-binding 
guidance for Home Office staff. As noted above, some of the instruments cover more 
than one domain and apply to both static UK nationals and mobile EU citizens.  
Next, in order to consider how the concept of marriages of convenience is 
approached by UK courts, the author has conducted an analysis of 110 recent Upper 
Tribunal (UT) Immigration and Asylum Chamber decisions. In addition, the author 
has examined several high-profile cases on the issue, delivered by the former Asylum 
and Immigration Tribunal,26 the Court of Appeal, the High Court of England and 
Wales, and the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the thesis has consulted a large number 
of other sources, such as Home Office explanatory memorandums; papers and impact 
assessments; reports of parliamentary debates; political speeches and statements; 
ICIBI reports; ILPA documents; statements by politicians; media reports; and 
government statistics. With regard to the latter, it should be stressed that there is a lack 
of publicly available data related to the identification of marriages of convenience. 
Although some numbers have been disclosed following the author’s FOI requests to 
the Home Office, these have not been answered in full.  
Furthermore, to provide a concise overview of pre-Brexit referendum 
negotiations between the UK and the EU and the subsequent developments, the author 
has mainly looked at the documents concerning a new settlement for the UK within 
the EU which ultimately never entered into force, as well as the EU-UK Withdrawal 
Agreement,27 UK Withdrawal Act,28 and the EU Settlement Scheme. Additionally, 
where it is relevant, the author also refers to the legislation of European countries other 
 
26 The Tribunal was abolished in 2010 and its functions transferred to the new Asylum and Immigration 
Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. 
27 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community [2019] OJ C384/1 (Withdrawal 
Agreement). 




than the UK; a comparative analysis of the respective aspects, however, falls outside 
the scope of this thesis.  
Furthermore, to develop a better understanding of the operation of marriage 
controls in practice, the author conducted semi-structured interviews with two 
London-based immigration practitioners who deal with family reunion cases on a daily 
basis: Nath Gbikpi, an immigration solicitor at Wesley Gryk Solicitors, and David 
Tang, principal solicitor at David Tang & Co. Both meetings took place in person in 
February 2019, with the list of key questions being sent to the author’s discussants 
beforehand. In addition, the author held an informal conversation with a Commission 
representative involved in drafting a Handbook on the issue of marriages of 
convenience,29 which took place in March 2017 in Brussels. As opposed to a formal 
interview, the chosen discussion format allowed the author’s interviewee to talk more 
in-depth about the drafting procedure and share their views on specific provisions of 
the document. The perspectives of the author’s informants are essential for 
understanding the rationale behind various elements of marriage controls and the 
practical implications of such measures for the individuals concerned. The information 
obtained has been used accordingly throughout the thesis to strengthen the author’s 
argument.  
Of course, completion of the present analysis would not have been possible 
without consulting the rich academic literature on various issues closely intertwined 
with the subject matter. In addition to the above-listed scholarship which explicitly 
addresses the concept of marriages of convenience, this thesis engages with studies on 
several other interrelated topics, such as: the general development of EU free 
movement law and citizenship; the right to family reunion and the concept of abuse in 
EU law; the relevant fundamental rights; family reunification rules in several Member 
States and the situation in the UK; as well as tensions between the EU and national 
governments. Given the plethora of literature available in these fields, the choice of 
sources has been inevitably dictated by their quality, novelty, and relevance to the topic 




29 Commission, ‘Staff Working Document - Handbook on addressing the issue of alleged marriages of 
convenience between EU citizens and non-EU nationals in the context of EU law on free movement of 






a) ‘Marriages of convenience’ 
 
As will be shown in Chapter 2, the concept of marriage contracted in order to 
secure the right of residence for the foreign spouse has originated in the national 
domains. It is designated in domestic legal and public discourses by various terms, 
such as ‘marriages of convenience’, ‘residence marriages’, ‘sham’, ‘bogus’, ‘fake’, 
‘false’, ‘fictitious’, ‘fraudulent’, ‘pro forma’ marriages, as well as ‘marriage fraud’, 
the term most commonly used in the US and Canada. Whilst the definition(s) of the 
relevant concept will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, the EU-level instruments 
adopted in the area of free movement law invariably employ the term ‘marriages of 
convenience’. By contrast, the UK legislation on the issue uses both the terms 
‘marriages of convenience’ and ‘sham marriages’ to refer to the phenomenon in 
different legal settings.  
To avoid unnecessary confusion, this thesis adopts the terminology used in EU 
documents and consistently employs the term ‘marriages of convenience’; the term 
‘sham marriage’ is only used to highlight the terminological differences between the 
various pieces of UK domestic law. Another exception is direct quotations where 
different terms are used interchangeably; in such cases, the exact wording of the source 
material has been reproduced. It should also be noted that the term ‘fraudulent 
marriages’ in EU law has a meaning distinct from ‘marriages of convenience’ and 
relates to cases where individuals rely on false documentation to claim Treaty rights.30 
Furthermore, for the purposes of this thesis, the concept of ‘marriages of convenience’ 
shall normally be understood as including the analogous concept of ‘registered 
partnerships of convenience’; this point is specifically addressed in the study  where 
relevant.  
 
b) ‘Citizen’ v ‘national’ 
 
Although the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are widely regarded as 
synonymous, some authors draw a distinction between the two, arguing that the former 
 




is a concept of international law and the latter belongs to the municipal law domain. 
Whilst ‘citizenship’ is specifically linked with the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights, ‘nationality’ is considered to be broader and covers all those who formally 
belong to the state.31 Without engaging in this very interesting debate, the present study 
accordingly employs the term ‘nationality’ in the meaning of the European Convention 
on Nationality. The relevant concept is understood there as ‘the legal bond between a 
person and a State’ which ‘does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin’.32 
 The notion of EU citizenship, meanwhile, does not seem to easily fit within 
this framework, not least due to its conceptual ambiguity.33 Notwithstanding that, 
Article 20 (1) TFEU34 states that ‘every person holding the nationality of a Member 
State shall be a citizen of the Union’ and ‘[c]itizenship of the Union shall be additional 
to and not replace national citizenship.’ Given that Member States enjoy exclusive 
competence to decide upon who their nationals are,35 it has been left to the 
governments to impose their own understanding of nationality onto EU institutions,36 
notwithstanding the fact that this would determine the scope of application of EU 
law.37  
For the sake of clarity, the present study refers to ‘nationals’ or ‘nationality’ to 
emphasise the individual’s formal belonging to a particular state. Meanwhile, the terms 
‘citizens’ or ‘citizenship’ are used here exclusively in the meaning of ‘EU citizens’ or 
 
31 For an overview of the relevant literature, see, Hennie Strydom, ‘The Theory of Citizenship: A 
Reappraisal’ (1985) 18 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa  103.  
32 European Convention on Nationality ETS No.166 (06.11.1997), art 2. 
33 For a critical discussion on EU citizenship, see among others, Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The Essence of 
EU Citizenship Emerging from the Last Ten Years of Academic Debate: Beyond the Cherry Blossoms 
and the Moon?’ (2013) 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 97; Jo Shaw, ‘EU Citizenship: 
Still a  Fundamental Status? in Rainer Bauböck (ed) Debating EU Citizenship (Springer 2019).  
34 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union [2016] OJ C202/1 (TFEU). 
35 Ibid, arts 3 and 4 a contrario. 
36 In this context, it is peculiar that not all nationals of Member States are recognised as such for the 
purposes of free movement law. Prior to the UK accession to the then Community in 1973, the Dutch 
government demanded that the UK adopt a unilateral declaration limiting the scope of its nationals who 
would be covered by the Treaty. The UK authorities did so, essentially depriving migrants from former 
British colonies of the right to free movement. The link between the UK declaration and EU citizenship 
was later endorsed by the CJEU in Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I-01237, para 27. For an analysis, 
see, Dora Kostakopoulou, Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European Union (Manchester 
University Press 2001) 43-4; Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship 
and the Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European 
Law 169, 188-90.  
37 Although the determination of nationality must be exercised with ‘due regard to Community law’. 
Case C-369/90 Micheletti and Others [1992] ECR I-04239, para 10. For general criticism of the 
‘derivative’ nature of EU citizenship, see, Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces’ (n 36); Helen 
Oosterom-Staples, ‘The Triangular Relationship Between Nationality, EU Citizenship and Migration in 




‘EU citizenship’ as defined under Article 20 (1) TFEU. The designation ‘third-country 
national’ is employed in the thesis to cover any individual who is not considered an 
EU citizen, including stateless persons. Terms such as ‘foreigner’, ‘foreign national’, 
‘non-EU national’, and ‘migrant’ also refer to this group and should be regarded as 
synonymous to the term ‘third-country national’ for the purposes of this study. 
  
c) ‘Family reunion’ v ‘family reunification’ 
 
Although the terms ‘family reunion’ and ‘family reunification’ describe the 
same process, the two are employed in separate legal settings. Whilst the concept of 
‘family reunification’ is typically used in domestic contexts, ‘family reunion’ is the 
wording most commonly found in the area of EU free movement law. For the purposes 
of this thesis, ‘family reunion’ should hence be understood as entry into or residence 
in a Member State by the TCN family members of a mobile EU citizen. Conversely, 
when referring to ‘family reunification’, the author is referring to entry into or 
residence in a particular country by family members of its static nationals or residents 
other than mobile EU citizens, including refugees and persons under international 
protection.   
 
5. Chapter outline  
 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters, an introduction and a conclusion.  
The purpose of Chapter 1 is to demonstrate what impact a marriage to an EU 
citizen may have on the TCN spouse’s residence status. First, the evolution of EU 
citizenship and the extent to which it is moving away from market citizenship is briefly 
explored. Next, the Chapter addresses the position of TCN spouses of Union citizens 
– in particular, in which situations do they fall within the scope of beneficiaries of the 
Treaty rights. The final sections of the Chapter are devoted to the relevant provisions 
of the Citizenship Directive, including the concept of abuse of free movement rights. 
Chapter 2 examines the extent to which the development of the concept of marriages 
of convenience in EU law reflects the Member States’ concerns about the perceived 
abuse of free movement rights. After providing an overview of the key CJEU 
jurisprudence in the field, the Chapter moves on to explore the Member States’ 




contains a critical analysis of the relevant soft-law measures, adopted by the 
Commission in recent years, whereby Chapter 4 deals with the concept of marriages 
of convenience in ECtHR case-law, particularly focusing on Articles 8 and 12 of the 
ECHR. Chapter 5 is devoted to the concept of marriages of convenience in UK 
domestic law in the context of the implementation of the Citizenship Directive and the 
recent decision of the UK to leave the EU. In particular, the Chapter explores if, how, 
and in which context, the concept of marriages of convenience is reflected in UK law 
applicable to couples consisting of mobile EU citizens and third-country nationals, as 
well as the way it intersects with the country’s family law. Chapter 6 contains an 
analysis of the UK jurisprudence on marriages of convenience. By focusing on the 
relevant UT decisions, it seeks to determine how British courts approach the relevant 




CHAPTER 1. Setting the Scene: The Right to Family Reunion in EU 
Free Movement Law  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Over the decades, the institutions of first the EEC and later the EU have 
gradually expanded the free movement rights of Member State nationals, ultimately 
transforming them from purely economic agents into Union citizens. Since the very 
inception of the then Community, the right of an individual to enjoy family life with 
their close ones has traditionally been viewed as an intrinsic component of free 
movement. This approach has been further cemented in the Citizenship Directive.  
The purpose of this Chapter is to set out the general legislative framework for 
further analysis by showing how the position of non-EU family members is regulated 
by the Directive. The Chapter begins with providing a brief overview of the evolution 
of free movement rights and EU citizenship and the extent to which it is departing 
from the purely economic paradigm. Following that, it moves on to specifically 
examining the relevant provisions of the Citizenship Directive. First,  by exploring 
under what conditions EU citizens may benefit from the right to family reunion and 
what impact a marriage to an EU citizen may have on the non-EU national’s residence 
status. Second, it addresses the question, on what grounds can the right to family 
reunion be limited? In this context, the chapter focuses on two sets of provisions in the 
Directive which, as will be seen further, the UK authorities rely on to tackle perceived 
marriages of convenience: those related to public policy and abuse of rights.  
 
2. From ‘market citizen’ to Union citizen: Evolution of the 
concepts of free movement of persons and EU citizenship  
 
2.1 On the way towards the Citizenship Directive  
 
The roots of today’s European Union date back to the post-war years, 
commonly associated with economic reconstruction and the emergence of federalist 
ideas. In 1951, six European countries – France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 




(ECSC), which abolished nationality-based restrictions with regards to the 
employment of nationals of other Member States.38 At the time, however, the scope of 
the labour force admitted was merely confined to qualified workers in the coal and 
steel industry. Yet, these limitations were soon to be lifted. In 1957, the governments 
of the six ECSC Member States signed the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community.39 The document, known as the Treaty of Rome, signalled a shift away 
from the sector-based approach towards full economic integration, as well as the 
course taken towards a political union. The Treaty expanded the right to free movement 
to all Community workers, irrespective of their field of employment. Another crucial 
principle enshrined in the document was that of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, provided that nationals of other Member States were to be treated equally 
with nationals of the host Member State with regards employment, remuneration and 
other working conditions.40 
The subsequent years were crucial in terms of developing secondary legislation 
which gave substance to, as some commentators call it, an ‘incipient form’ of the 
European citizenship.41 A transitional period, during which there was no full-fledged 
free movement, was finalised by the adoption of two key documents defining the scope 
of Treaty-based rights: Regulation 1612/6842 and Directive 68/360.43 From then on, 
for nearly forty years, both documents served as the main source for the rights of 
Member State nationals under the free movement provisions. At this stage, however, 
the measures adopted to facilitate the free movement and residence rights of mobile 
Member State nationals were strictly confined to those engaged in economic activity. 
The only exception were workers who had ceased their occupational activities in the 
host Member State but wished to stay there.44  
Furthermore, the secondary legal instruments limited the ratione personae of 
 
38 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 261 UNTS 140 (18.04.1951) (ECSC 
Treaty), art 69. 
39 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 UNTS 11 (25.03.1957) (EEC Treaty).  
40 Ibid, arts 7 and 48(2).  
41 See for instance, Richard Plender, ‘An Incipient Form of European Citizenship’ in Francis G. Jacobs 
(ed.), EU Law and the Individual (North Holland 1976) (as cited in Dimitry Kochenov and Richard 
Plender, ‘EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the 
Treaty Text’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 369, 372). 
42 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community [1968] OJ L257/2. 
43 Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families [1968] OJ L257/13. 





free movement to those holding nationality of a Member State.45 It must be noted that 
the original EEC Treaty, apparently, did not foresee such an interpretation; indeed, it 
simply referred to ‘workers’ in the broadest sense of the word, drawing no distinction 
between nationals and residents of a Member State. Yet, when enacting the secondary 
legislation, the Council chose to apply this concept in a way that might not have been 
intended by the Treaty-makers. As a consequence, a significant part of the European 
labour force was excluded from participation in the development of the internal 
market. The restrictive approach was dictated by political reasons, in particular, by 
anti-immigration discourses, often race and class-based, that were gaining power in 
the political agendas of Member States during the 1960s.46 As Dora Kostakopoulou 
observes, ‘[s]ince migrant workers were not regarded as equal participants in European 
societies, they could not be rightful beneficiaries of freedom of movement.’47  
From the 1970s onwards, it was the CJEU that began to progressively play the 
most substantial role in transforming the perception of Member State nationals from a 
mere factor of production to the so-called, ‘market citizens’.48 Having consistently 
followed the aim of creating an ‘ever-closer union among the European peoples’ as set 
out in the Treaty of Rome49 and subsequent Treaties,50 the Court favoured a wide and 
inclusive interpretation of the concept of ‘worker’. It stated that any person would fall 
within the definition, provided that they are pursuing a ‘genuine and effective’ activity 
for remuneration and the work is not purely marginal and ancillary.51  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Court extended the scope of those eligible for 
free movement rights to those indirectly contributing to the economic objectives of the 
Community: students,52 service recipients,53 and consumers.54 The CJEU approach 
was subsequently codified in three directives which extended the right to free 
movement to all mobile Member State nationals, both economically active and 
 
45 Reg 1612/68, art 1 and Dir 360/70, art 1. 
46 Kostakopoulou, Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European Union (n 36) 42-43. For more 
details on Member States’ approaches to immigration during this period, see Chapter 2, Section 2.1. 
47 Ibid 43. 
48 For an analysis, see, Ferdinand Wollenschläger, ‘New Fundamental Freedom Beyond Market 
Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European 
Integration’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 1. 
49 Preamble to EEC Treaty. 
50 Almost the same wording is found inter alia in the Preamble to TFEU.  
51 Case 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 01035, para 17. 
52 Case 293/83 Gravier [1985] ECR 00593. 
53 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 00377; Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] 
ECR 00195. 





inactive, provided that the latter satisfy the self-sufficiency condition.55   
The process of transforming ‘market citizens’ into members of a political 
community culminated in the introduction of Union citizenship in the Maastricht 
Treaty56 in 1992, a status that provided its beneficiaries with a set of novel, including 
political, rights. From then on, EU citizenship has been subject to rich and 
controversial academic debate.57 Yet, whilst a comprehensive analysis of the 
developments in the field falls outside the scope of the present research, it is important 
to note that governments have demonstrated no political will to extend Treaty rights to 
long-term residents.58 On the contrary, upon the introduction of Union citizenship, the 
nationals-only approach found its way into primary law,59 a clear indication that the 
perceived need to protect state sovereignty remained the key factor determining the 
scope of the new concept.60  
 
2.2 Citizenship Directive  
 
Introduction of the status of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty paved the 
way for the consolidation of the piece-meal approach to free movement. This process 
ultimately manifested itself in the adoption of the Citizenship Directive on 29 April 
2004, which coincided with the largest single expansion in the Union’s history 
involving ten new Member States. By integrating all the prior legislation covering the 
field, the Directive pursues a teleological approach by providing new rights without 
limiting the existing ones.61 Whilst giving legislative expression to the right of 
movement and residence conferred by Articles 20(2)(a) and 21(1) TFEU, the Directive 
 
55 Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence [1990] OJ L 180/26; Council 
Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed 
persons who have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ L180/28; Council Directive 93/96/EEC 
of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ L317/59. 
56 Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/1 (Treaty of Maastricht). 
57 See among others, Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces’ (n 36); Kochenov and Plender (n 41); 
Oosterom-Staples, ‘The Triangular Relationship Between Nationality, EU Citizenship and Migration in 
EU Law’ (n 37). 
58 Several pressure groups invited the 1996 EU Intergovernmental Conference to do so but to no avail. 
Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘Nested “Old” and “New” Citizenships in the European Union: Bringing out the 
Complexity’ (1999) 5 Columbia Journal of European Law 389, 406. 
59 TFEU, art 20(1). 
60 Siofra O’Leary, European Union Citizenship: Options for Reform (IPPR 1996) 91 (as cited in 
Kostakopoulou, Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European Union (n 36) 55).  
61 The CJEU explicitly stated that ‘Union citizens cannot derive less rights from that directive than from 
the instruments of secondary legislation which it amends or repeals’. Case C-127/08 Metock and Others 





introduced a gradual system governing residence in the host Member States. The 
stages of residence are differentiated by its duration, as well as the rights attached and 
the conditions to be fulfilled.  
Article 6 of the Directive provides Union citizens and their family members62 
the right to reside in a host Member State for up to three months with the only 
requirement being the possession of a valid identity card or passport. Article 7(1) of 
the Directive confers the right of residence in another Member State for a period of 
longer than three months to three different groups of EU citizens and their respective 
family members: (a) workers and self-employed persons, (b) those who are not 
economically active but have sufficient resources for themselves and family members, 
as well as comprehensive sickness insurance, and (c) students.  
Workers and self-employed persons remain the most privileged group of EU 
citizens with regards to their entitlement to free movement rights. Unlike other groups 
listed in Article 7, they are exempt from the self-sufficiency and comprehensive 
sickness insurance requirements. Union citizens who have ceased their economic 
activity may retain their status of workers or self-employed persons in a number of 
situations, such as illness or involuntary unemployment.63 Furthermore, retired 
workers and self-employed persons, or those who have become permanently 
incapacitated, can continue to reside in the host Member State, provided that 
conditions pertaining to their length of work and residence are satisfied.64  
The third category of individuals who fall within the scope of Article 7(1) is 
EU citizen students. The right of residence of this group is subject to possession of 
comprehensive health insurance and the availability of sufficient resources for 
themselves and their family members.65 It must be noted that students who are at the 
same time engaged in an employment activity fall within the definition of ‘worker’ 
and therefore are not subject to restrictions reserved to the student category.66  
Article 14 of the Directive, in conjunction with Recital 16 of its Preamble, sets 
out the principles Member States should respect when verifying if the conditions for 
the retention of residence rights are satisfied, as well as regulating the circumstances 
 
62 The position of family members is specifically explored in Section 3 below.  
63 Citizenship Directive, art 7(3). 
64 Ibid art 17(1). 
65 Ibid art 7(1)(c). 
66 Case C-46/12 L. N. ECLI:EU:C:2016:674, para.48. Working students also enjoy a more 





under which expulsion may follow. First, it is clarified that Member States are 
prohibited from carrying out systematic checks to verify that the conditions of 
residence under Article 7 are fulfilled, and instead can only examine ‘specific cases 
where there is a reasonable doubt’ about that’.67 Second, the Preamble specifies that 
beneficiaries of the residence rights should not be expelled, as long as they do not 
become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member 
State.68 Moreover, their recourse to social assistance shall not be automatically 
followed by expulsion.69 It is also highlighted that expulsion of workers, self-
employed persons, or job-seekers is prohibited in all situations,70 except for public 
policy or public security grounds.71  
One of the most substantial innovations introduced by the Directive is a general 
right to permanent residence for EU citizens and their family members. Whilst in prior 
legislation this right was limited to workers and self-employed persons and their family 
members in several specific situations,72 the Directive extended it to all its 
beneficiaries who have continuously resided in the host Member State for five years.73 
Those with a permanent status no longer need to satisfy the conditions set out in Article 
7 and must be treated equally with the nationals of a particular Member State in all 
areas covered by the Treaty, including access to welfare.74 Further, permanent residents 
enjoy stronger protection against expulsion.75 According to Article 16(4), this status 





67 Citizenship Directive, art 14(2). 
68 Ibid recital 16. 
69 Ibid art 14(3). 
70 As long as job-seekers continue to seek employment and have a genuine chance of being engaged. 
See ibid art 14(4)(b).   
71 Ibid recital 16, art 14(4). For more details, see Section 4.1 below. 
72 Such as retirement and permanent incapacity to work, subject to certain conditions. See Regulation 
(EEC) No 1251/70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the right of workers to remain in the territory 
of a Member State after having been employed in that State [1970] OJ L142/24, a rts 2 and 3(1). 
Equivalent provisions for self-employed persons and their family members were established by arts 2 
and 3 of the Council Directive 75/34/EEC of 17 December 1974 concerning the right of nationals of a 
Member State to remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity 
in a self-employed capacity [1970] OJ L 14/10.  
73 Citizenship Directive, art 16. 
74 Ibid arts 16(1) and 24.  





3. Right to family reunion under the Citizenship Directive  
 
3.1 Rights of family members as derivative rights 
 
Although the TFEU or the preceding Treaties do not contain a provision on 
family reunion, the secondary legislation in the area of free movement rights has 
addressed this issue since the very creation of the Community. The right of workers to 
live in the host Member State with their family members was already enshrined in the 
first instruments which were issued during the transitional period.76 Over the 
subsequent decades, equivalent rights were granted to family members of service 
providers,77 persons who had ceased their economic activity,78 and those who were not 
carrying out economic activities, at all.79  
The decision to grant Member State nationals the right to be joined by their 
family members seems, at least at the outset, to have been primarily dictated by 
economic rather than humanitarian considerations. The main focus of the Community 
institutions in post-war years was on the need to encourage unemployed Italian 
workers to move to regions with a shortage of labour, such as France or Germany. It 
was therefore considered that precluding family members from accompanying migrant 
workers in the host Member State would diminish their incentive to relocate  which 
would consequently seriously impede freedom of movement and the creation of the 
single market.80 This logic is clearly reflected inter alia in the Preamble of Regulation 
1612/68, which states that ‘freedom of movement constitutes a fundamental right of 
workers and their families’ and that ‘obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be 
eliminated, in particular as regards the worker’s right to be joined by his family and 
the conditions for the integration of that family into the host country’.  
However, in the subsequent stages of its development, the EU chose to depart 
from a purely economic paradigm and started to view the right to family reunion from 
a broader social and civic perspective, with the CJEU taking the leading role in 
 
76 Regulation 15/61 [1961] JO 1073/61, art 11; Regulation 38/64 [1964] JO 965/64, art 17.  
77 Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the 
provision of services [1973] OJ L172/14, a rt 1(1)(c) and (d). 
78 Reg 1251/70, art 1; Dir 75/34, art 1.  
79 Dir 90/364, art 1(2); Dir 90/365, art 1(2); Dir 93/96, art 1.  





transforming the original approach. In a number of judgments, the Court reminded 
Member States of the need to respect family life protected under EUCFR and ECHR81 
and held that by enabling EU citizens to enjoy family life, the host Member State 
would facilitate the EU citizen’s integration into its society.82 Notably, the shift was 
directed not only towards improving the position of mobile EU citizens who wished 
to enjoy their family life, but also enhancing the protection of their TCN family 
members who, with the introduction of the Citizenship Directive, were provided with 
an opportunity to obtain an independent, including permanent, right of residence, 
subject to certain conditions.  
Under the Directive, family members of mobile EU citizens, irrespective of their 
nationality, are entitled to take up employment or self-employment in the host Member 
State.83 Should their planned period of residence exceed three months, Member States 
must issue non-EU family members a residence card. In contrast to EU citizens 
relocating to the host Member State, who only may be asked to register with the 
competent authorities, in the case of TCN family members, such a requirement is 
mandatory.84 It is nonetheless clarified that a residence card merely serves to attest the 
existing rights under EU law and cannot be made a precondition for their exercise.85  
 Up until the acquisition of a permanent residence permit, the rights of family 
members of EU citizens are derivative in nature. As will be explored below, their 
existence depends on two key conditions: a family relation to a Member State national 
and the exercise of free movement rights by the primary beneficiary. There are 
nonetheless situations when these rights can be transferred into being autonomous: the 
death or departure of the EU citizen from the host Member State, as well as divorce, 
annulment of marriage, or termination of a registered partnership, subject to certain 
conditions. Such measures are introduced by the Directive for the first time and 
primarily affect the position of non-EU nationals: prior to that the couple had to stay 
married in order for the TCN spouse to enjoy the right of residence and economic 
activity, whereby the only option for the latter to obtain an independent right of 
 
81 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-06279, paras 41-42; Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] ECR I-
09607, para 58; Case C-304/14 CS ECLI:EU:C:2016:674, para 36.  
82 Case 59/85 Reed [1986] ECR 01283, para 28.  
83 Citizenship Directive, art 23. The rights of family members are also recognised in recital 5 of the 
Preamble that provides that ‘[t]he right of all Union citizens to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States should (…) be also granted to their family members, irrespective of 
nationality.’ 
84 Emphasis added. 




residence would typically be naturalisation. 
Article 12(1) guarantees protection to family members of EU citizens, who are 
EU citizens themselves, in the event of the death or departure of the principal. 
According to the Directive, such events do not affect the right of residence of the 
relevant family members in so far as they satisfy either of the conditions set out in 
Article 7(1). Article 12(2) expressly refers to the rights of non-EU family members in 
the event of the death of the EU principal. It states that family members may retain 
their right of residence in such a situation, provided that they (a) have been residing in 
the host Member State as family members for at least one year before the Union 
citizen’s death and (b) fulfil the requirements equivalent to those set out in Article 7(1). 
If these conditions are satisfied, TCN family members ‘retain their right of residence 
exclusively on a personal basis’, meaning that the nature of their rights transforms 
from derivative into autonomous. 
 Unlike the provisions of Article 12(1) dealing with EU citizen family members, 
Article 12(2) does not protect the residence rights of non-EU nationals whose principal 
has left the host Member State. Certain categories of persons can nonetheless retain 
such rights under other provisions of the Directive. Article 12(3), for instance, provides 
that, in the event of the death or departure of the EU principal, their children in 
education in the host Member State can continue living there until the completion of 
their studies. The right to reside is also granted to their other parent who has ‘actual 
custody’ of them, irrespective of the parent’s nationality.  
Another option is to rely on Article 13, which provides for retention of residence 
in the event of divorce, annulment of marriage, or termination of registered 
partnership. Similarly to Article 12(1), Article 13(1) stipulates that such events do not 
affect the right of residence of family members who are EU citizens themselves, given 
that they satisfy the conditions set out in Article 7(1). By contrast, TCN family 
members retain this right only in a number of particular scenarios set out in Article 
13(2). First, prior to initiation of the divorce, annulment or termination proceedings, 
the relevant union needs to have lasted at least three years, including one year in the 
host Member State.86 It is assumed that the country/countries in which the couple has 
previously lived are irrelevant. Moreover, the one year of residence in the host Member 
 





State does not necessarily have to occur immediately before the start of proceedings.87 
In a second scenario, the TCN spouse should have, by agreement or by court order, 
custody of or access to the EU citizen’s children.88 Alternatively, the spouse of an EU 
citizen should have suffered from ‘particularly difficult circumstances, such as having 
been a victim of domestic violence while the marriage or registered partnership was 
subsisting’.89 In addition, in all these cases, the non-EU national needs to comply with 
the conditions equivalent to those listed in Article 7(1).  
In the context of the present research, it is important to distinguish two categories 
of non-EU family members who, most likely, will lose their residence rights upon EU 
citizen’s departure from the host Member State. The first group, which bears particular 
relevance to this study, consists of TCN spouses who neither have custody over nor 
access to the EU citizen’s children, nor has their marriage lasted for at least three years. 
The second group includes childless, unmarried TCN partners who are not covered by 
Article 13 at all.90 It, therefore, follows that the right of residence of third-country 
nationals belonging to these categories is fully dependent on the continuous residence 
of the EU citizen principal in the host Member State. 
Article 16(2) extends the right of permanent residence to TCN family members 
who have legally resided with the Union citizen in the host Member State for a 
continuous period of five years. Article 18 additionally provides that non-EU nationals 
who have benefitted from Articles 12(2) or 13(2) also qualify for this status after five 
years of residence, provided that the requirements of economic activity or self-
sufficiency are still satisfied. The only exception is reserved for the family members 
of certain groups of EU citizens who stop working in the host Member State: these 
groups may enjoy permanent residence before the completion of the five -year 
residence period.91 
 
3.2 Who is considered a family member? 
 
Article 2(2) of the Citizenship Directive defines the scope of the so-called 
 
87 See, Elspeth Guild, Steve Peers and Jonathan Tomkin, The EU Citizenship Directive: A 
Commentary (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2019) 179. 
88 Citizenship Directive, art 13(2)(b) and (d).  
89 Ibid art 13(2)(c). 
90 This has been confirmed by the CJEU in Case C-45/12 Hadj Ahmed ECLI:EU:C:2013:390, para 36. 
For categories of persons falling within the definition of ‘family members’, see Section 3.2. 




‘direct’ family members who have the right to join or accompany an EU citizen in the 
host Member State. These are: 
a) Spouse. 
b) Registered partner if the legislation of the host Member State treats 
registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage. 
c) Direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those 
of the spouse or registered partner. 
d) Dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or 
registered partner. 
The list of family members above is not exhaustive. Article 3(2) deals with so-
called ‘extended’ family members who do not fall within the scope of Article 2(2). 
This category includes, in particular: 
a) Any other family members who are dependants or members of the EU 
citizen’s household in the country from which they have come, or require 
the EU citizen’s personal care due to a serious health condition.   
b) Unmarried (or unregistered) partner ‘with whom the Union citizen has a 
durable relationship, duly attested’. 
The main difference between the two articles is that Member States are obliged 
to admit the family members listed in Article 2(2), whilst only ‘facilitate’ admission of 
categories found in Article 3(2), which is subject to a degree of their discretion.92 It 
must be noted that non-working students are disadvantaged in comparison to other 
groups of EU citizens; the former are only entitled to live in the host Member State 
with their spouses or registered partners and dependent children. Likewise, the scope 
of the student’s ‘extended’ family members is limited to dependent direct relatives in 
the ascending line and those of the student’s spouse or registered partner.93  
 
3.3 Married couples as a privileged group 
 
The nature of the legal concept of ‘spouses’ is of particular relevance to the 
present study. When interpreting Regulation 1612/68, the CJEU explicitly clarified 
that it involved solely married couples, whereas unmarried couples could not be 
 
92 See also Case C-83/11 Rahman and Others [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519, para 26. 





regarded as spouses due to ‘the absence of any indication of a general social 
development which would justify a broad construction’.94 Yet, the proposal for the 
Citizenship Directive, presented by the Commission in May 2001,95 opened the 
opportunity to re-evaluate the concept of family members and depart from the ‘spouses 
only’ policy.96 The first draft proposed to include the category of ‘unmarried partners’ 
within the scope of direct family members in Article 2, provided that the legislation of 
the host Member State treats them equivalent to parties to a marriage.  
The Commission justified its initiative by relying on the increasing numbers of 
alternative family forms, such as unmarried couples, an arrangement that was already 
legally recognised in a number of Member States.97 However, the amended 
Commission proposal of mid-2003 and the common position subsequently adopted by 
the Council confined the scope of Article 2(2) to registered partners only, requiring 
Member States to merely facilitate admission of durable partners instead of granting 
them directly effective rights.98 At present, the Directive explicitly distinguishes the 
terms ‘spouses’ and ‘registered partners’ under Article 2(2) and ‘durable partners’ 
under Article 3(2). The EU, hence, has shown reluctance to depart from the traditional, 
conservative notion of the family as a legally married (or registered) union, viewing 
marriage (or registered partnership) as a proxy for a long-term commitment and using 
it as a central organising principle in the determination of a non-EU national’s right of 
residence.  
Against this background, one important aspect addressed by the CJEU is the 
principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality. The key judgement in 
this context is Reed,99 delivered before the adoption of the Citizenship Directive. The 
 
94 Reed (n 82), para 15.  
95 Commission, ‘Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’ 
COM (2001) 257 final (Proposal for Citizenship Directive).  
96 For an analysis, see, Helen Toner, Partnership Rights, Free Movement, and EU Law (Hart 2014), 60-
61; Clare McGlynn, Families and the European Union (Cambridge University Press 2006) 127-28. 
97 Proposal for Citizenship Directive (n 96) 7-8.  
98 Commission, ‘Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States’ COM (2003) 199 final, 10-11; Council, ‘Common Position (EC) No 6/2004 of 5 
December 2003 adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
251 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, with a  view to adopting a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 
1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 
75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC’ [2004] OJ C54E/12. 





case concerned Ms Reed, a UK national, who relocated to the Netherlands following 
her unmarried partner, also a UK national, who was employed in the country. Initially 
hoping to find a job in the Netherlands, one year later Ms Reed was still unemployed 
and claimed a residence permit on the basis of Regulation 1612/68, as she was living 
with a then EEC worker. Her application was rejected although the couple was 
cohabiting and had been in a relationship for five years. Having acknowledged that 
unmarried partners cannot be regarded as spouses for the purposes of the Regulation, 
the Court argued that the relevant Dutch policy breached the principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Whilst the domestic  immigration law 
allowed Dutch nationals and permanent residents to bring unmarried partners to the 
country, this right was unlawfully denied to nationals of other Member States.100 
According to the CJEU, Ms Reed was therefore entitled to the right of residence.  
It must be stressed that EU citizens would only be entitled to live with 
unmarried partners if the host Member State reserved that right for its own nationals. 
Conversely, had there been no such provision in Dutch law, Ms Reed would have no 
right to remain in the country. Further, it is worth noting that, in comparison to married 
couples, unmarried partners may find themselves in a disadvantaged position, not only 
because Member States are not obliged to recognise such relationships, but also 
because these must be ‘duly attested’ even where they do so. Whilst the Directive does 
not foresee systematic checks or additional requirements with respect to married 
couples; unmarried partners may be required to comply with extra conditions, as well 
as undergo a thorough examination to convince the authorities that their relationship 
is of sufficient quality. 
 
4. Derogations from free movement rights 
 
As observed above, national governments have very limited powers to remove 
mobile EU citizens and their family members merely because they do not comply with 
the conditions of economic activity or self-sufficiency. The only remaining grounds 
for exclusion reserved in the Directive are those of public policy, public security, public 
health, and the abuse of rights. Two of them – namely, public policy and abuse of rights 
– are of particular importance to this study. As will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6, these 
 




exceptions are used by the UK inter alia to deny free movement rights to nationals of 
other Member States and their non-EU spouses whose marriages are considered to be 
ones of convenience. The following sub-sections explore the relevant provisions in 
more detail.  
 
4.1 Public policy, public security and public health 
 
Since the early days of the Community, national governments were provided 
with the opportunity not to admit nationals of other Member States or to remove them 
on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Initially incorporated 
into the Treaty of Rome,101 the respective limitations found their way into the 
succeeding Treaties and secondary legislation,102 and ultimately, TFEU103 and the 
Citizenship Directive.  
The CJEU, on the other hand, has early on held and consistently maintained 
that the relevant derogations must be interpreted strictly,104 with its key case-law later 
consolidated in the Citizenship Directive. Restrictions of the right to free movement 
on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health are found in a separate 
chapter of the document.105 The public security exception is typically linked with 
concerns related to national security,106 whereby the public health ground is limited to 
serious infectious or contagious diseases and is rarely imposed. Public policy is the 
grounds most frequently employed by the governments; it is relied on to exclude EU 
citizens whose character is deemed to be insufficiently good. One such example is the 
approach of British authorities who consider it legitimate to use the public policy 
provision to remove EU citizens allegedly involved in perceived marriages of 
convenience with non-EU nationals.  
 
101 EEC Treaty, art 48(3).  
102 Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures 
concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health [1964] OJ 56/850. See also Preamble to Reg 1612/68; Dir 
73/148/EEC, art 8; Dir 90/365/EEC, art 2(2); Dir 90/364/EEC, art 2(2); Dir 93/96, art 2(2). 
103 TFEU, arts 21(1), 45(3), 52(1) and 62.  
104 See among others, Case 41-74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 01337, para18; Case 36-75 Rutili [1975] ECR 
01219, para 28; Case 30-77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 01999, para 35; Case C-50/06 
Commission v Netherlands [2007] ECR I-04383, para 42.   
105 Citizenship Directive, ch VI.  
106 The CJEU has nonetheless held that the ‘public security’ concept may also be applied to cases 
involving exceptionally serious crimes. Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] ECR I-11979, para 56; Case 
C-348/09 P.I ECLI:EU:C:2012:300, para 33. For a discussion, see, Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘When EU 




Whilst the relevant UK practices will be explored in-depth in Chapter 5, it must 
be underlined that Member States are bound by a wide array of restrictions when 
applying the public policy test. First, neither the TFEU, nor the Citizenship Directive 
provides a definition of public policy; determination of the concept is left to the 
Member States. The Directive nonetheless offers EU citizens and their family 
members extensive guarantees when it comes to their potential exclusion on public 
policy grounds. First, it introduces a system linking the level of protection against 
expulsion with the length of the individual’s residence in the host Member State. EU 
citizens holding a permanent resident status, i.e., those who have been living in the 
country for at least five years, can be expelled only on ‘serious grounds’ of public 
policy or public security.107 The same level of protection is equally guaranteed to their 
family members, irrespective of nationality. As Chiara Berneri reasonably observes, 
this can be explained not only by the EU legislator’s desire to protect family out of 
humanitarian considerations, but also to ensure that the effectiveness of EU citizens’ 
right of residence is not jeopardised by the possible removal of their close ones.108 
Notably, EU citizens whose residence lasts for ten years or more, or who are minors, 
enjoy an even higher level of protection and can be expelled only on ‘imperative 
grounds of public security’.109 
Second, the Directive sets out a number of principles that Member States need 
to respect when invoking public policy grounds. First, such measures must comply 
with the principle of proportionality and be based exclusively on the personal conduct 
of the individual concerned, whereby the latter ‘must represent a genuine, present, and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’.110 
Previous criminal convictions themselves should not be regarded as a reason for 
exclusion, nor are considerations of general prevention accepted.111 Further, before 
taking an expulsion decision, the host Member State must consider such factors as the 
length of residence of the individual in its territory, as well as their age; state of health; 
family and economic situation; social and cultural integration; and the extent of their 
links with their country of origin.112  
 
107 Citizenship Directive, art 28(2).  
108 Berneri, Family Reunification in the EU (n 81) 72.  
109 Citizenship Directive, art 28(3). 
110 Ibid art 27(2).  
111 Ibid.  





The CJEU case-law further specifies that, when assessing the proportionality 
of such a decision, fundamental interests of the host Member State must be weighed 
against the interests of the person in exercising their free movement rights. 113 The 
assessment may also involve a number of factors, including the nature and gravity of 
the offending activities, the time that has elapsed since that conduct, the individual’s 
behaviour during this period, and the degree of social danger caused by the presence 
of the person concerned in the host Member State.114 Moreover, the ‘fundamental 
threat’ test is forward-looking, meaning that the individual concerned shall be likely to 
repeat their conduct in future.115 Last, like in every situation falling within the scope 
of EU law, due regard must be paid to the best interests of the children involved, as 
laid down in Article 24(2) of the EUCFR.116 
As to the duration of restrictive measures taken on public policy grounds, the 
Citizenship Directive provides that the individuals affected may submit a request for 
lifting the exclusion order not earlier than three years after its adoption. In their 
application, they must demonstrate that there has been a ‘material change in 
circumstances’ which informed the original prohibition. The Member State concerned 
shall consider their request in six months time; during this period, the applicants are 
not allowed to enter its territory.117  
 
4.2 Abuse of rights  
 
Another ground for derogation from the free movement of persons is found in 
Article 35 of the Citizenship Directive which deals with the concept of abuse of rights 
or fraud. The relevant provision reads:  
 
Member States may adopt the necessary measures to refuse, terminate 
or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the case of abuse 
of rights or fraud, such as marriages of convenience. Any such measure 
shall be proportionate and subject to the procedural safeguards provided 




113 Tsakouridis (n 106), para 50; Joined Cases C-331/16 and C-366/16 K and HF 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:296, paras 62, 67. 
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115 Bouchereau (n 104), para 29; P.I (n 106), para 30; K and HF (n 113), para 56; Case C-193/16 E 
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Recital 28 of the Preamble further adds:  
 
To guard against abuse of rights or fraud, notably marriages of 
convenience or any other form of relationships contracted for the sole 
purpose of enjoying the right of free movement and residence, Member 
States should have the possibility to adopt the necessary measures. 
 
The Directive is the first legal instrument in the area of free movement of 
persons introducing this concept; the preceding legislation contained no reference to 
abuse of rights. The wording of the relevant provisions suggests that these must be 
interpreted similarly to restrictions based on public policy grounds and public security 
grounds that can be used to justify the denial of Treaty rights in exceptional cases.118 
Procedural safeguards referred to in Article 35 concern the notification of relevant 
decisions (Article 30) and access to judicial or administrative redress procedures in the 
host Member State (Article 31), both equally applicable to public policy or public 
security cases.  
Further, the word ‘may’ makes it clear that application of Article 35 is not 
mandatory and Member States enjoy discretion as to the withdrawal of the rights in 
question in proven cases of abuse or fraud.119 Although the Directive does not contain 
a definition of abuse or fraud, the specific focus on marriages of convenience 
nonetheless implies that the main area of concern is the right to family reunion with 
non-EU nationals who may obtain residency in the host Member State following 
marriage to the principal. It does not, however, follow that this is the only form of 
abuse; Article 35 and the Preamble apparently leave a possibility for other situations 
to be equally classified as such, provided that the sole purpose of such conduct is to 
enjoy free movement rights. Hence, before specifically turning to an analysis of the 
concept of marriages of convenience, it will be helpful to explore the basic principles 
of application of the concept of abuse in EU law, as well as look at how, and to what 
extent, it is applicable in family reunion cases in the context of free movement 
provisions. These issues are accordingly dealt with in Section 4.2.1 below and the first 
part of Chapter 2.  
 
 
118 Katja S Ziegler, ‘“Abuse of Law” in the Context of the Free Movement of Workers’ in Rita De la 
Feria and Stefan Vogenauer (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law?  
(Hart 2011) 295-96. This has also been implicitly acknowledged by the CJEU in Metock and Others (n 
61), paras 74, 75.  




4.2.1 Doctrine of abuse of rights in EU law 
 
At present, the concept of abuse of rights has been subject to extensive CJEU 
jurisprudence in several areas, particularly company and tax law, giving rise to 
discussion of whether it constitutes a general principle of EU law.120 The origins of the 
abuse of rights doctrine in EU law are found in the CJEU judgment in Van Binsbergen, 
delivered in the 1970s in the area of free movement of services.121 In its ruling, in 
essence, the Court granted Member States broad permission to impose anti-abusive 
measures in so-called ‘U-turn’ situations where either persons or goods move to 
another Member State, although their final destination is the home Member State.122 
Such practices are typically a consequence of more restrictive domestic regulations 
that governments apply to their own nationals or products in purely internal situations, 
a phenomenon known as ‘reverse discrimination’.123 The main aim of exercising free 
movement rights in these cases, therefore, is to avoid application of the national 
legislation of the home Member State. 
Following Van Binsbergen, the CJEU continued to apply the same approach in 
other ‘U-turn’ cases.124 The late 1990s, however, were marked by a significant change 
of the CJEU position on the issue which most notably manifested in the judgment in 
Centros,125 delivered in the field of company law. Having recalled that Member States 
are entitled to take measures to prevent abuse,126 the Court underlined that it must be 
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121 Case 33-74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 01299. 
122 For an analysis, see, Rita de la Feria, ‘Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law: The Creation of a 
New General Principle of EC Law through Tax’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 395, 399-400. 
See also Anders Kjellgren, ‘On the Border of Abuse – The Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice on Circumvention, Fraud and Other Misuses of Community Law’ (2000) 11 European Business 
Law Review 179. 
123 This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
124 See among others, Case C-148/91 Veronica [1993] ECR I-00487; Case C-23/93 TV10 [1994] ECR 
I-4795. 
125 Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459.  





established on a case-by-case basis and based on objective evidence, whereby an 
assessment of the relevant conduct must take place ‘in the light of the objectives’ of 
the EU law provisions that are sought to be relied upon.127 The CJEU then proceeded 
to conclude that the mere fact that a person intends to obtain a certain advantage by 
placing themselves within the scope of a less restrictive regulatory regime does not, in 
itself, constitute an abuse of free movement rights.128  
One of the most important limitations of the judgment in Centros was that it 
did not provide explicit criteria distinguishing use and abuse of EU law. The issue, 
nonetheless, was soon clarified in Emsland-Stärke,129 delivered in the field of free 
movement of goods, which equally dealt with a ‘U-turn’ situation. In its judgment, the 
CJEU introduced a two-limb abuse test which reads: 
 
A finding of an abuse requires, first, a combination of objective 
circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions 
laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not 
been achieved. It requires, second, a subjective element consisting in 
the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by 
creating artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it. (…) It is 
for the national court to establish the existence of those two elements, 
evidence of which must be adduced in accordance with the rules of 
national law, provided that the effectiveness of Community law is not 
thereby undermined.130 
 
The Emsland-Stärke case has been subject to an intense scholarly discussion 
that reveals two main concerns about the application of the test. The first relates to the 
element of ‘intention’, for determination of the subjective motives is a difficult task 
that would typically require interrogation of the persons concerned.131 In the 
subsequent tax law case of Halifax, the CJEU, however, objectified the subjective 
element by stating that motives can be inferred from the objective circumstances of 
the case.132 Yet, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, reliance on the objective 
circumstances to determine the purpose of marriage may equally appear problematic.  
 
127 Ibid para 25. 
128 Ibid para 27. 
129 Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke [2000] ECR I-11569. 
130 Ibid paras 52-54. 
131 For criticism of this element, see, Dennis Weber, ‘Abuse of Law –European Court of Justice, 14 
December 2000 – Case C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke’ (2004) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 43, 
51-54; Karsten Engsig Sørensen, ‘Abuse of Rights in Community Law: A Principle of Substance or 
Merely Rhetoric?’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 423, 456-58. 





Further, a distinction has been made between the concepts of ‘abuse’ and 
‘fraud’. As noted in the Introduction, the former refers to a situation where formal 
requirements for the exercise of a right have been met, but the purpose of the relevant 
conduct is considered unacceptable. The notion of fraud, by contrast, appears to be 
confined to situations where persons or legal entities concerned present false 
documentation to prove the conditions for the exercise of the relevant right have been 
fulfilled.133 Cases of fraud are, hence, relatively straightforward, as Member States 
may deny Treaty rights to those concerned without having to prove their motives. 134 
The same approach is employed in the context of the Citizenship Directive. 
Commission guidelines for the application of the Directive define abuse as:  
 
[A]n artificial conduct entered into solely with the purpose of obtaining 
the right of free movement and residence under Community law which, 
albeit formally observing of the conditions laid down by Community 
rules, does not comply with the purpose of those rules.135  
 
Fraud, on the other hand, ‘is likely to be limited to forgery of documents or false 
representation of a material fact concerning the conditions attached to the right of 
residence’, such as a false EU passport or certificate of marriage to an EU citizen.136  
Notwithstanding the development of extensive CJEU jurisprudence on the 
issue of abuse of rights, it appears that the Court has not applied this concept to all 
fundamental freedoms in the same way. Whilst acknowledging the growing relevance 
of the concept of abuse of law in other areas of EU law, academic discussion tends to 
reject its impact within the area of free movement of persons137  and EU citizenship.138 
The reason for such an assessment has been the extreme reluctance of the CJEU to 
find abuse in situations where interests of national governments have come into 
 
133 See among others, Case C-285/95 Kol [1997] ECR I-03069, paras 25, 29; C-63/99 Gloszczuk [2001] 
ECR I-06369, para 75.  
134 For a discussion on the concepts of ‘fraud’ and ‘abuse’, see, Kjellgren, ‘On the Border of Abuse’ (n 
122) 180-83; Sørensen, ‘Abuse of Rights in Community Law’ (n 131) 431-32. 
135 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’, 
COM (2009) 313 final (2009 Guidelines), 4.1.2. For an analysis of the Guidelines, see Chapter 3.  
136 Ibid, 4.1.1.  
137 See, Ziegler (n 118) 306-13; Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Comments on Abuse of Law and the Free Movement 
of Workers’ in De la Feria and Vogenauer (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of Law (n 118).  
138 See, Cathryn Costello, ‘Citizenship of the Union: Above Abuse?’ in De la Feria and Vogenauer (eds), 
Prohibition of Abuse of Law (n 118). Michael Dougan, ‘Some Comments on the Idea of a General 
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conflict with those of nationals of other Member States claiming their Treaty rights. 
The first part of Chapter 2 explores if and how the concept of abuse is addressed by 
the CJEU in family reunion cases revealing such tensions, and whether it covers other 
situations apart from perceived marriages of convenience explicitly mentioned in the 




The ability of Union citizens to live in the host Member State with their (non-
EU) family members has always been regarded by the EU legislator as a key 
precondition of intra-European movement. The rights to family reunion, already 
incorporated in EEC secondary law in the 1960s, have since been expanded in line 
with the general development and strengthening of the Treaty rights. Currently, the 
Citizenship Directive provides families involving mobile EU citizens a high level of 
protection, enabling TCN family members to enjoy virtually the same rights as the 
principal with the only condition being that the latter falls within the scope of the 
Directive. The document has further transformed the situation of non-EU family 
members who may now acquire an independent status after having lived in the host 
Member State for at least five years, as well as, in certain situations, before this date.  
 Regarding the scope of family members defined as such by the Directive, 
marriages and registered partnerships (provided that the host Member State treats the 
latter as equivalent to marriage) are privileged over unregistered relationships. Whilst 
Member States are obliged to admit spouses or registered partners of EU citizens 
without any additional requirements, the residence of the so-called ‘durable partners’ 
continues to be subject to the discretion of national governments.  
There are two types of derogations from free movement rights permitted under 
the Directive that are relied on by Member State authorities to target perceived 
marriages of convenience. The first one is the public policy provision which is relied 
on by the UK to remove mobile EU citizens allegedly involved in such arrangements 
with non-EU nationals. Whilst this point will be specifically discussed in Chapter 5, it 
should be stressed that the Directive imposes a very high threshold for the public policy 
grounds to apply. The second ground for derogation is contained in Article 35 , which 
explicitly allows Member States to exclude individuals in cases of abuse of rights, such 




by the CJEU in family reunion cases, and explores its relationship with the general 





CHAPTER 2. Right to Family Reunion as a Source of Tension 
between the EU and Member States  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Chapter 1 demonstrated that the Union legislator and the CJEU have 
continuously extended the boundaries of free movement, including the right of mobile 
EU citizens to live with their family members. EU decision-makers considered the 
absence of such a possibility would prevent Member State nationals from relocating, 
and hence impede the creation of the single market, as well as hinder EU citizen s’ 
integration into the society of the host Member State. Starting from the 1990s, 
however, this paradigm began to sharply contrast with the relevant developments in 
domestic family reunification laws in a number of Member States. Aiming to reduce 
the numbers of family migrants who could not be selected in the same way as foreign 
labour force, Member States tightened up the rules for the entry and residence of 
family members of their own nationals. This created a peculiar situation where 
individuals not covered by Treaty rights can find themselves in a discriminatory 
position compared to mobile EU citizens enjoying more generous provisions under EU 
law. 
 The gap between the two sets of rights has given rise to anxieties among several 
governments who started to complain about the growing numbers of non-EU nationals 
allegedly seeking to circumvent restrictive national immigration rules by marrying 
mobile EU citizens. Such practices are commonly designated by Member States as 
abuse of EU law and routinely linked with the discourse on marriages of convenience 
which are now viewed by policymakers as a significant problem. The tensions between 
the EU and Member States became visible in two principal settings. First, in CJEU 
case-law and, second, on the political level when Member States expressly advocated 
for the restriction of family reunion rights under the Citizenship Directive.  
 This Chapter explores whether and how the relevant concerns of Member 
States have been addressed by EU institutions. The Chapter is structured in two parts. 
The first part reveals how the tension over family reunion rights has been reflected in 
CJEU case-law. With this aim, the author identifies the main points of friction between 




concepts of abuse and marriages of convenience. The second part of the Chapter 
describes the political dialogue between the EU and a number of national governments, 
and looks at how far the Union has been prepared to go to accommodate the demands 
of Member States.  
 
2. Points of friction between the CJEU and Member States in 
family reunion cases  
 
2.1 Treating nationals worse than foreigners: The phenomenon of ‘reverse 
discrimination’ 
 
As observed in Chapter 1, the personal scope of family members eligible to 
accompany or join the EU principal in the host Member State has, from the very outset, 
included third-country nationals. At the time of adopting the first secondary law 
provisions on the issue, immigration was not perceived by Member States as a 
problem. To the contrary, Western European countries actively relied on foreign 
workers, many of whom came from their former colonies, as a means to rebuild their 
economy.139 This type of migration, however, was largely seen as a temporary solution, 
used in response to labour market needs.140 Indeed, the open-door policy proved to be 
short-lived and changed dramatically after the 1973 oil crisis, which seriously hit the 
coal and heavy industries, leading to rises in unemployment. As a response, the 
receiving countries tightened up their immigration laws, giving preference only to 
highly skilled workers, and started to promote voluntary return policies among 
migrants already present in their territory.141 
Yet contrary to Member States’ expectations, many foreign workers did not 
move back to their countries of origin. This gave rise to anti-immigrant and 
xenophobic sentiments amongst the local population, particularly those with lower 
socioeconomic status, which were further fuelled by populist media and political 
 
139 For instance, France recruited workers from Algeria; the UK recruited from the Indian Subcontinent 
and the Caribbean; the Netherlands recruited from Indonesia and the Carribean (Surinam and the 
Netherlands Antilles), as well as from Turkey and Morocco. For an overview of post-war immigration 
patterns to Western Europe, see among others, Klaus Bade, Migration in European History (Blackwell 
2003); Berneri, Family Reunification in the EU (n 80) chs 1 and 2. 
140 Berneri, Family Reunification in the EU (n 80) 30.  





narratives.142 Over the years, most of the descendants of migrants who decided to stay 
in their host country acquired its nationality, either by birth or after undergoing a 
naturalisation procedure. Having reached marriageable age, many began looking for 
spouses in countries of their parents’ birth to bring them over to their state of residence.  
Such practices became increasingly problematised by the respective Member 
States for two principal reasons. First, the governments could not select family 
migrants based on the same criteria as foreign workers; hence, family reunification 
was seen as a route enabling unwanted foreigners to enter the country. Second, 
marriages between migrants and naturalised nationals were viewed as a symptom of 
failed integration of the latter group. A particular focus was placed on forced and 
arranged marriages. These were typically seen as a product of a ‘backward’ culture, 
closely intertwined with highly gendered and racialised narratives on young, 
uneducated, and vulnerable Muslim women who would be unable to integrate , and 
therefore, become a burden on the society of the receiving state.143 In the UK, on the 
other hand, the state anxieties centred on male migrants from the Indian subcontinent 
who allegedly only intended to use marriage to a British-settled woman as means to 
gain residence rights in the country.144 As commentators reasonably argue, such 
discourses, in effect, question the membership of nationals of migrant origin, 
transforming them into second-class citizens who do not deserve to live with their 
close ones in their own country.145  
Starting from the late 1970s, Western European countries (most notably, the 
UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark) have attempted to limit the number of family 
members eligible for joining the principal. With this view, the governments made this 
right conditional upon the fulfilment of certain requirements, such as high visa and 
application fees; language and integration tests; age and income thresholds; 
cohabitation requirements, and probationary periods. Whilst their principal target 
 
142 Ibid.  
143 On this topic see among others Albert Kraler, ‘Civic Stratification, Gender and Family Migration 
Policies in Europe’ (International Centre for Migration and Policy Development 2010); Wray, 
‘Regulating Spousal Migration in Denmark’ (n 21); Bonjour and De Hart (n 20). Saskia Bonjour and 
Laura Block, ‘Ethnicizing Citizenship, Questioning Membership. Explaining the Decreasing Family 
Migration Rights of Citizens in Europe.’ (2016) 20 Citizenship Studies 779.  
144 For more details on the UK, see Chapter 5. 
145 See among others Kees Groenendijk, ‘Reverse Discrimination, Family Reunification and Union 
Citizens of Immigrant Origin’ in Elspeth Guild, Cristina Gortázar Rotaeche and Dora Kostakopoulou 






remained nationals with foreign roots marrying within their ethnic group, such policies 
equally apply to those of the majority ethnicity. As a consequence, both groups are 
effectively punished for choosing partners of undesirable origin instead of marrying a 
national of a particular country, an approach reflecting the generalised fears of the state 
that marriages with foreigners may undermine the envisioned national community.146  
Meanwhile, EU citizens exercising their free movement rights are not subject 
to any additional requirements when it comes to living with their non-EU family 
members. Yet, according to the division of competences between the EU and Member 
States, EU provisions on family reunion do not apply to Member State nationals if 
their situation is purely internal, a principle that was already confirmed by the CJEU 
in its early jurisprudence on the issue.147 This created a peculiar situation where static 
nationals of a particular Member State are treated less favourably than nationals of 
other Member States residing in the country.148 The issue has been extensively 
criticised by a number of scholars who argue that such ‘reverse discrimination’ is 
inconsistent with the logic of EU citizenship and advocate for bringing the rights of 
static EU citizens in line with those provided by the Citizenship Directive.149 Such a 
proposal was indeed put forward by the Commission in 1999 during the negotiations 
for the Family Reunification Directive but was unable to overcome opposition from 
the Netherlands, one of the countries with the most restrictive family migration 
 
146 For a general discussion on contemporary family reunification policies in Western Europe, see 
among others, Kraler (n 143); Helena Wray, Regulating Marriage Migration into the UK: A Stranger 
in the Home (Ashgate 2011); Bonjour and De Hart (n 20); Wray, ‘Regulating Spousal Migration in 
Denmark’ (n 21); Helena Wray, Agnes Agoston and Jocelyn Hutton, ‘A Family Resemblance? The 
Regulation of Marriage Migration in Europe’ (2013) 16 European Journal of Migration and Law 209; 
Laura Block, ‘Regulating Membership: Explaining Restriction and Stratification of Family Migration 
in Europe’ (2015) 36 Journal of Family Issues 1433; Laura Block, Policy Frames on Spousal Migration 
in Germany (Springer 2016).  
147 See among others, Joined Cases 35/82 and 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan [1982] ECR 03723, paras 16-
18; Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] ECR I-03171, paras 16-17.  
148 For the most recent overview of discrepancies between EU law and national family reunification 
provisions, see, Elspeth Guild, ‘EU Citizens, Foreign Family Members and European Union Law’ 
(2019) 21 European Journal of Migration and Law 358, 369-72. 
149 For this opinion, see among others, Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly 
Internal Rule: Time to Move On?’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 731; Helen Oosterom-
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The CJEU has been equally reluctant to act contrary to the will of resistant 
Member States. In its landmark ruling in Metock, delivered in 2008, it confirmed that 
any difference of treatment between mobile and static Union citizens with regards to 
conditions of entry and residence of TCN family members falls outside the scope of 
EU law.151 It must nonetheless be noted that levelling up the domestic provisions was 
not the issue at stake at the relevant proceedings. In fact, the contrary was the case: 
several national governments essentially demanded the CJEU level down the family 
reunion rights of certain groups of EU citizens, claiming that a more inclusive 
interpretation of the Citizenship Directive would result in ‘unjustified reverse 
discrimination’ of their own nationals.152 The Court, however, refused to follow the 
logic of Member States and impose obstacles, real or potential, to the free movement 
of EU citizens and their family members. 
Metock, which will be extensively discussed in the following subsections, is 
only one of the numerous cases concerning residence the rights of EU citizens’ family 
members that, over the last three decades, has been referred to the CJEU by national 
courts. Reflecting the growing gap between the two sets of rights, the CJEU activity 
in this area reached its peak in the 2000s, when several Member States further 
tightened up their domestic family reunification rules. It is no coincidence that the 
majority of such cases originate in the Netherlands and the UK – two Member States 
with substantial differences between their national family reunification policies and 
provisions applicable for mobile EU citizens.   
The following sub-sections will identify the main points of friction between the 
Court and Member States with regards to family reunion rights of EU citizens, as far 
as it is relevant to the topic of the present study. Along with exploring the  Court’s 
response to the Member State attempts to deny residence rights to EU citizens’ family 
 
150 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the right to family reunification’ COM (1999) 
638, recital 9 and art 4. For an analysis see Anne Walter, Reverse Discrimination and Family 
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Germany and Spain. See, Groenendijk, ‘Reverse Discrimination’ (n 145) 178-79. On the ruling of the 
Belgian Constitutional Court, see EMN, ‘Family reunification with Third-Country National Sponsors 
in Belgium’ (July 2017), 14-15  
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members, the author will also reveal if and how the concept of abuse of rights is 
reflected in the CJEU jurisprudence on the subject.  
 
2.2 The substance of marriage153   
 
As observed in Chapter 1, the EU has been continuously privileging married 
couples over unregistered partners, enabling mobile EU citizens to live with their TCN 
spouses without having to satisfy any additional requirements. One of the objections 
expressed by the Member States in this context concerned the retention of the right of 
residence of non-EU national spouses in cases of relationship breakdown. The issue 
was first addressed by the CJEU in its ruling in Diatta, handed down in the mid-
1980s.154 The case concerned a Senegalese spouse of a French national working in 
Germany. Having lived together for some time, the couple notified of their intention 
to divorce and moved into separate accommodations. When the Senegalese national 
applied for renewal of her residence permit, her request was declined on the basis that 
the couple no longer cohabited. The CJEU, however, preferred to adopt a formal 
approach to the issue, stating that a marital relationship is not regarded as dissolved as 
long as it has not been terminated by the competent authority and that the TCN spouse 
is not required to live together with the EU principal in order to qualify for residence 
rights.155  
Having confirmed its position in subsequent case-law,156 the Court delivered 
its judgment in Ogieriakhi where it specified that the non-EU spouse continues to 
benefit from the Treaty rights even if both spouses cohabit with other partners, as long 
as their marriage is not officially terminated.157 In other words, the CJEU jurisprudence 
shows that the TCN spouse of a Union citizen is entitled to a residence permit 
irrespective of the fact of cohabitation158 and the quality of the relationship between 
 
153 The structure of the CJEU case-law analysis in this and the subsequent sub-sections is partly 
borrowed from Elspeth Guild, ‘Free Movement of EU Citizens and Their Family Members’ (2016) 7 
New Journal of European Criminal Law 231. 
154 Case 267/83 Diatta [1985] ECR 00567. 
155 Ibid paras 20, 22.  
156 Case C-370/90 Surinder Singh [1992] ECR I-04265, para 12; Case C-40/11 Iida 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:691, para 58. 
157 Case C-244/13 Ogieriakhi ECLI:EU:C:2014:2068, para 38.  
158 There is nonetheless a requirement pursuant to the Citizenship Directive that the TCN spouse must 
be resident in the same Member State as the EU citizen, otherwise the spouse could not be regarded as 





the spouses.159 The Court’s approach is commendable, provided that many couples 
may choose to live separately for a variety of reasons, such as different job locations. 
Further, as the claimant sensibly argued in Diatta, even if the relationship between the 
spouses has deteriorated, it is not for the state authorities to decide whether 
reconciliation is still possible.160 In addition, the requirement for the spouses to live 
together would leave the TCN party unprotected and entirely dependent on their EU 
citizen partner who could cause her expulsion simply by depriving her a roof.161 
 
2.3 Returning Member State nationals 
 
Another major point of friction between the EU and Member States remains 
the position of EU citizens who return to their country of origin from another Member 
State, bringing with them their TCN family members. The first and principal ruling in 
this regard is Surinder Singh, delivered in 1992.162 The case involved an Indian 
national who got married to a British national and then travelled with her to Germany 
where both worked before returning to the UK a couple of years later. Soon after their 
return, the couple separated and started divorce proceedings. Although the marriage 
had still not been dissolved, the UK authorities considered the situation in the domestic 
context, not the EU one, issuing a deportation order against the TCN spouse because 
the couple did not live together as foreseen by national immigration law. The UK court 
sought clarification from the CJEU, essentially asking if a Member State can deny 
residence rights to the TCN spouse of its own national who moved, with that spouse, 
to another Member State, and then returned to his home country. The CJEU considered 
that such situations did indeed fall within the scope of Treaty rights. In the view of the 
Court, Member State nationals would be deterred from leaving their country of origin 
if, upon return, their family members were not also permitted to reside there under the 
same conditions as granted to them under the Treaty in another Member State.163  
The judgment was subject to two interpretations.164 According to the first one, 
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supported by most commentators165 and later apparently confirmed in subsequent 
case-law,166 the relevant intra-state movement the Court referred to was the UK 
national’s initial movement from the UK to Germany. When viewed in this context, 
the significance of the element of deterrence was called into question.167  
A number of scholars, nonetheless, opted for the second interpretation of the 
judgment, suggesting that the relevant movement the Court referred to was the one 
from Germany back to the UK. This logic was seen as more convincing. Since the 
couple was able to reside together in Germany by virtue of EU law, refusal of British 
authorities to grant Mr Singh a residence permit would indeed create an obstacle for 
his spouse to return to the UK.168 Yet, without engaging into a discussion on the real 
rationale of the court and its justifiability, it is important to underline that the CJEU 
has used a deterrence test to decide whether the TCN family members could benefit 
from Treaty rights. 
During the proceedings, the UK authorities appeared extremely reluctant to 
give up control over the admission of non-Europeans into the country. British 
representatives argued against the application of EU law to ‘returnees’, claiming that 
granting residence rights to their spouses ‘increases the risk of fraud associated with 
sham marriages’,169 irrespective of the fact that Mr Singh’s marriage was not suggested 
to be such.170 Whilst the Court rejected this argument, it nonetheless made a passing 
reference to the concept of  abuse of rights, pointing out that, in principle:  
 
the facilities created by the Treaty cannot have the effect of allowing 
the persons who benefit from them to evade the application of national 
legislation and of prohibiting Member States from taking the measures 
necessary to prevent such abuse.171 
 
 
165 See among others, Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘The scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely 
Internal Situations and Reverse Discrimination’ in  Claire Kilpatrick, Tonia Novitz and Paul Skidmore 
(eds), The Future of Remedies in Europe (Hart 2000); Nic Shuibhne (n 149) 744-48.   
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Third-Country Family Members’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 369, 379.  
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The implications of the judgment for cross-border couples cannot be 
overstated. EU citizens unable to be together with their close ones due to restrictive 
national family reunification provisions now obtained an opportunity to avoid these by 
moving to another Member State and then returning to their home country. Such 
practices, rather unsurprisingly, caused growing discontent among Member States who 
were used to treat their own nationals worse than EU citizens. A decade after the 
delivery of the ruling in Surinder Singh, the CJEU handed down its judgment in Akrich 
where the UK authorities repeatedly sought to deny residence rights to a TCN spouse 
of a British national in a ‘U-turn’ situation.172 The case involved a Moroccan national 
with a history of expulsion from the UK who clandestinely returned to the country and 
lived there undocumented before marrying a British national. Following that, he was 
detained for his irregular presence in the UK and deported, according to his wishes, to 
Ireland where his spouse had meanwhile moved. Having spent six months in Ireland, 
during which both spouses were employed, Mr Akrich applied for a UK entry visa as 
a spouse of a returning British national under the Surinder Singh rule. His application, 
however, was rejected because the couple admitted that the purpose of their relocation 
to Ireland and back was to bring themselves within the scope of EU law to be able to 
benefit from its family reunion provisions. The UK authorities considered such an 
arrangement ‘no more than a temporary absence deliberately designed to manufacture 
a right of residence for Mr Akrich’173 which, in their view, constituted an abuse of EU 
law.  
The CJEU disagreed. First, it reiterated its position in Singh that a Member 
State national may rely on EU law to claim family reunion rights upon return to his or 
her country of origin from another Member State.174 As to the concept of abuse, the 
Court stated that the motives which may have prompted the person to take up 
employment in another Member State or return to their home country are irrelevant, 
as long as the employment activity is ‘effective and genuine’ – even where the non-
EU spouse did not have residence rights in the EU citizen’s home Member State, in 
the first place.175 In the meantime, it was specified that:  
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[T]here would be an abuse if the facilities afforded by Community law 
in favour of migrant workers and their spouses were invoked in the 
context of marriages of convenience entered into in order to circumvent 
the provisions relating to entry and residence of nationals of non-
Member States.176  
 
Yet, whilst confirming that reliance on the Surinder Singh route cannot be 
considered abusive, the Court made a surprising move by introducing the so-called 
‘prior residence rule’ – a significant limitation of the EU citizens’ right to family 
reunion. The CJEU held that, to fall within the scope of EU law, the TCN spouse must 
be already ‘lawfully resident’ in the first Member State before moving with the EU 
principal to another Member State.177 In the view of the Court, EU law covered only 
freedom of movement within the Union, whereby first entry of non-EU nationals to 
their territory was to be regulated by Member State authorities. Absence of  an EU right 
to family reunion was to be considered detrimental only in cases where the TCN 
spouse had a legal right to remain in one Member State in the first place, and the move 
to another Member State would result in the loss of the opportunity to live together.  
Conversely, if the spouse of an EU citizen had no right to remain in the first 
place, their inability to benefit from EU rules in another Member State would not be 
regarded as less favourable treatment than they enjoyed before the movement. The 
same considerations were applied to returning EU citizens whose TCN spouses were 
not granted residence rights by the authorities of the host Member State.178 In essence, 
that meant that the right of EU citizens to live with their family members was made 
entirely dependent on the national immigration law in their first country of residence. 
Importantly, the implications of the ruling not only concerned returning EU citizens 
but also nationals of other Member States who met their partners already in the host 
country and wished to continue living there.179 Given that the relevant rules varied 
considerably across Member States, this created an odd situation where some couples 
did not face any particular obstacles in being together, while others were prevented 
from doing so. 
The decision in Akrich was heavily criticised. Due to procedural flaws and 
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inconsistency with prior case-law,180 Steve Peers called it ‘the worst judgment in the 
long history of the Court of Justice.’181 He also pointed out that, whilst suggesting a 
‘radical (or rather, reactionary)’ re-interpretation of the scope of Treaty rights without 
adequate clarification, the decision was fundamentally unclear in its scope.182 In two 
subsequent judgements, Jia183 and Eind,184 the Court, however, attempted to clarify 
and limit its decision in Akrich, before ultimately overturning it in Metock. In the latter 
case, which is discussed in detail in Section 2.4, the CJEU held that the right to family 
reunion under the Citizenship Directive could be enjoyed by mobile EU citizens 
irrespective of the prior residence status of the TCN spouse. As will be shown in 
Chapter 2, the ruling caused an outcry in several Member States; one of their main 
objections was the loss of control over their own nationals who bring their spouses 
back into the home country after having spent a very short time in another Member 
State.  
The question about the duration of stay in another country, after which one 
could rely on the Citizenship Directive when moving home, was ultimately clarified 
six years later in O and B.185 In that case, the CJEU linked the possibility to rely on 
EU law with the condition of ‘sufficiently genuine’ residence in the host Member State 
that would enable the citizen ‘to create or strengthen family life’.186 In the view of the 
CJEU, this requirement could only be fulfilled where the EU citizen settles in the home 
Member State under Article 7(1) of the Citizenship Directive. Tourists and other short-
term visitors relying on Article 6(1), accordingly, were not deemed to be discouraged 
from moving to the host Member State if their TCN spouses were not granted the right 
of residence after returning home.187 Whilst this reasoning has been subject to diverse 
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views and interpretations,188 it is another point that bears particular relevance to the 
present research. Having set out the principles for the operation of the Surinder Singh 
route, the Court recalled that ‘the scope of Union law cannot be extended to cover 
abuses’ and described the two-stage abuse test by explicit reference to 
Emsland-Stärke.189 In spite of making this statement, the Court, however, appeared 
reluctant to apply the concept of abuse to the issue at stake, choosing to impose a 
general condition for family reunion under EU law instead. If the latter is not fulfilled, 
the situation concerned would simply fall outside the scope of the Directive, making 
the concept of abuse inapplicable in principle. 
 
2.4 EU citizens forming families in the host Member State 
 
An interrelated issue giving rise to Member States’ migration-related anxieties 
is the position of nationals of other Member States who meet their future spouses when 
they are already in the host country. As will be demonstrated throughout this study, it 
is exactly this group that is typically associated with abuse of EU law via marriages of 
convenience, particularly where the TCN family members are overstayers or 
unauthorised migrants who can regularise their status by marrying an EU citizen.  
Early CJEU case-law on TCN family members of mobile EU citizens neither 
dealt with the question of in which (home or host) Member State family was formed, 
nor considered the immigration status of TCN family members prior to the acquisition 
of residency based on free movement provisions. In MRAX case,190 delivered in 2002, 
a Belgian court asked the CJEU whether national authorities could deny residence 
rights to TCN spouses of mobile EU citizens if the former arrived at the border without 
a valid identity document or visa, or were already irregularly present in the country, 
and ask them to acquire national visas first. The Court answered the question in the 
negative. Relying on the literal interpretation of the relevant secondary law, it 
confirmed that the right of mobile EU citizens to live with their spouses is derived 
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from a marital relationship alone.191 Consequently, Member States are obliged to grant 
TCN spouses the right of entry and residence without any additional formalities, 
provided that they can prove their identity and marriage to an EU citizen.192 
Rather surprisingly, the decision in MRAX was completely ignored in Akrich, 
where the CJEU imposed the controversial ‘prior lawful residence’ requirement on 
TCN family members. As noted above, the rule was denounced by the landmark 
judgment in Metock, handed down in 2008. The case was referred to the CJEU by the 
Irish High Court, which was hearing four appeals against the denial of residence rights 
to non-EU spouses of mobile EU citizens. Following the decision in Akrich, Ireland, 
along with ten other Member States, had linked the right of residence of non-EU family 
members to a prior lawful immigration status in a Member State.193 The particular case 
concerned four couples, all involving unsuccessful male asylum-seekers married to 
British, German, and Polish nationals working in Ireland. Their applications for 
residence cards were refused because they did not satisfy the condition of prior lawful 
residence in another Member State.  
The case was decided under an accelerated procedure given the uncertainty 
over the validity of the Irish law preventing the couples from leading  normal family 
lives. During the proceedings, the Irish authorities argued in favour of the principle 
imposed in Akrich. In their view, there was a division of competences between the 
Member States and the EU, under which the former have control over the admission 
of non-EU nationals upon their first entry into the EU, whereas the latter regulates the 
further movement of TCN family members within its territory.194  
In the first question, the Court was asked to rule on the legality of the prior 
lawful residence requirement. In its reply, the CJEU stated that the ruling in Akrich 
needed to be reconsidered,195 noting that ‘if Union citizens were not allowed to lead a 
normal family life in the host Member State, the exercise of the freedoms they are 
guaranteed by the Treaty would be seriously obstructed’.196 The Court then went on to 
argue that the refusal of the host Member State to grant family reunion rights to EU 
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citizens would discourage them from exercising their free movement rights, even if 
their family members did not already have regular residence status in another Member 
State.197 Conversely, if Member States retained exclusive competence upon granting 
residence rights to family members who did not satisfy the prior lawful residence 
condition, the freedom of movement of EU citizens would vary from one Member 
State to another, according to the national family reunification provisions. In the view 
of the Court, this would not be compatible with the objective of establishing the 
internal market, which implies the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of 
persons.198  
Second, the CJEU was asked to clarify whether a TCN spouse can enjoy the 
right of residence if their marriage to an EU citizen has already taken place in the host 
Member State. The CJEU answered this question in the affirmative, confirming that 
this right was provided through EU law, ‘irrespective of when and where their marriage 
took place and of how the national of a non-member country entered the host Member 
State’.199 The Court reasonably argued that the refusal of the state to grant residence 
rights to the EU citizen’s new spouse would discourage the EU citizen ‘from 
continuing to reside there and encourage him to leave in order to be able to lead a 
family life in another Member State or in a non-member country’.200 Further, similarly 
to its previous case-law in this area, the CJEU acknowledged that Member States may, 
in principle, derogate from provisions of the Directive in cases of abuse of rights,201 
yet did not even consider the applicability of Article 35 to the situation at stake.  
Although the judgment in Metock, in fact, merely restored the previous status 
quo established in MRAX, it caused considerable controversy in several Member 
States. As will be shown in the second part of this Chapter, it was exactly at this point 
that fears about perceived marriages of convenience involving mobile EU citizens 
escalated to an unprecedented level, ultimately resulting in the adoption of new EU-
level measures aiming to calm the worries of national authorities. In this context, it is 
remarkable that, as expressly admitted by the Irish government, none of the marriages 
discussed in Metock were found to be ones of convenience.202 
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2.5 Visas for non-EU family members travelling to the UK  
 
The issue of excessive visa requirements re-emerged before the CJEU a few 
years later, this time with respect to TCN family members who already hold residence 
cards issued by another Member State. In the McCarthy case,203 a Colombian spouse 
of a dual British and Irish national living in Spain challenged British rules requiring 
all TCN family members of mobile EU citizens to acquire entry visas before visiting 
the UK. In order to justify these measures, the British authorities claimed that there 
was a risk of systemic abuse of rights and fraud by ‘those engaged in the “business of 
sham marriages”’ who would use falsified residence cards to gain access to the UK. 204  
Having found that the wording of the Citizenship Directive exempts residence 
card holders from the visa requirement,205 the CJEU proceeded to discuss the 
applicability of Article 35 to the present case. The Court, first, observed that 
examination of the potential abuse must be based on the two-stage test established in 
Emsland-Stärke206 and carried out on a case-by-case basis, assessing the specific 
conduct of the individual concerned.207 By contrast, the requirement to obtain UK visas 
could be regarded as an automatic measure of general prevention targeting all TCN 
family members of EU citizens, irrespective of whether their residence cards were 
authentic or not.208 The court concluded that this norm, in effect, would obstruct the 
free movement rights of EU citizens and their family members, and therefore had to 
be abolished.209  
 
2.6 Family reunion cases outside the scope of the Citizenship Directive 
 
Tensions between CJEU and Member States have also been observed in cases 
which, for some reason, are not covered by the Citizenship Directive. One category of 
persons falling outside its scope is third-country nationals who have no EU citizen 
family members. Apart from national immigration provisions, their position may be 
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covered by EU immigration and asylum law, which is of limited interest to the present 
study. In the meantime, non-EU nationals who do have EU citizen family members 
may not benefit from the Directive in two cases: either because they find themselves 
in purely internal situations, or, less often, because, even if there is a cross-border 
element in their circumstances, it is not sufficient to trigger the application of the 
Directive. 
 
2.6.1 Different forms of free movement 
 
The first group of persons who do not qualify as beneficiaries of the Directive 
are those whose situations are not precisely addressed by its provisions yet do include 
a cross-border element. Apart from the ‘returnees’, the CJEU has identified two more 
subcategories of such individuals: family members of EU citizens who work in more 
than one Member State (commonly referred to as ‘Carpenter cases’) and family 
members of an EU citizen child who is exercising rights pursuant to the Directive in a 
host Member State (referred to as ‘Chen cases’). 
In Carpenter,210 a British national residing in the UK was providing services 
to persons established in other Member States where he frequently travelled for the 
purpose of his business. When his Filipino wife applied for leave to remain in the UK 
as the spouse of a British national, the Home Office rejected her application because 
she had previously overstayed her visitor visa, and signalled an intention to deport her. 
In her appeal, Ms Carpenter argued that her situation fell within the scope of the Treaty 
rights, as her husband could more easily travel abroad while she was looking after his 
children from his first marriage. She accordingly claimed that her deportation would 
interfere with her husband’s right to provide services. 
 First, the Court noted that the relevant secondary legislation (namely, Directive 
73/148/EEC in force at the time) did not apply in this case, since the EU citizen’s 
spouse physically remained in the Member State of his nationality.211 It was 
nonetheless found that this situation could still trigger the application of Treaty 
provisions on the free movement of services. Having underlined the importance of 
protection of the family life of EU citizens to enable them to exercise their Treaty 
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rights, the Court concluded, by reference to Singh, that ‘the separation of Mr and Mrs 
Carpenter would be detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the conditions 
under which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom’.212 Further, it noted that 
any national public interest measures that may hinder the exercise of Treaty rights had 
to comply with the fundamental rights observed by the EU, in this particular case the 
right to respect for family life protected under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court 
consequently considered that the decision to deport Ms Carpenter would be 
disproportionate, given that breach of national immigration rules was the only 
complaint related to her conduct.213  
Along with the ruling in MRAX explored above, the Court’s judgment in 
Carpenter contrasts strikingly with Akrich which was handed down only a year later. 
In Carpenter, the Court not only extended application of the deterrence test to 
situations involving a very limited element of physical movement, but also did not 
consider it necessary to substantiate its claim that expulsion of his TCN spouse could 
deter the EU citizen concerned from providing services in other Member States. 
Without going into much detail, the Court merely emphasised the link between the 
right to enjoy the freedom of movement and the right to family life, leaving the scope 
of the judgment rather uncertain.214 
The issue was given more clarity in a similar case of S and G,215 which dealt 
with family members of two Dutch nationals who resided in the Netherlands but who 
travelled regularly to other Member States for work. The first wished to secure 
residence for his Ukrainian mother-in-law who took care of his son in his absence, 
whilst the second claimed family rights for his Peruvian spouse with whom they had 
two children together. The Court found that the Court’s interpretation of the Treaty 
provisions on the freedom to provide services in Carpenter could, by analogy, be 
equally applied to the freedom of movement of workers.216 The CJEU, nonetheless, 
did not precisely follow its reasoning in Carpenter, concluding that it would be up to 
the national court to determine whether the refusal to grant TCN family members a 
derived right to reside would deter the EU citizen from exercising their fundamental 
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rights.217 Further, whilst in Carpenter, the role of family members as child-carers was 
not given any consideration, at all, in S and G the Court found that this was a ‘relevant 
factor to be taken into account’.218 Some scholars saw this as a substantial change of 
the approach established in Carpenter. For instance, Eleanor Spaventa argues that in 
Carpenter, the Court regarded the protection of the EU citizen’s family as ‘a value in 
itself (and the lack thereof could be construed as a barrier to movement) and no longer 
merely instrumental to the achievement of internal market objectives’.219 By contrast, 
in S and G, it was considered that a mere fact of interference with the EU citizen’s 
family life was insufficient to constitute an obstacle to free movement. In the 
application of the deterrence test, the Court now focused on the extent to which the 
relevant national measures could obstruct someone’s exercise of their Treaty rights, 
with factors such as childcaring playing a crucial role in the assessment. In the opinion 
of Spaventa, such an approach ‘restates the centrality of the market citizen whose non-
market rights are protected only insofar as they facilitate her economic activity’. 220 
Indeed, it is remarkable that in S and G, Article 8 of the ECHR was not mentioned at 
all.   
Another contentious issue in this area relates to non-EU nationals deliberately 
giving birth in the particular Member State to enable the child to acquire its nationality. 
The key judgment illustrating this type of anxiety is Chen, which concerned a Chinese 
national who temporarily moved to Northern Ireland to give birth.221 Similarly to 
applicants in Akrich, she expressly admitted that the purpose of such an arrangement 
was to ensure that her child would obtain Irish nationality on the basis of the jus soli 
principle which was in force in Ireland at the time. This, in turn, was expected to enable 
the mother to acquire the derived right of residence in the UK, where she intended to 
live. The Court first found that, as a Union citizen, the child was entitled to enjoy the 
right to free movement and residence protected by the Treaty, and the fact that she was 
born in the host Member State could not, ‘for that reason alone, be assimilated to a 
purely internal situation’.222 As she satisfied the self-sufficiency requirement 
(resources were provided by her TCN mother), she was also regarded as a beneficiary 
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of Directive 90/364 (now, by analogy, Article 7(1)(b) of the Citizenship Directive).223 
The mother, on the other hand, was not dependent on her EU citizen child and, 
therefore, did not fall within the scope of direct family members listed in the 
Directive.224 The Court nonetheless held that she was still entitled to the right to reside 
with her child in the host Member State since a refusal to allow a TCN parent to do so 
‘would deprive the child’s right of residence of any useful effect’.225  
Further, the UK government objected that provisions of EU law were not 
applicable in the situation at stake because the Chinese national mother’s conduct 
constituted ‘an attempt improperly to exploit’ Treaty rights which, from the British 
perspective, fit the notion of abuse described in Centros.226 The Court rejected this 
argument. Although in this particular case, the Irish nationality of the child was sought 
to be merely used as an instrument to secure residence rights under EU law, it was 
reiterated that acquisition of nationality fell within the competence of a particular 
Member State, and that other Member States were obliged to recognise it without any 
further conditions.227  
 
2.6.2 Static EU citizens  
 
 Although situations having no cross-border element at all will typically be 
entirely covered by national law, the CJEU has recognised some of them as falling 
within the scope of Treaty provisions on EU citizenship. This is viewed with  unease 
by Member States who often perceive it as an intrusion into the sensitive area of their 
competence.  
The key judgement giving rise to Member State anxieties in this context is Ruiz 
Zambrano.228 The case concerned Mr Ruiz Zambrano, who, together with his spouse 
and child, arrived from Colombia and applied for asylum in Belgium. Their 
applications were refused, but they were allowed to temporarily remain in the country 
based on a non-refoulement clause. In the following years, Ms Ruiz Zambrano gave 
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birth to two more children who acquired Belgian nationality since they were not 
registered at the Colombian consulate in Belgium. After unsuccessful attempts to rely 
on national law to take up residence in Belgium as their parents, Mr Ruiz Zambrano 
argued that he enjoyed the derived right of residence under the Citizenship Directive. 
The case was referred to the CJEU for clarification. 
The CJEU first found that the situation at stake did not fall within the scope of 
the Citizenship Directive, since the EU citizen children resided in the Member State 
of their nationality and had never moved outside it.229 Yet, the Court then proceeded 
to acknowledge the fundamental status of EU citizenship, stating that ‘Article 20 
TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the 
Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of 
their status as citizens of the Union’.230 In the Court’s view, this is precisely what would 
happen if Member State authorities denied residence to parents of dependent minor 
children who are static nationals of a particular Member State. Since such a refusal 
would force the TCN parents to leave the Union together with their children, it would 
preclude the latter from exercising their rights derived from EU citizenship.231 In other 
words, that would mean that situations where a Member State national risks losing 
their core EU citizenship rights would fall within the scope of EU law, regardless of 
whether they are purely internal or not.  
The Court’s reasoning and possible implications of the judgment gave rise to 
much controversy, not least due to the lack of clarity in its scope and possible 
implications.232 In its follow-up jurisprudence, the Court, however, confined the 
ratione personae of the Zambrano rule to exceptional cases. The key requirement in 
this context is the relationship of legal, financial or emotional dependency between the 
third-country national and the EU citizen concerned. Although it may not necessarily 
be limited to the one between a TCN parent and an EU citizen child, and may also 
include spouses,233 the dependency threshold is high; a mere desire of a Union citizen 
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alone, for economic or other reasons, to preserve the family unit in the EU territory 
would not be sufficient.234 Further, this criterion would apply only to situations where 
the EU citizen concerned would be forced to leave not only the Member State of their 
own nationality but the territory of the Union as a whole.235  
 
2.7 Marriages of convenience as the only form of abuse of rights? 
 
As has been shown in the sections above, the CJEU has, in principle, confirmed 
the applicability of the concept of abuse to family reunion cases. Nonetheless, like in 
other relevant rulings in the area of free movement of persons, it consistently refused 
to give it effect. The Court’s extreme reluctance to find abuse in this field has been 
explained by some commentators by its different approaches to economic transactions 
and human beings where the latter are considered to have ‘a higher moral value’.236 
Further, as AG Geelhoed convincingly argued in Akrich, establishing the subjective 
purpose of enjoying the freedom of movement may prove nearly impossible, given 
that an EU citizen ‘may have all kinds of reasons for installing himself in another 
Member State’.237 AG also noted that the explicit admission of the motives by the 
individuals concerned in Akrich was rather exceptional; it could thus be assumed that 
in other cases the motives may be subject to manipulation.238 Others, in the meantime, 
have been more critical of the Court’s position, suggesting, for ins tance, that the 
situation described in Chen obviously contains an artificial element which would have 
deserved a more detailed assessment.239  
Irrespective of the rationale of the CJEU approach, it follows that the scope of 
abuse in family reunion cases is de facto confined to marriages (or, by analogy, 
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registered partnerships)240 of convenience. As the CJEU has consistently held, the 
finding of this type of abuse falls within the competence of Member States and must 
be based on an individual examination of the particular case. The CJEU, however, was 
never asked to elaborate on the substance of the concept of marriages of convenience, 
or rule on the compatibility of specific aspects of the examination with EU law. This 
is unsurprising, provided that none of the cases discussed above involved an alleged 
marriage of convenience; moreover, in several judgments, it was explicitly noted that 
none of the marriages concerned was considered as such.241  
In light of the consistent refusal of the Court to find abuse in the area of free 
movement of persons, the decision to single out marriages of convenience from the 
general rule inevitably invites a further question – namely, why this type of conduct is 
treated so remarkably different from other similar arrangements, most notably the one 
discussed in Chen.  
To begin with, it is worth exploring whether the concept of marriages of 
convenience satisfies the general two-stage test of abuse, established in 
Emsland-Stärke.242 The first element of the test requires proving that, despite formal 
compliance with the relevant conditions, the purpose of the rules concerned has not 
been achieved. As observed above, the underlying aim of the right to family reunion 
granted to mobile EU citizens is to enable them to enjoy family life. Where a marriage 
is a purely formal arrangement which has never had any substance but an immigration 
motive, the intended purpose is not achieved. The second element of the abuse test 
refers to the subjective intention to obtain advantage from EU law by artificially 
creating the necessary conditions. Although there are a great variety of motives for 
getting married,243 one of them – obtaining an immigration advantage – is not accepted 
for the purposes of the Citizenship Directive, provided that this is the only reason for 
marriage and the couple does not intend to lead a family life. Whilst the subjective 
intention is difficult to prove, it is considered an inherent part of the concept of 
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marriages of convenience; therefore, the second element of the Emsland-Stärke test is, 
at least formally, equally met.  
Irrespective of this finding, marriages of convenience as a form of abuse do not 
sit particularly well with the CJEU approach to the relevant nationality cases, such as 
Chen. First, it must be noted that both areas concerned – i.e., the conditions of entry 
into marriage and acquisition of nationality, respectively – are regulated exclusively 
by Member States.244 However, whilst marriages contracted for the ‘wrong’ purpose 
are considered abusive, Member States are obliged to automatically recognise each 
other’s nationalities. The purpose of its acquisition is consequently deemed irrelevant; 
there is no concept of a ‘nationality of convenience’ even where, as in Chen, the bond 
with the state of nationality is a pure formality, and the nationality was acquired only 
to enable the individual concerned to benefit from the Treaty rights.245 The author 
agrees that making acceptance of the nationality conditional upon the existence of a 
‘close’ or ‘genuine’ link with the relevant state would undermine legal certainty of 
nationality regimes, which would adversely impact the position of the individuals 
involved. For instance, Cathryn Costello argues that in this case ‘[a]ll designations of 
nationality at birth had to predict a child’s life course and where she will develop 
genuine links’.246 Notwithstanding that, given the parallels between the concepts of 
nationality and marriage, the decision to single out marriages of convenience as the 
only form of abuse would arguably need further justification, both by the EU legislator 
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3. After Metock: Marriages of convenience as an apple of 
discord between the EU and Member States  
 
3.1 All you need is love? The controversial notion of marriages of 
convenience 
 
As mentioned above, it was the CJEU judgment in Metock in 2008 that marked 
the turning point in bringing unprecedented attention to the perceived marriages of 
convenience in the context of EU free movement rights. Yet, before the author 
proceeds describing the political tensions over the issue between the EU and Member 
States, it will be helpful to provide a brief insight into the controversy surrounding the 
normative distinction between ‘genuine’ marriages and those of convenience.  
Unlike the concept of abuse in EU law, the notion of marriages of convenience 
had first developed in Member States’ national laws before finding its way in the EU 
instruments. In the contemporary Western European context, the fight against 
marriages for residence purposes began to intensify after the introduction of 
restrictions on labour migration in the 1970s and further expanded alongside the 
tightening of domestic family reunification provisions in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Controls of marriages between nationals (or residents) and foreigners consequently 
became an intrinsic part of migration policies in the majority of Western European 
states, most notably the UK,247 Denmark,248 Germany,249 Austria,250 the 
Netherlands,251 Belgium,252 and Norway.253  
At the same time, it must be noted that marriages for residence purposes are 
not the only instance where marriages may be deemed to be contracted, either entirely 
or partly, for rational reasons. Such arrangements may equally find place in other areas 
of national law, such as tax, social security, welfare or pension law. 254 As Kerry 
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Abrams explains, for lawmakers, marriage serves as a proxy for a committed, long-
term, and possible economic dependency relationship that makes the parties worthy of 
receiving the benefit, such as tax advantages. However, the legally valid marriage 
alone is not always deemed sufficient for this. Whether authorities will subject 
marriages to further (functional) tests, largely depends on their perception of the risk 
that the party(ies) will use the marriage instrumentally in order to obtain the benefit, 
as well as the harm this would potentially cause the state.255  
Indeed, it is possible that good friends living in a shared flat may decide to 
marry solely to obtain tax advantages, without any intention of founding a family. The 
government, however, may believe that the number of such couples is unsubstantial 
because of the low value of benefit compared with the legal obligations arising from 
marriage (e.g., liability to spouse’s debts, obligation to support the spouse, equitable 
distribution of property in case of divorce.). In addition, the parties continue to receive 
the benefit only as long as they stay married. It is therefore unlikely that the state will 
spend significant resources to investigate the purpose of the marriage, particularly 
given the general nature of the respective benefit in question.  
By contrast, a marriage between a third-country national and a national or a 
permanent resident would provide the former with an opportunity to obtain an 
immigration advantage. This type of benefit is often considered substantial enough to 
subject the spouses to further (e.g., income) requirements and/or functional tests – 
especially in light of the political importance of immigration control where marriages 
of convenience are perceived as a brutal invasion of the polity by new members who 
would not otherwise be accepted there.256 The fact that the TCN party would later be 
able to obtain an independent residence permit serves as a further justification for 
subjecting marriages to additional scrutiny. Furthermore, in comparison with the 
previous group, this category is much more limited, which makes it easier to target 
‘suspicious’ cases.  
Scholars from various disciplines have argued that the normative distinction 
between ‘genuine’ marriages and those of convenience is deeply problematic, 
particularly in light of the great variety of global relationship patterns. When 
exercising control practices, national authorities tend to impose onto couples their own 
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value judgments of how a ‘real’ marriage should look like, a process that Helena Wray 
designates as ‘moral gate-keeping’.257 By doing so, governments risk targeting not 
only artificial arrangements that have no other substance apart from an immigration 
motive, but also marriages which do not entirely fit their subjective perceptions, 
leading to significant intrusion into the couples’ family life.258 Further, the assessment 
of a marriage is commonly based on the simplistic juxtaposition between ‘pure’ 
marriages based on the Western ideal of romantic love and those contracted for 
‘ulterior’ reasons, such as social or financial gain via immigration. In reality, however, 
the two sets of motives can hardly be separated. As Katharine Charsley and Michaela 
Benson underline, the reasons for marriage-related migration may include ‘love, 
genuine affection, family unity, property, status, economic and financial 
considerations, stability (including for children), and future security, and are often 
difficult to disentangle from one another’.259 Due to global inequality, the migration 
status of the potential spouse may make them appear more attractive, but this does not 
mean that such couples do not wish to create a family. In the words of Helena Wray, 
‘[m]arriage to secure the ability to move is no more morally reprehensible and no more 
sham than aspiring to social advancement through marriage within a state’.260 
 
3.2 The judgment in Metock: Opening a Pandora’s box 
 
The issue of marriages of convenience found its way in EU law in the 1990s, 
although not in the context of free movement rights. The first attempt to consolidate 
policies specifically targeted at the phenomenon was made in 1993 with the adoption 
of a non-binding Resolution on the harmonisation of national policies on family 
reunification. The document contained a provision stating that Member States may 
refuse admission of TCN spouses if the marriage concerned was found to be 
‘contracted solely or principally for the purpose of enabling the spouse to enter and 
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take up residence in a Member State’.261 The Resolution, nonetheless, only applied to 
non-EU nationals already legally resident in a Member State who wished to be reunited 
with their TCN family members. It later transformed into the binding Family 
Reunification Directive, which is of limited interest to the present study.   
The next EU soft-law document dealing with marriages of convenience was 
adopted a few years later. In December 1997, the Council agreed on a Resolution on 
measures specifically targeting marriages of convenience262 in light of the need to 
‘adopt equivalent measures to combat the phenomenon’.263 The proposal for the 
document, brought up by the Luxembourg presidency, was seemingly initiated by the 
UK which abolished its ‘primary purpose rule’ in the same year.264 The document 
narrows down the definition provided in the 1993 Resolution, stating that a marriage 
of convenience is: 
  
[A] marriage concluded between a national of a Member State or a 
third-country national legally resident in a Member State and a third-
country national, with the sole aim of circumventing the rules on entry 
and residence of third-country nationals and obtaining for the third-




The 1997 Resolution also lists several hints indicating that this might be the 
case. The wording of the document suggests that it was not intended to apply to mobile 
EU citizens before 2004 when the concept of marriages of convenience was introduced 
in the Citizenship Directive. Such an interpretation would, in any event, be ultra 
vires.266 Although the notion did finally appear in the area of free movement law, the 
debate on the Article 35 was not as intense as the parallel discussion on the provisions 
concerning marriages of convenience in the Family Reunification Directive, which 
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was adopted one year before the Citizenship Directive.267 It is therefore apparent that 
during the negotiations, concerns about marriages of convenience primarily focused 
on the spouses of legally resident third-country nationals, rather than to those of EU 
citizens.  
The issue did not seem to gain much prominence on EU public and political 
agendas up until the delivery of the CJEU judgment in Metock. The decision caused 
unprecedented controversy in several Member States who appeared extremely 
reluctant to revoke the ‘prior lawful residence rule’. By July 2008 , when Metock was 
handed down, the rule had already been implemented in eleven Member States, either 
through a hard law instrument268 or administrative guidelines.269 The strongest 
opposition came from Denmark which claimed that the decision allowed foreigners to 
sidestep the country’s immigration law. At the JHA Council meeting in September 
2008, the Danish minister, supported by colleagues from Ireland, Germany, Austria 
and Cyprus, called the Commission to propose amendments to the Citizenship 
Directive. Some other Member States, such as the UK and the Netherlands, also 
strongly criticised the judgment but did not expressly ask for the Directive to be 
revised.270  
The Member State concerns over the impact of Metock focused on two different 
scenarios. The first was the Surinder Singh route which, as some governments feared, 
could be used by their own nationals to circumvent restrictive domestic family 
reunification rules. The second reason for objections related to third-country nationals, 
who could now automatically regularise their position by marrying a mobile EU citizen 
residing in the host Member State. Such marriages were now increasingly perceived 
as abusive, contracted solely to enable the non-EU national party to stay in the EU.  
The underlying reason why the anxieties of the Member States intensified so 
rapidly after Metock is found in the relevant developments in their own immigration 
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laws. As noted in Sections 2.1 and 3.1, in the early and mid-2000s, several Western 
European countries tightened up their national family reunification provisions and 
introduced new sanctions for those allegedly participating in marriages of 
convenience. In Denmark, the strongest opponent of the Metock, power was taken by 
the centre-right minority government which depended on the support of the right-wing 
Danish People’s Party who required them to accept some of their demands in 
exchange. This inter alia contributed to making Danish national family reunification 
policy one of the most restrictive in Europe.271 The judgment in Metock exempted non-
EU spouses of mobile EU citizens from domestic rules. This made the then Danish 
integration minister, Birthe Rønn Hornbech, argue that the ruling opened ‘the way for 
wide-scale approval of illegal immigration’ through marriages of convenience, whilst 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the country’s prime minister at the time, described it as  a 
‘hijacking’ of national immigration law.272 The Danish concerns about the potential 
growth of marriages of convenience, however, appeared to be unfounded; the 
country’s authorities presented no evidence suggesting this might be the case.  
Ireland was another Member State that was worried about an increase in the 
numbers of irregular or short-term migrants who could then try to regularise their 
situation by marrying an EU citizen. However, it was not able to provide reliable 
statistics on detected marriages of convenience, presenting figures on ‘suspicious-
looking’ applications instead. Just before the September JHA Council, the 
Commission set up a FREEMO expert group to encourage dialogue between Member 
State officials and the Commission on issues related to the application of the 
Citizenship Directive. During its first meeting, the Irish representatives informed that 
in the years before the judgment in Metock, 4,600 non-EU family members had 
claimed residence rights in the country under the Directive, of whom 2,000 had not 
met the ‘prior lawful residence’ requirement. It was further underlined that 18% of the 
applicants were asylum-seekers who had married ‘when their residence was in 
jeopardy’, with ‘disproportionate numbers’ of Nigerian nationals. Another group of 
spouses portrayed as suspicious were Pakistani students who had overstayed their 
visas. It was also stressed that around 10% of all EU citizen spouses were Latvian, half 
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of whom had married Indian or Pakistani nationals.273 The UK also raised concerns 
about this form of abuse, claiming at the Council that the judgment in Metock ‘could 
have implications for efforts to tackle false marriages’.274  
In the meantime, some other Member States indicated that the phenomenon of 
marriages of convenience was very rare there, whilst Swedish authorities argued that 
the requirement of prior lawful residence was not an appropriate tool to fight irregular 
migration.275 At the September JHA Council, the then presiding Member State, France, 
equally opposed the Denmark-led initiative to amend the Citizenship Directive. The 
Commission tried to calm the tensions down and win time by announcing its intention 
to present a report evaluating the transposition of the Directive and then, if necessary, 
draw up guidelines on combatting abuse.276  
In its report, published in December 2008, the Commission was extremely 
critical of national transposition measures, describing them as ‘rather disappointing’ 
and underlining that ‘[n]ot one Article of the Directive has been transposed effectively 
and correctly by all Member States’.277 This particularly concerned Chapter VI (on the 
restriction of rights on the grounds of public policy or public security) and Article 35. 
The Commission, however, did not consider it necessary to reopen the Directive and 
recalled that Article 35 already provided Member States with a possibility to prevent 
abuse. At the end, it was announced that Member States would be provided with 
guidelines on problematic issues,278 an intention that was ultimately welcomed by the 
Council279 and the European Parliament.280 The guidelines, which contained a separate 
section on abuse of rights (and also briefly referred to marriages of convenience), were 
subsequently issued in June 2009.281  
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3.3 Exploitation of the vulnerable? EU-8 nationals in focus 
 
The adoption of the Commission guidelines, nonetheless, did not reduce 
Member State anxieties with regards to perceived marriages of convenience, with the 
UK and Ireland continuing to voice the strongest concerns about the issue. 282 
Throughout the following years, couples involving nationals of EU-8 Member States 
and migrants from West Africa and the Indian Subcontinent remained the principal 
group strongly associated with abuse. At the EU level, concerns about this form of 
abuse remained on the agenda and have been expressed inter alia during the 
subsequent FREEMO group meetings,283 within the framework of a European 
Migration Network (EMN) country study published in 2012,284 as well as at JHA 
Council meetings.285 The Irish and UK authorities regularly complained that since the 
judgment in Metock, there had been a ‘highly unusual’ trend of  nationals from the 
Indian sub-continent marrying nationals of Eastern European Member States. 
The bias against such pairings was further reinforced by the widespread 
narratives of vulnerable Eastern European women being exploited by individual 
‘fixers’ or organised crime gangs who bring them to Ireland or the UK with a view of 
arranging marriages of convenience for financial gain. This discourse was backed up 
by the often sensationalist media reports exposing ‘the world of fake marriages’, 
operated by ruthless criminals taking advantage of poor and vulnerable Eastern 
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European women.286 In addition, governments of several EU-8 Member States 
regularly voiced serious concerns about their nationals tricked into such arrangements 
and called on receiving countries to intensify their efforts to tackle marriages of 
convenience. The perceived link between marriages of convenience and human 
trafficking became the focus of a transnational study, co-funded by the EU programme 
‘Prevention of and Fight against Crime’ (ISEC) and published by the Helsinki-based 
European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United 
Nations (HEUNI).e.287 Its findings were presented in 2016 and covered the relevant 
developments in five Member States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Ireland, 
with the first four identified as countries of origin and Ireland as a destination country. 
Although the UK was equally described as a destination country, it did not partake in 
the project. The main information sources featured in the study are NGOs providing 
assistance to victims of human trafficking and exploitation, the Latvian embassy to 
Ireland, and the police.  
According to the report, the women involved in perceived marriages of 
convenience were targeted by ‘fixers’ either online or via personal connections. Many 
of them were young, had little education, very low incomes, and little or no English 
skills. Some had learning disabilities. In the beginning, the study introduces the term 
‘exploitative sham marriage’, intended to be approached from a sociological, rather 
than a legal perspective. The notion is referred to a broad range of situations, including 
both cases with clear elements of human trafficking (e.g., when women are initially 
unaware of any marriage arrangements and approached with a promise of a job abroad, 
or where women are forced into marriage),288 and cases which cannot be identified as 
trafficking but involve ‘exploitative elements’.289 For instance, the study describes 
anecdotal cases where women initially consented to the marriage, but later the 
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promised financial reward was not paid, or they were physically, emotionally or 
sexually abused by their non-EU national husbands.290 Further, a significant emphasis 
is placed on so-called ‘unilateral sham marriages’ where ‘the victim is misled by the 
illusion of a genuine relationship’.291 The report quotes Latvian social service 
providers who believe this to be a widespread strategy of recruitment and claim that 
the deception is often exposed once the residence permit is obtained, which is often 
the point when the behaviour of the deceptive spouse becomes more violent. Whilst 
pointing out that such cases are difficult to prove, the study lists several features 
suggesting that the marriage had been ‘genuine’ only for one party, such as ‘the 
prospective husband has hastened the woman into marriage and to giving b irth to a 
child’ or that ‘the relationship is subordinated to visiting migration services to receive 
the residence permit’.292 
The Latvian government has also been the most active in bringing the perceived 
problem to the attention of the Irish authorities, calling them to tighten up domestic 
marriage laws. Most notably, calling for them to criminalise marriages of convenience 
and permit marriage registrars or the police to intervene in cases where the intended 
marriage looks ‘suspicious’.293 In 2014, Ireland indeed amended its Civil Registration 
Act by introducing a definition of marriages of convenience and empowering civil 
registrars to form an opinion of the nature of an intended marriage.294 As will be shown 
in Chapter 5, similar legislation has been introduced in the UK. Additionally, in 2013, 
Latvia amended its legislation to criminalise those involved in marriages of 
convenience for immigration purposes, including where these are intended to be 
contracted abroad. The relevant provisions cover both organisers of such marriages 
and their parties.295  
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In the author’s view, however, linking forced marriages and human trafficking 
with the concept of marriages of convenience is deeply problematic. As the author will 
show in Chapters 5 and 6, couples consisting of nationals of EU-8 Member States and 
migrants from the Indian subcontinent are disproportionately targeted by measures 
designed to curb marriages of convenience, which, in many cases, is nothing short of 
discrimination of the groups concerned. Furthermore, whilst cases of trafficking EU 
citizens to another Member State with a view to force them to enter into marriage with 
a non-EU national are reported; their numbers appear to be low. For instance, the 
HEUNI study reveals that f rom 2007 to 2014, there were as few as 59 Latvian nationals 
allegedly tricked into marriages abroad who were subsequently identified as victims 
of human trafficking – i.e., on average, less than ten per year.296 Moreover, this thesis 
argues that such situations can be effectively addressed by instruments other than 
marriage controls. Forced marriages have recently been criminalised in both Ireland 297 
and the UK,298 and are considered ‘voidable’ in UK family law.299 Likewise, the cases 
falling within the definition of trafficking in human beings should arguably be dealt 
with in the particular legal setting300 or, if necessary, through mutual cooperation 
within Europol and Eurojust.301 Notably, the link between marriages of convenience 
and organised crime has been already highlighted in various Europol notifications and 
reports.302  
Second, as implicitly acknowledged by the authors of the HEUNI study, the 
term ‘exploitative sham marriages’ is legally problematic. As the author will 
demonstrate in Chapter 3, the concept of marriages of convenience for the purposes of 
the Citizenship Directive is narrowly defined and principally limited to arrangements 
having no other content apart from the immigration motive. There is, however, lack of 
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statistics on how many marriages have been found to be such, and no reliable estimates 
as to the numbers of EU-8 Member State nationals who have been brought to the UK 
or Ireland by marriage ‘fixers’. Furthermore, it is admitted that many women whose 
marriages have been organised by facilitators develop an intimate relationship with 
their TCN husbands and have children with them. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this may be the case even if initially the sole purpose of the intended marriage is to 
help the non-EU national party obtain residence rights.303  
In addition, even if an EU citizen initially consents to marry a non-EU national 
for a financial reward, their intentions may not necessarily exclude founding a family 
should the couple like each other and get on well.304 Furthermore, the notion of 
‘unilateral sham marriages’ frequently referred to in the study is highly confusing. As 
the author argues in Chapter 3, this concept does not easily fit within the legal 
definition of marriages of convenience found in the Citizenship Directive. In addition, 
claims that many intimate relationships with or without children are ‘unilateral sham 
marriages’ are only based on subjective and normative judgments by the social service 
providers and should be approached with caution. Having a gender dimension, such 
assumptions tend to largely deny the agency of the women involved, who are instead 
portrayed as passive victims and castigated as naïve for failing to recognise that a 
residence status is the only reason for the marriage.305 Quite strikingly, there are cases 
where Latvian social service providers claim that women have been deceived even if 
they themselves do not believe so.306  
The language used by NGO representatives quoted in the report also suggests 
that there is a strong bias against marriages with non-Europeans who are typically 
perceived as abusers and perpetrators exploiting vulnerable women. This is perhaps 
unsurprising in light of the strong anti-immigrant sentiments in some Eastern and 
Central European Member States.307 The need to protect the family reunion rights of 
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their nationals, which constitutes an indispensable element of their freedom of 
movement, meanwhile appears to be completely ignored, both by the drafters of the 
study and their informants.  
Evidence about women encountering various forms of exploitation, however, 
is also anecdotal and can by no means be generalised. In the author’s view, such 
situations can equally be addressed by instruments other than marriage controls, such 
as laws on domestic violence. Alternatively, Member States of origin may 
preventatively target their nationals via awareness-raising campaigns, aimed at 
revealing the potential risks of such arrangements and helping the individuals 
concerned make an informed choice. Over 2009-2013, such campaigns were already 
conducted in Latvia and considered efficient, since the number of perceived 
‘exploitative sham marriages’ is reported to have decreased since  then.308  
Overall, the subsequent chapters will demonstrate that discourses on marriages 
of convenience between women from Eastern Europe and men from the Indian 
subcontinent may lead to general stigmatisation of these groups and target many 
genuine couples, as well as create what Helena Wray has described as a ‘self 
reinforcing cycle’.309 The latter implies that depiction of such nationality pairings as 
suspicious may further intensify the state focus on this group; this, in turn, will most 
likely result in an increase in reports of marriages of convenience allegedly contracted 
between partners of the relevant nationalities.  
In this light, it is important to mention that the normative perception of large 
cultural differences between such partners tends to dwell on the erroneous premise that 
partner choice is solely dictated by cultural or ethnic considerations. Meanwhile, 
scholarship has long identified similar social status and education as other major 
factors influencing partner choice.310 The increase in mixed-status marriages involving 
EU citizens and foreigners could, therefore, be explained inter alia by the overall 
increase in short-term mobility and transnational connections.311 As noted in the 
Introduction, unlike France or Germany, the UK and Ireland did not hesitate to allow 
nationals of EU-8 Member States full access to their labour markets immediately after 
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the respective countries joined the EU in 2004. Provided that after arrival, many 
mobile EU citizens share social, work and study spaces with non-EU nationals, it is 
indeed unsurprising that some of them end up forming a relationship with TCN 
partners who happen to possess short-term or irregular status.  
 
3.4 UK and three other Member States demanding change 
 
In response to the continued concerns of Member States over perceived 
marriages of convenience, the Commission signalled its intention to provide further, 
more detailed guidance specifically addressing the matter. In May 2012, the JHA 
Council agreed on a document, ‘EU Action on Migratory Pressures – A Strategic 
Response’,312 which identified several strategic priority areas of the Union, such as 
border management, cooperation on return practices, and prevention of abuse of free 
movement by third-country nationals. One of the intended activities mentioned in the 
document was the preparation of ‘a handbook on marriages of convenience, including 
indicative criteria to assist in the identification of sham marriages’.313 In March 2013, 
a preliminary draft of the handbook was sent to the Irish Presidency and the Chair of 
the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament,314 as well as presented to the 
Member States for informal feedback.315  
Yet, in April of the same year, the UK, together with Austria, Germany, and 
the Netherlands, made another attempt to achieve a more restrictive interpretation of 
the free movement rights. In their letter to the Irish Presidency of the Council and three 
European Commissioners, the interior ministers of the four Member States called for 
a more restrictive interpretation of the free movement provisions. This was based on 
the claims that economically inactive EU citizens were placing a strain on local 
services and social welfare systems, as well as that the host societies lacked the 
necessary legal tools to fight abuse and fraud.316 It is no coincidence that the letter was 
written a few months before the forthcoming removal of transitional restrictions for 
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citizens of Romania and Bulgaria,317 the two poorest EU Member States.318 Although 
the main focus in the document was placed on the perceived need to prevent 
‘unwanted’ EU citizens from claiming benefits, it also called for the introduction of 
more restrictive means to tackle systematic abuse or fraud, such as expulsion and re-
entry bans.319 The tone of the letter was further reinforced by the striking change in 
terminology: whilst in the first lines, the four ministers acknowledged the rights of 
‘Union citizens’ who move across the EU to work or study,320 the undesirable groups 
of mobile Member State nationals were further referred to as ‘immigrants’,321 
essentially implying that EU citizenship was no longer considered their primary 
status.322 Finally, the Member States requested the Presidency to put their letter on the 
agenda of the forthcoming JHA meeting in June 2013 and called upon the Commission 
‘to draw up proposals swiftly which can be submitted to the Member States for further 
consultations’.323 
The Commission responded to the letter in May 2013 highlighting the key legal 
principles of free movement and stating that the four ministers did not present evidence 
on systemic abuse through marriages of convenience, fraud or benefits tourism. 324 The 
letter was discussed over lunch at the JHA Council in June, but most of the remaining 
Member States apparently showed little support for the initiative.325 The Council 
invited the Commission to prepare a report on the implementation of free movement 
rules and present it by the end of the year.326  
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Upon the subsequent Commission request, the UK, along with several other 
Member States, provided the data intended to support its claims. In their letter to the 
Commission of 16 September 2013,327 the British authorities argued that ‘[c]laims that 
abuse of free movement is not widespread ignore the reality that such abuse exists, and 
if not dealt with effectively is likely to increase’ and ‘[t]he existence of serious fraud 
and abuse of free movement also has a serious and deleterious impact on the public 
perception of free movement’.328 Having provided statistics of forged EU 
documentation and described one police operation uncovering social benefits fraud, 
the UK authorities went at great length to discuss the issue of alleged marriages of 
convenience. The document noted that there was ‘significant evidence to suggest that 
the phenomenon of sham marriage is linked with serious organised criminal activity’ 
and followed the ‘exploitation’ narrative discussed above by stating that such 
arrangements mostly involve vulnerable women from Eastern European Member 
States who are ‘tricked, coerced or forced’ into marriages with non-EU nationals.329 
The letter then proceeded to describe several anecdotal cases illustrating the 
phenomenon, for instance, the story of a Church of England vicar who was found 
guilty of knowingly solemnising up to 360 alleged ‘sham marriages’,330 or the case 
involving a Slovakian woman of Roma descent who was kidnapped in Hungary and 
trafficked to the UK for the purpose of being forced into a marriage with a Pakistani 
man.331 At the end of the letter, the British government provided statistics of 
‘suspicious’ cases reported by marriage registrars, their numbers reaching 1,891 in 
2012.332 Meanwhile, statistics of detected cases of marriages of convenience were not 
given, at all. The relevant figures of identified cases provided to the Commission by a 
few other Member States appeared to be low. For instance, over the period 2010 to 
2012, Cyprus recorded 174 marriages of convenience, and Portugal, 144.333 
In a Communication in November 2013, the Commission concluded that the 
data received showed no factual evidence of widespread abuse of free movement rights 
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or large numbers of EU citizens relying on social assistance. Having underlined that 
mobile EU citizens pay more in tax contributions than they receive in benefits, it 
reiterated its earlier position and invited Member States to address cases of potential 
fraud or abuse on a case-by-case basis under the existing legal rules.334 The 
Commission also reminded of its intention to publish the Handbook on tackling 
marriages of convenience.335 During the JHA Council in December 2013, the majority 
of Member States agreed that ‘the free movement of persons is a core principle of the 
European Union’ and that ‘individual cases of abuse have to be combated within the 
existing legal framework’.336  
In addition, the Visegrad Countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia) issued a joint statement in which they voiced strong opposition to the British 
claims and underlined that the UK economy has hugely benefitted from the arrival of 
EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe and that ‘the selective application of core 
freedoms by Member States leads to an erosion of the single market’.337 The letter of 
the UK and the other three Member States to the Presidency was no longer discussed 
during the subsequent Council meetings. In September 2014, the Commission 
published a Handbook on marriages of convenience that will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.  
 
3.5 Pre-referendum settlement: An unprecedented concession to the UK 
 
Whilst Chapter 3 will show that the content of the Handbook is not always 
without problems, in 2013 the Commission remained true to its role as guardian of the 
Treaties, showing resistance to the pressure of Member States by upholding the 
fundamental rules and principles of EU law protected by existing legislation. Yet, only 
two years later, in an unprecedented move, it reversed its position in response to the 
same requests of the UK who was now threatening to leave the EU altogether.   
Already in early 2013, the then British prime minister and leader of the 
Conservative party, David Cameron, promised that if he was re-elected in the general 
election in 2015, the UK would hold a referendum on its membership of the EU. In his 
speech, he argued that the Union needed to reform to address the challenges it was 
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facing and that the ‘power must be able to flow back to Member States’.338 With this 
purpose, he pledged to enter into negotiations with the EU for a new settlement and, 
should the British demands be met, campaign for the UK to stay in the EU.339  
At the May 2015 election, the Conservative party obtained an absolute 
majority. In November 2015, Cameron outlined his demands in a formal letter to the 
president of the European Council, Donald Tusk. In the document, the UK prime 
minister set out four areas where he was seeking reforms: economic governance, 
competitiveness, sovereignty (which implied ending the UK’s obligation to work 
towards an ‘ever closer union’ and enhancing the role of national parliaments), and 
‘immigration’.340 Like in the 2013 letter explored above, the term ‘immigration’ was 
used here to refer to free movement rights of Union citizens, expressly transforming 
them into foreigners who need to fulfil certain conditions to obtain the privilege to 
reside in the country.341 Cameron then argued that arrangements needed to be found 
‘to reduce the current very high level of population flows from within the EU into the 
UK’ which have been ‘unplanned and (…) much higher than forecast’. 342 Another 
priority named by the prime minister was ‘to crack down on the abuse of free 
movement’, including the introduction of more restrictive and lengthy entry bans for 
those involved in fraud or ‘sham marriages’, as well ‘addressing the fact that it is easier 
for an EU citizen to bring a non-EU spouse to Britain than it is for a British citizen to 
do the same’.343  
On 2 February 2016, following the negotiations that started only after the 
December 2015 European Council, Donal Tusk presented a draft Decision concerning 
a new settlement for the UK within the EU.344 The document was then adopted in an 
astonishingly speedy procedure that attracted a lot of criticism due to its obvious 
democratic deficit and disregard of the ordinary legislative process in the EU. 345 
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Already on 19 February 2016, the Heads of State or Governments of the 28 Member 
States came up with the final Decision that was aimed to support the ‘remain’ option 
without changing the Treaties.346  
Whilst the purpose of the deal was to persuade the UK to remain in the EU, the 
proposed changes would have equally applied to the remaining 27 Member States. 
Published in the form of an international agreement, rather than a decision of the 
European Council, the document was annexed to the Council Conclusions and 
organised in four main sections: Economic Governance, Competitiveness, 
Sovereignty, and Social Benefits & Free Movement. The latter section, for the first 
time in the Union’s history, introduced several measures designed to significantly limit 
the free movement rights of EU citizens, such as an ‘emergency break’ on the access 
of newly arriving EU workers to non-contributory in-work benefits or enhanced 
powers to expel EU citizens under the public policy provisions. 
The most significant changes, however, were intended to be introduced in the 
area of family reunion. The Decision stated that ‘[t]hose enjoying the right to free 
movement shall abide by the laws of the host Member State’ and that national 
governments can address not only fraud or abuse of rights such as marriages of 
convenience, but also U-turn arrangements to bypass national family reunification 
rules.347 These points were further elaborated in the attached Declaration by the 
Commission which the latter undertook to adopt a proposal to amend the Citizenship 
Directive:  
 
[I]n order to exclude, from the scope of free movement rights, third 
country nationals who had no prior lawful residence in a Member State 
before marrying a Union citizen or who marry a Union citizen only after 
the Union citizen has established residence in the host Member State.348  
 
It was further specified that in such cases, the position of couples would be 
governed by national immigration law.349 This is a serious offence against the CJEU 
case-law which would effectively mean the re-introduction of the infamous ‘prior 
lawful residence rule’ which was abolished in Metock. 
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Further, the Commission sought to extend the definition of  a marriage of 
convenience to marriages which are not only contracted but also maintained for the 
purpose of enjoying a right of residence by a TCN spouse.350 This clearly violates the 
CJEU jurisprudence in Diatta and Ogieriakhi and essentially suggests that marriages, 
entered into to found a family, may later become ones of convenience. Such an 
approach is highly dangerous, particularly because of the lack of legal certainty of 
what constitutes a marriage of convenience and the unprecedented breadth of the 
powers given to the governments who would then be free to deeply intrude into the 
private and family life of the EU citizens, attacking any marriage which does not 
conform to their perceptions of how a ‘genuine’ couple should behave. Finally, the 
Commission would allow the governments to address ‘specific cases of abuse’ 
involving their own nationals relying on the Surinder Singh route in case ‘residence in 
the host Member State has not been sufficiently genuine to create or strengthen family 
life and had the purpose of evading the application of national immigration rules’.351 
This passage equally disregards the CJEU judgment in O and B, which does not make 
this right conditional upon such requirements.    
The proposed rules, however, never entered into force. Following the 
referendum on 23 June 2016 in which the British people voted in favour of the UK 
leaving the EU, the agreement was annulled.352 However, the significance of the 
Decision should not be underestimated. Having agreed to attack the key elements of 
free movement together with the long-standing jurisprudence of the CJEU, EU 
institutions created a dangerous precedent showing how much they would be prepared 
to sacrifice to accommodate the (very poorly justified) demands of a single Member 
State. It is thus possible that this signal is relied upon in the future by other Member 
States who may equally attempt to enforce their wishes and exclude the unwanted 








352 Council, Document 381/16 (24.06.2016).  
353 This point has been particularly emphasised in, Groenendijk, ‘Brexit: Free movement of Union 




4. Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has shown that the CJEU, with a few exceptions, continuously 
departed from the logic of elimination of all possible obstacles to family reunion, 
which was supposed to ensure that EU citizens can freely exercise their Treaty rights. 
In its efforts to achieve this aim, the Court extended the right to family reunion to EU 
citizens returning to their own Member State, as well as to several situations which did 
not involve an actual cross-border element. The CJEU has also set a very high 
threshold for establishing abuse in the area of freedom of movement of persons, 
essentially rejecting the applicability of Article 35 in ‘U-turn’ situations and confining 
it to the exceptional cases of marriages (or, by analogy, registered partnerships) of 
convenience. In its landmark judgment in Metock, the Court explicitly stated that, as 
long as the marriage is not one of convenience, the TCN party benefits from the 
Citizenship Directive irrespective of their residence status in the Member State 
concerned, as well as of where and when the marriage took place.  
With regards to the marriages of convenience, the CJEU has established two 
key principles Member States must respect when targeting suspicious marriages. First, 
it confirmed that the relevant examination must only be carried out on a case-by-case 
basis, and systematic checks are prohibited. Second, the Court specified that a TCN 
spouse continues to benefit from the Directive even if the couple do not live under one 
roof or even if they cohabit with other partners, as long as their marriage is not 
officially dissolved (provided that it was not contracted only to enable the non-EU 
national to obtain residence rights). 
The 2008 ruling in Metock exacerbated tensions between the EU and some 
Member States who claimed that the CJEU was encroaching upon their competences 
in immigration matters. Two principal issues are perceived as problematic in this 
regard: ‘U-turn’ arrangements enabling individuals to avoid domestic family 
reunification provisions which were tightened up during the 2000s, and the possibility 
for non-EU nationals to automatically regularise their status in the country by marrying 
a mobile EU citizen. The latter group of marriages were now increasingly portrayed 
as suspicious and associated with the exploitation of female nationals of EU-8 Member 
States and organised crime.  
The UK has always been among the countries voicing the strongest concerns 




the climate of growing Euroscepticism. Following Metock, there have been several 
attempts to persuade the EU institutions to reduce the family reunion rights of EU 
citizens under the Citizenship Directive. The first two such proposals received little 
support within the Commission and the rest of the Council – particularly due to the 
absence of evidence of the widespread abuse that would  justify the restriction of 
fundamental rights. Instead, the Commission adopted two soft-law documents aimed 
at assisting Member States in identifying marriages of convenience.  
However, already in 2016, as part of the pre-Brexit referendum deal concluded 
to persuade the UK to remain in the EU, the Commission appeared willing to sacrifice 
its role as guardian of the Treaties. The proposed agreement foresaw a severe reduction 
of the family reunion rights of mobile EU citizens, including broadening up the 
definition of marriages of convenience and the re-introduction of the infamous ‘prior 
lawful residence rule’, abolished in Metock. Although the deal ultimately never entered 
into force, it set a striking precedent of attacking fundamental rights and long-standing 
CJEU case-law, a signal that may potentially be used by other Member States willing 





CHAPTER 3. Europeanisation of Relationship Standards? 
Marriages of Convenience in EU Soft Law  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Chapter 2, the author described the political conflict between the CJEU and 
a small group of Member States, including the UK, who feel that EU law is 
encroaching upon their sovereignty in immigration matters. Over the past decade, the 
pressure of Member States resulted in the European Commission adopting two soft-
law instruments addressing their concerns: the Guidance on the better application of 
the Citizenship Directive, issued in 2009354 and the Handbook on addressing the issue 
of alleged marriages of convenience, published in 2014.355 By focusing on these 
documents, this Chapter explores how the Commission has responded to the tensions 
between the CJEU and national governments and to what extent it has been ready to 
accommodate the concerns of Member States. The principal attention of the Chapter 
is concentrated on the Handbook, which is the key non-binding legal instrument in this 
field. 
The Chapter will begin with a general overview of EU soft law, including its  
definition, functions, and legal effects. It will then move on to specifically examine the 
content of the Commission Handbook, and to a lesser extent, Guidelines, as well as 
discussing the potential implications arising from it.  
 
2. EU soft law in a nutshell  
 
2.1 The concept of European soft law 
 
The concept of ‘soft law’ first emerged in the domain of public international 
law in the early 1970s as a response to the need to accommodate the diverse interests 
of various state and inter-state actors in a globalising postcolonial world.356 The term 
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equally found its way into the then EC law soon after the establishment of the 
Community. At present, soft law has become an integral part of the EU legal order, 
with some estimates suggesting that it accounts for over 10% of all EU legislative 
acts.357 Traditionally such tools are actively adopted in areas of strong competence of 
the EU where the Commission retains exclusive competences, such as competition law 
or state aid. During the past years, however, the use of regulatory soft law instruments 
expanded to other sectors, such as labour, tax, welfare, education, healthcare, 
migration and environment, where the power of the EU remains limited.358 
The very term ‘soft law’ is ambiguous, for the general aim of law is not, by its  
very nature, to express ‘soft’ rules of conduct, but to impose mandatory measures. Soft 
law differs from this. Linda Senden has explained the core contradiction as follows: 
‘soft law without legal effects is not law and soft law with legal effects is hard  law’.359 
A range of scholars has attempted to address this issue by providing several definitions 
of the concept.360 The most frequently quoted one is given by Francis Snyder who 
argues that soft law consists of ‘rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally 
binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects’.361 However, the most 
precise interpretation of the concept, in the author’s view, is the one proposed by 
Senden: in her fundamental book on the subject she designates soft law as ‘[r]u les of 
conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally 
binding force as such, but nevertheless may create certain (indirect) legal effects, and 
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2.2 General rule: No derogation from hard law 
 
The distinction between EU hard law and soft law can be observed inter alia 
in Article 288 of the TFEU, which lists key legal acts of the Union. In doing so, it 
refers to regulations, directives and decisions as binding instruments, and refers to 
recommendations and opinions as those deprived of legally binding force. 
Nevertheless, EU institutions also rely on other non-binding tools that equally fall 
within the soft-law concept. For instance, a European Parliament working document 
explains that:  
 
At EU level, soft-law ranges from Green and White Papers, Council 
Conclusions, Joint Declarations, Council Resolutions, Codes of 
Conduct, guidelines, communications and recommendations to the 
phenomenon known as ‘co-regulation’.363 
 
The main aim of non-binding interpretative instruments supplementing 
primary or secondary EU law is to provide (normative) guidance for its proper 
interpretation, ensure its uniform application, and describe the relevant legal acts with 
greater specificity.364 Yet, notwithstanding its positive effects, soft law has been 
frequently criticised. For instance, it has been argued that the legal effects of non-
binding measures cannot be determined, which impacts negatively on legal 
certainty.365 A further point of criticism relates to the legitimacy deficit of soft law 
instruments. Notably, the Commission can generally adopt its guidelines without 
undergoing the scrutiny of the European Parliament and the Council, or the comitology 
control. In its 2007 Resolution, the European Parliament even went as far as to claim 
that:  
 
[T]he use of soft law is liable to circumvent the properly competent 
legislative bodies, may flout the principles of democracy and the rule 
of law under (…) EU Treaty, and also those of subsidiarity and 
proportionality under (…) EC Treaty, and may result in the 
Commission's acting ultra vires.366  
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The last point is particularly important since, in principle, soft-law instruments 
of this type should not aim to create new legal effects apart from those already 
stemming from the hard law provisions they are interpreting. Nevertheless, as Senden 
notes, there are ‘various gradations of interpretation’367 and ‘varying degrees of’ 
“newness”’.368 In the first scenario, soft-law may indeed merely restate and explain the 
relevant hard law provisions governing the area in question and summarise the relevant 
CJEU jurisprudence. Meanwhile, the second scenario envisages that the Commission 
provides a more subjective interpretation of EU legislation and comes up with new 
rules, which are not necessarily contained in the existing body of law.369  
In this context, an important question arises: is there any limit to the degree of 
subjectivity and ‘novelty’, when it comes to the guidance offered by soft law? In other 
words, to what extent is the Commission allowed to provide its own interpretation of 
the underlying body of hard law, and is it bound by any restrictions? The answer to 
this question is apparently found in the general rule which says: a soft-law act is valid 
as long as it does not derogate from primary or secondary law provisions of EU law or 
CJEU jurisprudence.370  
This brings us to the next question, namely, if and how the legality of a soft-
law measure can be challenged before the CJEU. To begin with, it should be noted that 
enforcement of legal acts deprived of binding force is generally considered 
problematic. Due to the high ‘legal effects’ threshold, provided for in Article 263 of 
the TFEU, the applicability of traditional judicial review mechanisms, such as an 
action for annulment, remains largely confined to hard law instruments.371 With 
limited options for direct review, the only available alternative for challenging the 
validity of EU soft law is a preliminary ruling procedure prescribed in Article 267 of 
the TFEU. The existence of such a possibility has been confirmed by the CJEU on a 
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number of occasions.372 Some commentators nonetheless argue that the literal reading 
of both articles 263 and 267 of the TFEU restricts their applicability only to acts 
adopted by EU institutions. It is therefore unclear if this condition would also be met 
by documents co-authored by EU institutions and Member States, such as Commission 
guidance.373 
 
2.3 Legal effects of EU soft law at the national level 
 
Although soft-law instruments generally lack legally binding force, they can 
nonetheless become binding if translated into national law. The questions related to 
the interpretation of EU soft-law instruments by courts and regulatory authorities of 
the Member States have been addressed by the CJEU on several occasions.  
With respect to the Member States’ judiciary, the CJEU held in Grimaldi that 
‘national courts are bound to take recommendations into consideration (…), in 
particular where they cast light on the interpretation of national measures adopted in 
order to implement them or where they are designed to supplement binding 
Community provisions’.374 This essentially meant that whilst national courts were not 
obliged to comply with the Commission recommendations, they were under the duty 
to take the measures into account. In its later jurisprudence, the CJEU extended the 
Grimaldi approach to other EU soft-law instruments, including Commission 
guidelines, reiterating the original wording ‘bound to take’ into account.375 Two other 
rulings, however, further added to the confusion over the issue. In CFK, the Court 
concluded that the national court ‘may’ take account of the Commission guidelines.376 
In contrast, in Koninklijke, the CJEU adopted a more restrictive position, stating that a 
national court may depart from Commission recommendations ‘only where (…) it 
considers that this is required on grounds related to the facts of the individual case’.377 
Emilia Korkea-aho explains the differences in the CJEU approach by the nature of the 
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soft law act in question. She argues that the Court imposes a duty to take soft law into 
account only where ‘either primary or secondary law confers on the institutions (…) 
the task of providing further guidance, or where soft law guidance is in other ways 
foreseen in the underlying legislation’.378 Meanwhile, in cases where the adoption of 
the relevant soft-law instrument is not prescribed in primary or secondary law, national 
courts enjoy more discretion in deciding whether the measure at stake should be given 
any weight, at all.379 Notably, whilst in CFK, the Commission guidelines were not 
derived from a primary or secondary legal instrument, in Koninklijke, the 
recommendations were adopted pursuant to the relevant framework directive. The 
latter explicitly suggested that the Commission was expected to issue 
recommendations,380 and Member States needed to ensure that the national authorities 
take these into account.381 
Apart from that, European soft law can become binding as a result of its 
implementation into national legislation. Yet, even in the absence of direct 
transposition into national law, EU soft-law instruments may serve as a tool to 
reinforce certain values, norms, and practices and therefore transform the behaviour of 
national authorities. Practical effects of soft law in the national domain may range from 
policy changes to more subtle implications, such as the development of new discourses 
and policy principles.382  
 
3. EU soft law on marriages of convenience 
 
3.1 Commission Guidelines and Handbook as interpretative tools 
 
As noted in the Introduction, two soft-law instruments issued by the 
Commission – the 2009 Guidelines and the 2014 Handbook – are of particular interest 
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to the present research. According to the classification proposed by Senden,383 both 
documents fulfil a post-law function and fall within the group of interpretative and 
decisional instruments. Both the Guidelines and the Handbook were published in the 
aftermath of the adoption of a secondary legal act – the Citizenship Directive – and 
aim to serve as guidance for its interpretation and application, particularly when it 
comes to implementation of Article 35. Since their publication was not originally 
foreseen in the Directive, national courts are not obliged to, and instead, may take these 
documents into account should they wish to do so.384   
Issued following an unsatisfactory Commission report on the transposition of 
the Citizenship Directive, the 2009 Guidelines pursue a broad aim ‘to provide guidance 
to Member States on how to apply Directive 2004/38/EC (…) correctly’.385 The 
document contains a separate section on abuse and fraud,386 the main part of which 
deals with the concept of marriages of convenience. It is, however, rather brief, and 
merely seeks to provide a general overview as to the application of the relevant 
concepts in the context of the Citizenship Directive.  
The principal soft-law instrument in this context is the 2014 Handbook which 
is devoted entirely to the issue of alleged marriages of convenience between mobile 
EU citizens and non-EU nationals. As noted in its introduction, the aim of the 
Handbook is:  
 
[T]o help national authorities effectively tackle individual cases of 
abuse in the form of marriages of convenience while not compromising 
the fundamental goal of safeguarding and facilitating free movement of 
EU citizens and their family members using EU law in a bona fide 
way.387  
 
The document is 47 pages in length and structured into four sections. While the 
first three provide a comprehensive summary of the applicable legal framework and 
procedural safeguards Member States must respect when fighting abuse; the last 
‘operational’ section contains a list of subjective hints that may indicate the marriage 
is not acceptable for the purposes of EU law. In addition, both the Guidelines and the 
Handbook seek to clarify the scope of the definition of marriages of convenience 
provided in the Citizenship Directive.  
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3.2 Definition of marriages of convenience: The ‘sole purpose’ test 
 
Although the Citizenship Directive does not contain a self-standing definition 
of ‘marriages of convenience’, this term shall be understood for its purposes as 
marriages entered into with the only aim being to regularise the stay of a third-country 
national in the EU. Whilst Article 35 of the Directive entitles Member States to adopt 
measures to tackle marriages of convenience, the wording of its Preamble makes clear 
that these are marriages ‘contracted for the sole purpose of enjoying the right of free 
movement and residence’.388 This definition has also been reproduced in the 
Commission Guidelines and Handbook. According to the latter, marriages of 
convenience are formally valid marriages ‘contracted for the sole purpose of 
conferring a right of free movement and residence under EU law on free movement of 
EU citizens to a spouse who would otherwise not have such a right’.389  
It is also reiterated that marriages of convenience are regarded as a specific 
form of abuse where ‘abusive conduct is linked to the absence of intention to create a 
family as a married couple and to lead a genuine marital life’.390 The Handbook further 
clarifies that the abusive character in this case is represented by ‘mala fide of the 
spouses prior to and at the moment they enter into the marriage’.391 The cases where, 
in addition to the right of residence, the purpose of a marriage is to acquire other ‘unfair 
advantages’, e.g., a tax advantage, may also be considered ‘abusive’.392  
The Handbook then goes on to state that the ‘“sole purpose” is an autonomous 
concept of EU law’, whereby ‘a marriage cannot be considered a marriage of 
convenience simply because it brings an immigration advantage’.393 It is further noted 
that ‘[w]hen an EU citizen genuinely marries a non-EU national, it should not be 
surprising that they want to live together somewhere, often in a country in which the 
other spouse had no legal right of residence before the marriage’.394 In another passage, 
however, the Commission argues that: 
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[T]he notion of ‘sole purpose’ should not be interpreted literally (as 
being the unique or exclusive purpose) but rather as meaning that the 
objective to obtain the right of entry and residence must be the 
predominant purpose of the abusive conduct.395  
 
Several points of criticism can be made in this regard. First, the assertion that 
the ‘sole purpose’ is an autonomous concept of EU law has no basis in EU hard law. 
Given that the CJEU has never designated the concept of the ‘sole purpose’ as 
autonomous, the relevant passage of the Handbook is rather puzzling, particularly 
because the development of autonomous concepts in EU law is arguably not a matter 
of soft law. It is nonetheless true that, when examining the concept of abuse, the Court 
has consistently employed the narrow ‘sole purpose’ or, in other words, ‘wholly 
artificial arrangements’ test, referring to abuse as ‘wholly artificial arrangements 
which (…) are set up with the sole aim of obtaining (…) advantage’.396 This 
interpretation has been further confirmed by AG Poiares Maduro who referred to the 
‘sole purpose’ paradigm as excluding situations where the activity in question ‘may 
have some explanation other than the mere attainment’ of the relevant advantage.397 In 
addition, it is only where the conduct concerned does not have any other motive apart 
from obtaining such an advantage, that the objective of the relevant EU rules is not 
achieved.398  
Against this background, the notion of the ‘sole purpose’ in the context of the 
Citizenship Directive shall be understood as referring to purely artificial arrangements 
having no content other than an immigration motive. Hence, obtaining an immigration 
benefit must be the only aim of the marriage, rather than one among many. This is 
logical, given the fact that the state typically privileges marriage when it comes to 
family reunion and many couples get married just to be able to live together in one 
country, its choice often affected by various factors, including economic ones.399 The 
Commission is therefore right in stating that a marriage cannot be considered to be one 
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of convenience simply because it allows the TCN party to obtain a residence status. 
Indeed, the fact that an immigration advantage may be a consequence of marriage or 
even one motive for it does not mean that that the couple does not intend to lead a 
family life.400 Against this background, the Commission’s reference to the 
predominant purpose is highly confusing and seems to suggest that the Handbook 
seeks to expand the definition of a marriage of convenience found in the Citizenship 
Directive.401 Going further than the Directive, however, constitutes a clear breach of 
EU law and must be considered ultra vires.402  
Following the controversial passages discussed above, the Handbook proceeds 
to warn that some genuine marriages can sometimes be incorrectly considered 
marriages of convenience and distinguishes several situations where this may be the 
case. One particular example is arranged marriages.403 It is noted that, although some 
characteristics of such marriages may resemble those of convenience (e.g., for 
example, where spouses have not met before the marriage or met only briefly), these 
should not be considered such, as long as they are the ‘result of free will and wish of 
the spouses to create together a durable family unit as a married couple and to lead an 
authentic marital life’.404   
Next, the Handbook refers to proxy marriages where one or both spouses are 
not physically present at the wedding ceremony and are usually represented by another 
person, a ‘proxy’. After pointing out that such practice is uncommon in the EU and 
even unlawful in some Member States but rather common in several non-EU countries, 
the Handbook states that: 
 
The reasons for marriage by proxy can be genuine (for example when 
one spouse cannot attend the ceremony for reasons of military service 
or imprisonment or is unable to travel due to serious health issues) but 
they can also be nefarious (such as to quickly contract a marriage of 
convenience without the EU spouse having to travel to another country 
for the wedding ceremony).405  
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The Handbook then goes on to list several possible scenarios of marriages of 
convenience, depending on the mode in which they have been set up. It is stressed that 
the list is not exhaustive.  
The first scenario is labelled as a ‘standard’ marriage of convenience. In this 
case, both spouses are ‘willing accomplices, freely consenting to enter into a 
relationship designed to abuse EU law’.406 The Handbook suggests that this is probably 
the most common modus operandi related to marriages of convenience. It is 
nevertheless noted that ‘[t]he degree to which the EU citizens freely consent to enter 
into a marriage of convenience can significantly differ’.407  
The second category encompasses the so-called ‘marriages by deception’. As 
the Handbook explains, in such cases ‘the EU spouse is deceived by the non -EU 
spouse to genuinely believe that the couple will lead a genuine and lasting marital 
life’.408 According to the document, ‘[s]uch marriage is a marriage of convenience and 
should be tackled accordingly, with due regard to the innocence of the EU spouse’.409 
It is further stated that ‘[s]uch marriages typically, but not necessarily, follow a short 
relationship on the internet, or after the EU citizen has met the non-EU spouse in a 
foreign country on holidays’ and ‘may involve violence and threatening behaviour, 
particularly if the EU spouse has started to have concerns and is unwilling to 
participate in the immigration process’.410  
The third and fourth categories concern forced marriages and marriages which 
include elements of human trafficking and/or are linked to organised crime. These 
groups typically overlap. The Handbook points out that EU citizens can sometimes be 
coerced into marriage without their consent or against their will, which is often 
considered trafficking in human beings. Meanwhile, it is noted that organised crime 
groups may also exploit the vulnerability of  EU citizens (such as poverty, outstanding 
debt, homelessness, drug addiction, unemployment or psychological vulnerability) to 
make them enter into a marriage of convenience.411  
The Commission approach to the situations described above, however, is not 
unproblematic. First, the depiction of proxy marriages as a potential route of abuse 
may have adverse implications for couples who wish to lead a family life. As will be 
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argued in Chapter 5, these are hostile and disproportionate Member State policies 
targeting perceived marriages of convenience that may prompt many couples to enter 
into marriage by proxy to avoid separation.  
The author’s major objection, however, relates to the Commission’s decision 
to place so-called ‘marriages by deception’ within the scope of marriages of 
convenience. In the author’s view, it is unclear how the situation at stake fits within 
the narrow definition of marriages of convenience found in the Citizenship Directive. 
First, in the absence of any additional remarks, the wording of both Article 35 and 
Recital 28 suggests that marriage is understood here as a holistic concept, i.e., a union 
entered into by two individuals. Accordingly, abuse in this situation presumably refers 
to the conduct of both spouses – both of them should be aware that a marriage is 
entered into with the only purpose to legalise the stay of the TCN party in the EU.  
Second, even if this interpretation is incorrect and the motives of the spouses 
are to be examined separately, the concept of a ‘marriage by deception’ typically 
implies that the parties have already developed a relationship before the marriage, 
irrespective of the motives of the non-EU national. This essentially means that the 
authorities would need to prove that, at the point of the wedding, the only intention of 
one of the parties to an already existing relationship is to obtain an  immigration 
advantage. These elements, however, seem to be mutually exclusive, which makes the 
task difficult and highly controversial. Moreover, it is highly likely that the TCN party 
would also intend to maintain a relationship with the EU spouse after the wedding. 
This is because, under the Citizenship Directive, a non-EU national spouse is normally 
able to obtain an independent right of residence only after three years of marriage. 
Such a situation, hence, cannot be regarded as one having no content other than an 
immigration motive. In the particular case, legalisation of the stay of a third-country 
national in the EU should not be considered a sole motive of marriage but rather a 
primary one (since a non-EU national also aims to maintain a relationship with the EU 
spouse). Accordingly, the author argues that by including ‘marriages of deception’ into 
the scope of marriages of convenience, the Commission has again unilaterally 
broadened the definition contained in the Directive and therefore derogated from hard 
law provisions.  
Last, the very fact of deception, i.e., the intention to leave after obtaining the 




residency has been granted to the TCN spouse.412 Yet, investigations of obviously 
ongoing relationships at the application, let alone the pre-wedding stage based solely 
on the fear that unscrupulous TCN applicants are taking advantage of naïve EU 
citizens, may appear highly unjustified, discriminatory and disproportionate, and may 
lead to intense scrutiny of cases involving certain elements, e.g., where the parties have 
met online or only shortly before the wedding.  
 
3.3 Relationship between the ‘sole purpose’ test and the CJEU case-law 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, once it has been established that the marriage was not 
contracted only for the purpose of enabling the non-EU national to benefit from the 
Treaty rights, its substance is considered immaterial. According to CJEU case-law, the 
spouses are recognised as family members for the purposes of the Citizenship 
Directive based only on their legal status, e.g., as long as the marriage has not been 
officially terminated, even if they already live with other partners.  
The CJEU position has also been summarised in the Commission Handbook. 
In particular, it clarifies that: 
 
Marriages which started off as genuine marriages but later descended 
into something that is merely of form should not be considered as 
marriages of convenience even where a marriage that would otherwise 
have been terminated by divorce is maintained for the sole purpose of  
continuing to confer on the non-EU spouse a right of residence under 
EU law on free movement of EU citizens.413 
 
Such an approach is logical, given that a marriage of convenience is defined as 
one entered into with the sole purpose of obtaining an immigration advantage. Once it 
has been established that the marriage in question cannot be classified as such, it is 
hard to imagine another legal reason why the spouses concerned would not be able to 
benefit from the Treaty rights, as long as the EU citizen satisfies the conditions laid 
down in Article 7 of the Citizenship Directive and the marriage has not been 
terminated.  
Yet, although both the ‘sole purpose’ rule and the CJEU position with regard 
to the substance of marriage seek to protect couples from state interference into their 
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marital life, the combination of the two approaches creates several challenges when it 
comes to detecting marriages of convenience.  
As discussed above, the ‘sole purpose’ rule is concerned with the motive at the 
time of entry into the marriage. It requires proving a state of mind at a particular 
moment, something which, by definition, is based on subjective judgments by 
immigration authorities and open to misconceptions. Apart from that, such an 
approach creates several legal challenges, their character depending on the point the 
marriage is (potentially) subject to checks. In general, three basic points of control can 
be identified: (1) before the marriage; (2) at the point of application for a residence 
card; and (3) after the residence card has been issued.  
With regards to pre-marriage controls, the Handbook specifies that the ECtHR 
case-law allows national authorities to scrutinise intended foreigner-involved 
marriages in order to establish whether or not these are of convenience and prevent 
them from being registered where they are found to be such.414 This approach may 
appear convenient from the immigration control perspective in that is prevents 
marriages from taking place. Furthermore, given the difficulties of determining the 
intentions of the couple post factum, the authorities may feel that carrying out pre-
wedding checks is an easier solution. It should, however, be stressed tha t yet unmarried 
partners of EU citizens do not fall within the scope of direct family members under the 
Citizenship Directive, and as a consequence, do not enjoy the protection of EU law 
with regards to potential scrutiny of their relationship. In this context, a reference to 
pre-marriage controls in the Handbook is somewhat confusing, particularly because 
Member States are not obliged to respect the EU law safeguards listed in the document 
(the Handbook, however, does not specify this). As will be demonstrated in Chapters 
4-6, national authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion when carrying out checks 
on intended marriages. In several cases, this has resulted in significant interference in 
the right to marry and in the private life of the individuals involved.  
In the second and third scenario, controls are exercised post-marriage, and the 
authorities face a difficult challenge of  determining the motives of the couple in 
retrospect. As far as the ‘sole purpose’ is concerned, evidence obtained during the 
investigation shall only be relevant to the extent that it casts light on the motivation for 
the wedding. However, this is not always the case: as the author will show in Chapters 
 





5 and 6, the UK authorities frequently draw conclusions about the motives at the time 
of the wedding based on the nature of an already existing marriage, a practice which 
can lead to significant intrusion into the couples’ private matters. Yet while such 
information may indeed, to a certain extent, shed light on the initial motivation of the 
parties, it is only of secondary importance: there is no direct correlation between the 
intentions before the marriage and the current state of the relationship.  
Secondly, and most importantly: both the definition of marriages of 
convenience and the CJEU case-law suggest that the nature of marriage becomes 
irrelevant immediately after the wedding. Following this logic, the spouses are not 
obliged to maintain the relationship and are even allowed to cohabit with other partners 
already at the application stage, which would still enable the TCN spouse to qualify as 
a family member of a Union citizen (provided that the purpose of marriage was to lead 
a family life and the marriage is not officially terminated). Conversely, denying the 
right of residence solely based on the fact that the relationship is non-existent at the 
present stage, would constitute a breach of EU law.    
In this context it must be stressed that the Directive was apparently drafted with 
a very simple situation in mind: a marriage that was entered into with the only aim to 
obtain an immigration advantage and that was presumed to have no other content after 
the wedding. A standard example of a marriage of convenience is described in the 
2009 Guidelines: 
 
S., a third country national, was ordered to leave in one month as she 
had overstayed her tourist visa. After two weeks, she married O., an EU 
national who had just arrived to the host Member State. The authorities 
suspect that the marriage might have been concluded only to avoid 
expulsion. They contact the authorities in O.’s Member State and find 
out that after the wedding his family shop was finally able to pay a debt 
of 5000 EUR, which it had been unable to repay for two years.  
 
They invite the newly-weds for an interview, during which they find 
out that O. has meanwhile already left the host Member State to return 
home to his job, that the couple is not able to communicate in a common 
language and that they met for the first time one week before the 
marriage. There are strong indications that the couple may have married 
with the sole purpose of contravening national immigration laws.415 
 
Meanwhile, as noted in Chapter 2, the perceived phenomenon of marriages of 
convenience in the EU context is far more complex than the traditional understanding 
 




of the concept. In particular, there may also be cases where a marriage, initially entered 
into with the sole purpose of securing a right of residence for a TCN spouse, later 
transforms into a close relationship and appears to have characteristics considered to 
belong to family life, such as cohabitation, intimate relationship, joint finances, 
common plans for the future, etc. In such cases, application of the ‘sole purpose’ rule 
may appear challenging, particularly if there are indicators suggesting a marriage may 
be one of convenience, e.g., the involvement of organised crime. 
In this regard, it is possible to identify several situations where the combination 
of the ‘sole purpose’ rule and the CJEU case-law may make identifying marriages of 
convenience particularly difficult: 
 
a) The marriage is entered into only for the purpose of securing an immigration 
advantage for the third-country national. However, at the application stage, it 
contains elements of a close relationship that may hold emotional significance 
for the parties involved. This may happen if, e.g., some time passes between 
the wedding and the application for a residence permit.  
b) The marriage is entered into for the purpose of creating a family. However, at 
the application stage, the spouses have already separated and, possibly, even 
cohabit with other partners. This may happen, e.g., if the time has elapsed 
between the wedding and application for a residence permit, for instance, when 
the TCN spouse joins the EU citizen from another country.  
c) Elements of a close relationship are present both at the wedding and application 
stage. In the meantime, there are indicators suggesting a marriage may be one 
of convenience, such as the involvement of organised crime. This may occur, 
e.g., where the couple initially intend to enter into marriage only for the 
purpose of obtaining residency but develop a relationship during the period 
between their meeting and the wedding (for example, in Ireland the parties to 
the proposed marriages must give a minimum of three months notification to a 
registrar,416 which is sufficient time for developing a relationship even if both 
initially had an intention to enter into a marriage of convenience).  
 
It is therefore possible to assume that from a legal perspective, the combination 
of the two approaches may lead to a paradoxical outcome where non-EU nationals 
 




leading a real family life may be denied residency (cases (a) and (c)), whereas those 
separated with no intention of reconciliation may have it granted (case (b)). Chapter 6 
will show that, in some cases, the literal interpretation of the definition of marriages 
of convenience by UK courts has indeed had such an effect. In the author’s view, to 
achieve the aim of the Citizenship Directive, the definition should not be interpreted 
literally. To designate a marriage as one of convenience, two conditions must be 
satisfied: a) the sole purpose of the couple before and at the moment of the wedding 
should be to enable the non-EU national to obtain an immigration advantage; and b) 
the marriage should have no other content after the wedding. Such an interpretation is 
consistent with the overarching purpose of the right to family reunion granted to 
mobile EU citizens – namely, to provide them with an opportunity to live with their 
family members in a country of their choice, which would, in turn, facilitate free 
movement and their integration into the host Member State. Even a hypothetical 
situation where point (b) is absent, i.e., where a marriage, initially entered into with a 
sole purpose of securing a right of residence for a TCN spouse, later transforms into a 
real relationship, would still be consistent with this aim.417 In contrast, refusal to grant 
a TCN spouse a residence permit would create unnecessary hardship for an EU citizen 
and, quite possibly, prompt the couple to move elsewhere, which would interfere with 
the principal’s free movement rights.  
 
3.4 Investigation of marriages: Limitations and procedural safeguards  
 
Having dealt the definition of marriages of convenience, the Commission 
proceeds to provide a detailed overview of the procedural safeguards and limitations 
enshrined in EU law that the national authorities must respect when tackling potential 
abuse. The applicable legal framework is described at length in Section 3 of  the 
Handbook. It begins by clarifying that derogations from free movement rights must be 
interpreted narrowly, whereby any measure adopted under Article 35 of the 
Citizenship Directive must be proportionate and subject to procedural safeguards. It is 
further stressed that the principle of proportionality prohibits measures of general 
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prevention and requires a case-by-case assessment where the decisions must be based 
‘exclusively on the personal conduct of the individuals concerned’.418  
One of the key issues highlighted by the Commission in this context is the 
question of who bears the burden of proof .  Both the Guidelines and the Handbook 
explicitly state that when investigating a potential marriage of convenience, the onus 
of proof rests on the authorities of the Member State seeking to restrict rights under 
the Citizenship Directive. Whilst the Guidelines address the issue only briefly, 419 the 
Handbook contains a separate subsection on evidential burden and burden of proof. It 
starts with a general observation that, in the absence of a unified EU approach to the 
issue, the evidential requirements to demonstrate that a marriage is one of convenience 
vary across Member States. It is nevertheless noted that national authorities must 
consider the collected evidence in its entirety and ‘review all various elements that 
might constitute evidence to support or oppose the conclusion that a marriage of 
convenience has been contracted’.420 
The Handbook then proceeds to note that the burden of proof is twofold. First, 
it is up to the non-EU national to prove that he or she is a beneficiary of EU free 
movement law. To do so, they are required to present supporting documentation 
proving their identity, the fact of their marriage to an EU citizen, and that they 
accompany an EU citizen who will be exercising free movement rights or join an EU 
citizen already doing so. Next, it is emphasised that the above list of documents is 
exhaustive and EU citizens and their family members enjoy the benefit of  the 
assumption and the presumption of innocence, meaning that couples cannot be 
required, as a rule, to present evidence that their marriage is not abusive. Regardless 
of whether any suspicions exist, non-EU spouses are formally only asked to present 
proof of a valid marriage.421 The Handbook accordingly states that ‘the burden of proof 
clearly rests on the national authorities who suspect that a non-EU national has entered 
into a marriage of convenience with an EU citizen’.422 
It is only where national authorities have ‘well-founded suspicions as to the 
genuineness of a particular marriage, which are supported by evidence (such as 
conflicting information provided by the spouses)’, that they can invite the couple to 
 
418 COM(2014) 604 final, 17.  
419 COM(2009) 313 final, 17.  
420 COM(2014) 604 final, 26.  
421 Ibid 26-27. 





produce further documentation.423 The term ‘well-founded suspicions’, however, is 
rather vague and lacks legal certainty. According to the Handbook, spouses are obliged 
to cooperate with authorities.424 Nonetheless, failure to provide evidence that would 
dispel suspicions or even refusal to provide it at all ‘cannot form the sole or decisive 
reason to conclude that the marriage is of convenience’.425  
The Handbook proceeds to clarify that an investigation into a marriage can only 
be launched if there are ‘reasonable doubts about its genuineness’.426 Meanwhile, once 
an investigation has been carried out and led to the conclusion that the marriage is one 
of convenience, rights under free movement rules can be refused ‘only where this is 
duly established by the national authorities concerned, in compliance with the relevant 
evidential standard’, which may vary in accordance to the legal nature of the objective 
pursued (e.g., when the abusive conduct is addressed in the context of criminal 
proceedings or under immigration, administrative or civil status law.427 
Other subsections provide an overview of the relevant principles and 
instruments of European and international human rights law. Having briefly explored 
the extent to which control practices are permitted under Articles 12 and 8 of the 
ECHR,428 the Handbook warns that Article 3 of the ECHR429 requires national 
authorities to respect the integrity of the individuals concerned and refrain from 
degrading or humiliating investigation techniques.430 Further, Member States are 
reminded that discrimination on nationality, race, colour, ethnic or social origin is 
prohibited, as it would violate Article 14 of the ECHR.431  
A separate subsection is devoted to the protection of the rights of the child. It 
begins with a statement that ‘[h]aving a child from the marriage is a strong “counter-
indication” of abuse’.432 It is nonetheless admitted that ‘there may still be some 
marriages of conveniences involving children, mostly from previous relationships of 
the spouses’.433 While this wording apparently still leaves room for the possibility that 
marriages of convenience may involve children from the same relationship, it is 
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difficult to imagine what this would mean in practice. In the author’s view, the very 
fact of pregnancy and/or childbirth per se signifies that the parties, at least temporarily, 
had been in an intimate relationship, which is inconsistent with the narrow definition 
of a marriage of convenience. It is therefore regrettable that the Commission fails to 
explicitly exclude marriages involving pregnancy and childbirth from the scope of the 
concept. 
Notwithstanding the above, the Handbook notes that, when deciding upon 
removal of one or both parties to an alleged marriage of convenience, the best interests 
of their children must be given primary consideration. It is specified that the relevant 
principle derives both from Article 24 of the EUCFR and, most notably, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child434 – the principal instrument of international 
law in this context. Article 3(1) of the Convention provides that ‘[i]n all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’. The Handbook then notes that 
in cases of alleged marriages of convenience it would typically be in the best interests 
of the child to be able to continue to reside in the host Member State with both parents, 
particularly where the child is well integrated there. This, nonetheless, does not mean 
that the final decision of national authorities must inevitably comply with the child’s 
best interests.  
Yet, although Member States are allowed to assess if the strength of other 
considerations would outweigh those of best interests of the child, the former must be 
very substantial to decide in favour of  the parent’s removal. Moreover, under Article 
9 of the Convention, the state needs to ensure that children are not separated from their 
parents against their will. Last, the Handbook warns that children who are nationals of 
the host Member State benefit from additional protection prohibiting the states from 
expelling their own nationals435 or, in exceptional cases, from the principle established 
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3.5 ‘Operational’ measures  
 
The final section of the Handbook lists an extensive catalogue of possible 
indicators of marriages of convenience which may trigger the launch of an 
investigation by national authorities.437 In the beginning, it is underlined that the hints 
are ‘distilled from national practices across the Member States’ and ‘should serve as a 
toolbox of solutions allowing Member States to set up tailored operational schemes 
fitting their specific needs and available resources’.438 
The Handbook then explains that in the case of doubts about the nature of a 
particular marriage and with a view to deciding whether to trigger an investigation, ‘a 
number of hints could constitute one of the elements guiding the authorities’.439 It is, 
however, stressed that the hints never automatically and inevitably confirm the abusive 
nature of the marriage but may merely ‘trigger an open-ended investigation, with no 
pre-determined outcome’.440 
In selecting the hints of abuse provided in the Handbook, its drafters followed 
the approach where ‘[a]n effective hint of abuse relates to conduct which abusive 
couples are reasonably expected to exhibit significantly more often than genuine 
couples’.441 For example, it is clarified that the spouses not having a joint bank account 
or having a large age difference could not be considered as effective hints of abuse, as 
this can also be the case in many genuine marriages. On the other hand, the spouses 
not knowing crucial personal information about each other may be considered as an 
effective hint of abuse. Accordingly, that means that there are no ‘safe’ hints of abuse 
that can be triggered only by abusive couples, as any single hint will also be triggered 
by some genuine couples. However, ‘while a typical genuine couple may trigger 
several hints of abuse, typical abusers will trigger substantially more hints of abuse’.442 
It is underlined that the hints of abuse ‘must therefore only be seen and understood in 
their entirety in order to be relevant for triggering an investigation’.443 
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The Handbook further explains that it cannot be excluded that the national 
authorities ‘will be confronted with atypical but genuine couples that will score a 
comparable number of hints of abuse as some abusive couples’.444 This, in itself, is not 
considered a ‘proof of their “guilt”, just a signal that an investigation could be launched 
to look into the case in more detail’.445 When making a decision, all pieces of evidence 
must be assessed together as a whole in a neutral and unbiased manner. The evidence 
which supports the conclusion that the suspected marriage is abusive should clearly 
outweigh the one supporting the view that it is not. The corroborating evidence can be 
used for prosecution if it is strong enough to meet the respective burden of proof.446 
The investigation techniques mentioned in the Handbook involve simultaneous 
interviews of questionnaires, document and background checks, inspections by law 
enforcement, and community-based checks.447  
The Handbook then goes on to provide a number of hints of abuse that could 
trigger an investigation into a marriage. The hints are divided into several groups 
according to the ‘inherent stages of “the life cycle” of marriages of convenience’,448 
starting from stage 1 before the future spouses meet for the first time, and ending with 
stage 6 when the parties divorce because the right of residence of the non-EU spouse 
is well established.449 It, therefore, follows that the couples, in principle, can be 
subjected to scrutiny at any stage of their residence in the host Member State.  
Further, it will be demonstrated that the hints provided by the Handbook refer 
not only to the character of marriage, but also to the personal characteristics of its 
parties. Based on the criteria, it is possible to distinguish several broad categories of 
persons whose marriage has significantly higher chances to be considered ‘suspicious’ 
and, consequently, become subject of closer scrutiny. These include: 
  
a) Third-country nationals who have not lawfully resided in another EU 
Member State before seeking residency in the host Member State; 
b) EU citizens finding themselves in a ‘vulnerable position’; and  
c) Persons whose marriages have been organised by individual facilitators or 
organised crime groups. 
 
444 Ibid 34. 
445 Ibid. 
446 Ibid 35. 
447 Ibid 42-44.  
448 Ibid 36. 





a) Third-country nationals who have not lawfully resided in another EU 
Member State  
 
Although the condition of prior lawful residence in another Member State was 
found to be in breach of the Citizenship Directive,450 this factor subsequently appeared 
in the Handbook as one of the crucial elements while drawing a distinction between 
‘safe’ and ‘suspicious’ TCN spouses of Union citizens. When pointing to the elements 
suggesting a marriage may be one of convenience, the Handbook consistently focuses 
on non-EU nationals who, before the application for a residence permit as a family 
member of an EU citizen, have not lawfully resided in another EU Member State. A 
particular emphasis is placed on those having a short-term or irregular status.  
Aiming to minimise the risk of an erroneous decision, the Handbook suggests 
employing the so-called ‘double-lock’ approach. Accordingly, in the case of 
suspicions that the marriage is one of convenience, the national authorities should not 
focus primarily on hints of abuse ‘to support their initial gut feeling’ or predetermined 
assumption.451 Rather, they are first recommended to verify the hints that there is no 
abuse, which, by analogy, reflect conduct which is ‘much more likely to be exh ibited 
by genuine couples than abusive couples’.452 Only where this has not prima facie 
confirmed the ‘genuine’ nature of the marriage, should the authorities proceed to 
examine the hints of abuse. 
The Handbook then lists a number of hints that there is no abuse. It is stated 
that, in comparison with abusive couples, ‘genuine’ couples are more likely: 
 
1) To consist of a non-EU spouse who has previously lawfully resided with 
the EU citizen in another Member State; 
2) To be in a close relationship for a long time; 
3) To share parental responsibilities for one or more children and to be equally 
involved in their exercise; 
4) To have a common domicile or household or to maintain regular and 
frequent contact if they do not live together;   
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5) To have entered a serious long-term legal or financial commitment together 
(e.g. a mortgage to buy a home); and/or 
6) To have their marriage lasting for a long time.453 
 
The non-EU nationals satisfying the condition of prior lawful residence in 
another Member State are therefore portrayed as ‘safe’ and have significantly lower 
chances of becoming an object of additional scrutiny. This point reflects the post-
Metock concerns of some Member States who expressed fears that the abolishment of 
the prior lawful residence rule would encroach upon their sovereignty in immigration 
matters.454  
Formally, only the hint N1 explicitly refers to this group of persons. However, 
upon closer inspection, it becomes obvious that other characteristics, to a large extent, 
equally exclude couples who have not previously resided together elsewhere in the 
EU. If the couple meets in the host Member State and the third-country national has a 
short-term or irregular immigration status, it is likely that the insecurity associated with 
this will prompt the couple to enter into a marriage and apply for a residence permit as 
soon as possible, just to be able to reside together in one country – without having the 
chance to be in a close relationship or marriage for a long time. Similar considerations 
apply to the hint N3: if the couple is hastened into marriage, as well as given the 
uncertainty surrounding their status, the probability of having children at this stage is 
less likely in comparison with those who have already enjoyed a stable life in another 
Member State. Likewise, an uncertain situation is likely to prevent the former from 
entering into a serious financial commitment.  
Out of the hints listed above, only one – the hint N4 – seems equally applicable 
both to TNC spouses with or without prior lawful residence in another Member State. 
It should be, however, remembered that according to CJEU case-law, the spouses are 
not obliged to have a common domicile or household to qualify under the Citizenship 
Directive.  
It is thus possible to conclude that newly-weds who have not lawfully resided 
together in another Member State may find themselves in a more disadvantaged 
position when it comes to the authorities deciding whether to proceed with further 
examination of the marriage in question. One can assume that in cases where the 
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authorities have a ‘gut’ feeling that the marriage may be one of convenience, most 
couples who have already met in the host Member State may be unable to satisfy most 
of the ‘no-abuse’ criteria and would therefore be referred for further inspection – this 
time, their conduct and personal characteristics would be measured against the hints 
of abuse.  
In selecting the hints of abuse, the drafters of the Handbook apparently 
followed the same approach. In particular, it is explained that TCN parties to an 
intended marriage of convenience are more likely:  
 
1) To have been unsuccessful in previous entry or residence applications 
through other migration channels; 
2) To have previously migrated or be currently residing irregularly in an EU 
Member State; and/or 
3) To be currently faced with imminent expiry of their legal residence.455  
 
These criteria repeatedly focus on the residence status of the non-EU spouse, 
with a particular emphasis on those with a short-term or irregular status. In general, 
however, all non-EU nationals who have not previously resided in another Member 
State are potentially regarded as a risk group. When explaining the reasons and 
motivations behind marriages of convenience, the Handbook argues that ‘[f]or some 
non-EU nationals, a marriage of convenience with an EU citizen offers a route towards 
a right of residence which may be more stable and protected than other channels of 
migration, regular or irregular’.456 It is therefore expected that all non-EU nationals 
who do not have permanent residence status in the first place – e.g., those with a work 
visa – would fall into this category. The breadth of its scope is deeply problematic, 
particularly given that those who already have an independent right of residence in the 
host Member State, would by definition have no incentive to apply for a residence 
permit as family members of EU citizens. Further, in a number of Member States, the 
limited legal avenues for obtaining long-term residence rights, low asylum approval 
rates, bureaucratic delays in considering residence applications, and the legal & 
practical complexity of removal procedures results in substantial numbers of non-EU 
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nationals living in legal limbo for many years.457 In this context, it is indeed 
unsurprising that many of them start families in the country they live – inter alia with 
EU citizens. The stigmatisation of people with ‘adverse immigration history’ as 
potential parties to marriages of convenience may therefore result in  significant 
difficulties for EU citizens who wish to lawfully live with their family members in the 
host Member State.458  
 
b) History of abuse or fraud 
 
The qualities of non-EU nationals are also assessed against such elements as a 
previous sponsorship, history of abuse, or forgery. According to the Handbook, where 
national law foresees banns of marriage or secular pre-marriage registration 
requirements, ‘abusers’ are more likely: 
 
1) To have discrepancies in the documents provided which raise concerns of 
forgery; 
2) To provide a false local address; and/or 
3) To have one of the prospective spouses registered in several municipalities 
as about to enter into marriage with a different person.459 
 
Furthermore, the Handbook explains that ‘abusers’ are more likely (1) to have 
a history of previous marriages of convenience or other forms of abuse or fraud, or (2) 
to have family members with such a history.460  
It must be stressed that the phrase ‘other forms of abuse or fraud’ lacks legal 
certainty and may potentially be interpreted broadly – for instance, as applicable even 
to those charged with minor offences unrelated to their marriage or immigration status. 
Similarly, a reference to their relatives is potentially over-inclusive. It increases the 
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risk of considering an individual suspicious just based on the involvement of his or her 
family members in unlawful activities. Meanwhile, the scope of such family members 
is not specified.  
As to the EU citizen parties to perceived marriages of convenience, the 
Handbook notes that they are not only more likely to have been previously involved 
in marriages of convenience461 but also to have concluded short marriages with non-
EU nationals as such.462 Yet, even if ‘serial cheaters’ do exist, this thesis argues that 
their number is likely to be low, given that the non-EU national can only obtain the 
independent right of residence after three years of marriage. Whilst it is not specified 
what period may be regarded ‘short’, it should be assessed with caution, provided that 
many marriages entered into for the purpose of creating a family, end up in divorce 
after a few years or even months.  
 
c) EU citizens in a vulnerable position  
 
In the meantime, ‘suspicious’ EU citizens are portrayed in the Handbook as 
individuals in a bad financial situation whose vulnerability is often exploited by non-
EU nationals or facilitators. Accordingly, the main reason why EU citizens may assist 
foreigners in contracting a marriage of convenience is deemed to be financial gain. It 
is stressed that:  
 
EU citizens finding themselves in a vulnerable position (poverty, 
outstanding debt, homelessness or drug addiction) are more likely to be 
convinced to contract a marriage of convenience in order to improve 
their situation. In many such cases, there are elements of human 
trafficking.463  
 
This construct apparently reflects the discourses that have gained prominence 
in several Member States. As explored in Chapter 2, several governments have 
described the phenomenon as closely linked to human trafficking, where vulnerable 
Eastern European women are maliciously exploited by both intermediaries and third-
country nationals. However, this factor may well appear over-inclusive. There is a 
danger that the terms ‘poverty’ and ‘vulnerable position’ can be easily attributed to a 
vast number of EU citizens exercising their Treaty rights. This, in turn, would 
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potentially subject their marriages to closer scrutiny, amounting to discrimination 
based on their social class. 
 
d) Involvement of facilitators or organised crime 
 
The (c) and (d) categories are largely interrelated, as perceived exploitation of 
vulnerable EU citizens has been closely linked to organised crime. The Handbook 
addresses the latter issue in a separate sub-section.464 The Commission underlines that 
marriages of convenience frequently involve elements of human trafficking, as well as 
provides the definition of human trafficking enshrined in the Directive 2011/36/EU.465 
It is also noted that besides what is ‘typically considered as trafficking in human beings 
(for example, women brought to the host EU country and forced to marry someone)’, 
organised crime groups may exploit the vulnerability of EU spouses to make them 
contract a marriage of convenience.466   
Another sub-section has been specifically devoted to facilitators who may be 
involved in a marriage of convenience and whose main motivation is financial gain.467 
The Handbook consistently refers to organised crime throughout the stages of 
marriages of convenience. During the pre-marriage phase, for instance, ‘abusers’ are 
more likely, inter alia: 
 
1) To never have met in person before the marriage; and/or 
2) To have got together through the services of a disreputable marriage agency 
with suspected connections to organised crime or through an informal 
network within non-EU national communities which is known to be acting 
as facilitator.468 
 
Likewise, during the wedding stage, ‘abusers’ are more likely: 
 
1) To use a marriage venue which is known to be prone to abuse or has 
possible connections to organised crime; 
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2) Where relevant – to have their wedding organised by a third party who does 
not seem to fit this purpose (e.g. not a friend/relative or a specialised 
agency) or who has suspected connections to organised crime; 
3) To celebrate their wedding ceremony together with other couples with 
whom they do not seem to have anything in common, possibly with the 
same witness(es); 
4) To have previously initiated procedures to wed another EU spouse; 
5) To have the EU citizen flown to the country only a short time before the 
marriage without any plausible reason or leave the country shortly after the 
marriage has been conducted without any plausible reason; 
6) To have their travel arrangements organised by a third party with possible 
connections to organised crime; and/or 
7) To hand over an ‘unexplained’ sum of money or gifts in order for the 
marriage to be contracted (with the exception of money or gifts given in the 
form of a dowry in cultures where this is common practice) that could be 
considered as ‘payment for abuse’ to the EU spouse and facilitators. 
 
While the hints provided may indeed be applicable to marriages involving 
elements of human trafficking, several risk factors can be identified. First, the hint of 
having never met in person before the marriage may disproportionately target arranged 
marriages where the couple may see each other only on the wedding day. Furthermore, 
at present, the abundance of alternative means of communication (e.g., messenger apps 
and social media) makes it possible to form and maintain long-distance relationships 
without meeting each other in person.469 
Next, with respect to the hint N5, one should be careful not to infer that the 
marriage is one of convenience only because the EU citizen maintains some ties to 
another Member State. It must be stressed that the right of EU citizens to live in the 
host Member State is not subordinated to a period of uninterrupted physical presence 
in that country. As long as they are considered ‘qualified persons’ for the purposes of 
the Citizenship Directive, checks of their presence in the host Member State are 
unnecessary and may even prompt EU citizens to refrain from frequent travelling out 
of the fear that their marriage can be considered as one of convenience. This may also 
put obstacles to their right to free movement.  
 




In addition, as pointed out above, there is a danger of not recognising the 
complexity of the phenomenon and oversimplifying it. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
involvement of facilitators or organised crime does not necessarily mean that the 
marriage has no content other than an immigration motive.  
Finally, the Handbook lists several ‘universal’ hints that appear to be 
attributable to any category of the individuals concerned. These include:  
 
1) Absence of a common language understood by both or evidence that they 
are making some efforts to establish a common basis for communication; 
2) Parties give conflicting, inconsistent or false information about each other 
on:  
a. crucial personal matters (name, date of birth and age, nationality, 
address, closest family members, possible previous marriages and 
cohabitation, education, profession or job/unemployment); 
b. the circumstances of their first meeting which can be verified; 
c. the wedding ceremony and celebration (list of wedding guests, 
names of witnesses); 
d. common plans for their future, for the establishment of genuine 
marital life and how they (plan to) assume some of the 
responsibilities resulting from the marriage (such as those of 
financial nature); 
3) Parties do not maintain their matrimonial cohabitation or continue living 
separately after their marriage without any plausible reason (for example 
work, children from previous relationships living abroad); 
4) One of the spouses lives with someone else; 
5) Parties show lack of contribution to the responsibilities and practical 
obligations arising from the marriage; 
6) Parties make no plans for their financial stability; 
7) Parties do not wish to effectively share parental responsibility for one or 
more children.470 
 
As to the first hint, it is unclear who will be capable of carrying out a 
professional assessment of the couple’s language and communication skills; it is 
 




doubtful that immigration officers are trained to do so. Furthermore, there are plenty 
of online translation tools that enable meaningful communication between parties who 
do not share a common language. The hints are also highly normative, of very general 
nature, and refer to elements that are difficult to assess. The CJEU has explicitly 
confirmed that couples must be free to arrange their marital life as they wish, including 
living separately or even cohabiting with other partners, as long as their marriage is 
not officially terminated. 
Overall, the approach suggested by the Commission raises several points of 
concern. First, it is unclear how any of the hints mentioned in the Handbook can trigger 
the authorities’ suspicions, given that the states are prohibited from systematically 
requesting married couples provide evidence of their relationship at the application 
stage. As noted above, spouses of EU citizens only need to present their passport, 
marriage certificate and proof that the EU citizen is exercising their Treaty rights or 
intends to do so. The information that can be obtained from these documents is 
essentially limited to nationality, the residence status of the non-EU national and the 
length of their marriage. Yet, the former two elements cannot serve as the only grounds 
for suspicions as this would amount to blatant discrimination of certain groups of 
applicants. The principle of the presumption of innocence and the Commission’s 
approach in presenting the list of ‘suspicions-triggering’ indicators are therefore 
mutually exclusive.  
The author’s second objection relates to the nature of the hints. 
Notwithstanding the safeguards and precautions stressed in Section 3 of the Handbook, 
the hints listed in its ‘operational’ part focus on detecting potential ‘abusers’ rather 
than on the need to minimise the risk of an erroneous decision and state interf erence 
into the family life of EU citizens. Such an approach is problematic, as it creates an 
artificial division between ‘pure’ and ‘abusive’ marriages and contributes to the 
reproduction of stereotypes and the normative, traditional perception of how ‘real’ 
couples should behave.471 Accordingly, the main risk associated with the respective 
policies is that they usually target a much broader category of couples – primarily those 
whose profiles do not correspond to the ‘standard’ models of behaviour.  
 





Moreover, although the drafters of the Handbook claim it was prepared in close 
cooperation with Member States,472 a number of governments have been reluctant to 
share the relevant information in writing with the Commission, for instance, the 
detailed questions they ask during the interviews. The main concern was the need for 
confidentiality, as national authorities feared that disclosure of such information could 
play into the hands of potential ‘abusers’.473 As a result, when selecting criteria, the 
Commission largely relied on the information provided by the UK authorities who 
appeared ready to collaborate. In general, the drafting process was characterised by a 
lack of clear methodology, with Commission officers relying on anecdotal evidence474 
and, to an extent, validating control practices of the British government. As the author 
will demonstrate in Chapter 5, UK domestic law indeed follows the spirit of the 
Handbook. Furthermore, the Commission’s normative perception of the conduct 
which abusive couples exhibit ‘significantly more often than genuine couples’475 is not 
substantiated by any statistical evidence.  
In the meantime, it must also be recalled that Member States are first advised 
to look for the hints that the marriage is genuine, which the author evaluates positively. 
Notwithstanding that, although the burden of proof lies on the national authorities, the 
latter do not need to prove that a marriage is one of convenience beyond all reasonable 
doubt, as is commonly required in criminal cases. To exclude the non-EU national 
spouse from the scope of the Citizenship Directive, it is sufficient to employ the 
balance of probabilities test. Yet, in light of the narrow definition of marriages of 
convenience provided in the Citizenship Directive and the fundamental nature of the 
rights at stake, the author advocates for a narrower approach. In the author’s view, the 
main focus should not be placed on detecting abuse but on reducing the risk of 
targeting couples who do (or did) intend to lead a family life but whose behaviour does 
not conform to the prevailing stereotypes of how a ‘genuine’ marriage should look 
like, or where its quality is deemed ‘insufficient’. Hence, in contrast to what is 
permitted in the Handbook, it would be more reasonable to require the authorities to 
 
472 COM(2014) 604 final, 3. A Commission representative involved in drafting the Handbook further 
clarified in an informal conversation that, whilst the Commission consulted Member States, the draft 
was not subject to their formal agreement (Brussels, 3 March 2017).  
473 Commission, ‘Draft Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting of Experts on the Right to Free Movement of 
Persons’ (n 317). This was also confirmed by the Commission representative involved in drafting the 
Handbook. (Brussels, 3 March 2017).  
474 Informal conversation with a Commission representative involved in drafting the Handbook 
(Brussels, 3 March 2017). 




prove the marriage does not have, and has never had, any other content apart from an 
immigration motive. The author, therefore, argues that a marriage should be 
considered genuine in the absence of any reliable evidence that it has been a purely 
artificial arrangement and/or in the presence of any elements suggesting there is (or 
used to be) a close relationship between the parties, such as cohabitation, joint 
finances, common plans for future, financial and/or emotional support, intimate 
relationships, etc.476 
 
3.6 Commission Handbook and the division of competences between the 
EU and Member States 
 
In general terms, by including into the Handbook an extensive list of indicators 
suggesting that the marriage may be one of convenience, the Commission has made a 
significant concession to Member State authorities. In doing so, it has, to some extent, 
shifted its emphasis from the necessity to protect the fundamental rights of EU citizens 
and their family members to de facto validation of a normative division between 
marriages contracted for ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ reasons, endorsed by several governments. 
A Commission representative involved in drafting the Handbook stressed that the 
Commission was under intense pressure from Member States who demanded more 
clarity as to the measures they are allowed to take to tackle the perceived abuse. He 
accordingly admitted that limiting the list of measures to the EU law safeguards and  
the fundamental rights the Member States must respect would be useful legally but not 
necessarily useful politically.477  
On the other hand, the ‘operational’ part is problematic from the perspective of 
the division of competences between the EU and Member States. At present, the 
substantive family law falls within the exclusive competence of Member States.478 In 
 
476 Emphasis added.  
477 Informal conversation with a Commission representative involved in drafting the Handbook 
(Brussels, 3 March 2017). 
478Arts 3-4 TFEU a contrario. For an analysis, see Parliament, ‘Which Legal Basis for Family Law? 
The Way Forward’ (PE 462.498, 2012). Shared competence in this sphere nonetheless exists in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice, where, under Article 81 TFEU, the EU is in charge of developing  
judicial cooperation in civil matters (including family) having cross-border implications. The 
instruments adopted on this basis include Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 
concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and 
the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L338/1 
(Brussels II bis Regulation), Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, 





other words, the Union institutions, are not authorised inter alia to adopt measures 
regulating the procedures of entry into marriage, or set out legal requirements for 
divorce. Provided that the Commission has never issued soft law guidelines on these 
matters, its decision to do so in relation to perceived marriages of convenience creates 
confusion – all the more so because the CJEU has confirmed that it is up to Member 
States to adopt measures addressing the phenomenon.479 It appears, however, that the 
Commission saw its interference justified by the fact that perceived marriages of 
convenience lie at the intersection between domestic family law and EU free 
movement law, and may therefore be used as a tool to abuse Treaty rights.  
It must be noted that this is not the only example of EU institutions becoming 
involved in areas they have no direct competence to regulate but nonetheless feel the 
need to protect certain ‘values’. Two notorious examples of such an approach have 
been the conditions on the acquisition of nationality or the procedure of granting 
residence permits to foreign investors, which falls within the exclusive competence of 
Member States.480 Yet the so-called ‘investor citizenship’ or ‘investor residence’ 
schemes have been extensively criticised by EU institutions,481 with some of them 
going as far as to explicitly call on Member States to cancel all such schemes and 
require their potential beneficiaries to be physically present in the country, as well as 
subject them to thorough security checks.482  
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4. Conclusion  
 
The drafters of the Commission Handbook – the principal EU soft-law 
instrument addressing the issue of marriages of convenience – faced a difficult 
challenge in striking a balance between accommodating Member State concerns about 
the perceived abuse and protecting the free movement rights of EU citizens and their 
family members. To a certain extent, the Commission showed resistance to Member 
States by providing a detailed overview of  the procedural safeguards and general 
principles of EU law that the national authorities must respect when tackling potential 
abuse. So far, the content of the Handbook can be evaluated positively.  
However, the Commission does not limit itself with merely restating the 
relevant provisions but supplements them with its own understanding of the concept 
of marriages of convenience. The analysis of the relevant measures has shown that 
some of them are highly contradictory and may produce adverse legal effects. For 
instance, extending the scope of the definition of marriages of convenience to those 
contracted with the primary purpose to obtain an immigration advantage is arguably 
ultra vires, yet the options to challenge the relevant provision before the CJEU are 
limited. The author’s second concern relates to the ‘operational’ part of the Handbook 
where the Commission goes at great length to describe hints that may trigger 
suspicions, as well as provides recommendations on the choice of investigation tools. 
By doing so, the Handbook effectively reinforces the traditional discourses on how 
married couples should behave, as well as creating a distinction between ‘safe’ and 
‘suspicious’ categories of persons: whilst the former are unlikely to be scrutinised by 
national authorities, the latter, such as those with an unstable residence status, have a 
good chance to become the focus of attention of the relevant state. The decision to 
include the catalogue of indicators in the Handbook represents an important 
concession to Member States’ authorities. On the other hand, it raises legitimacy 
issues, provided that EU institutions are not authorised to legislate in the area of 
substantive family law.  
As a soft-law instrument that correspondingly escaped the scrutiny of the 
European Parliament and the Council, the Handbook should be understood as a 
voluntary interpretation aid. Notwithstanding that, it may have wide-ranging 
consequences for the individuals concerned if implemented into domestic legislation 




show in Chapter 6, the Handbook has already produced adverse legal effects at the 
national level. The analysis of UK case-law suggests that the document has been 
influential in British courts where judges have relied on its most problematic passages 
to undermine the definition of marriages of convenience under the Citizenship 
Directive. By doing so, they have effectively incorporated the erroneous approach into 





CHAPTER 4. The Concept of Marriages of Convenience and 
European Human Rights Law 
 
1. Introduction  
 
When addressing perceived marriages of convenience, Member States are not 
only bound by the relevant constraints enshrined in EU law, but also by the principles 
of international human rights law. The right to live with their family members has been 
guaranteed to individuals by nearly all core international human rights instruments, 
most notably the UDHR,483 the ICCPR484, and the ECHR. In the EU, the principal 
sources of this set of rights are the ECHR and the EUCFR, the latter of which has 
acquired a legally binding force with the Lisbon Treaty.  
As shown in Chapter 3, the Commission Handbook has already pointed to some 
elements of human rights the state authorities must pay regard to when exercising 
marriage controls. This Chapter aims to explore the relevant legal framework in more 
detail and show if and how human rights can protect couples from hostile state 
practices. The author’s analysis will focus on two basic rights that are most likely to 
come into tension with government measures targeting perceived marriages of 
convenience. These are the right to respect for private and family life, guaranteed by 
Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the EUCFR; and the right to marry and to found 
a family, found in Article 12 of the ECHR and Article 9 of the EUCFR. Where 
relevant, the author will also explore the compatibility of the respective state policies 
with other fundamental rights, such as the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 of 
the ECHR and Article 21 of the EUCFR) and the right to respect for human dignity 
(Article 1 of the EUCFR).  
 To begin the Chapter, the author briefly defines the scope of Articles 8 and 12 
of the ECHR, as well as providing a short overview of the relevant ECtHR case-law 
in the context of immigration control. Then, the author explores the ECtHR position 
on the government measures targeting marriages of convenience and identif ies 
problematic issues arising from it. Finally, the author looks at the relationship between 
the ECtHR jurisprudence on marriages of convenience and EU free movement law, 
 
483 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III) (10.12.1948) (UDHR). 




focusing on the implications the Strasbourg court’s approach may have for couples 
involving (mobile) EU citizens and non-EU nationals.  
 
  2. Articles 12 and 8 of the ECHR in a nutshell 
 
a) The right to marry and to found a family 
 
Article 12 of the ECHR reads: ‘Men and women of marriageable age have the 
right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the 
exercise of this right’. Like many other rights protected under the Convention, the right 
to marry and to found a family originates from the UDHR.485 Both instruments were 
adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War,486 a period when the 
then-recent violations committed by the Nazis and other fascist regimes created a 
pressing need to de-legitimise their ideology. This objective also implied outlawing 
one of its key elements, namely, Nazi family policy which manifested itself in a ban 
of mixed marriages, as well as the curtailment of the reproductive rights of certain 
groups.487 It is against this background that the drafters of both the UDHR and the 
ECHR not only wished to protect the right to privacy in general but also addressed the 
right to marry and found a family in a separate article.488 The respective clauses can 
thus be viewed as guaranteeing classic human rights that protect individuals against 
government interference in their marital and family life.489  
The right to marry and to found a family has equally found its way into the 
EUCFR. The wording of Article 9 of the Charter is similar to that of the ECHR and 
reads as follows: ‘Right to Marry and Right to Found a Family shall be guaranteed in 
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights’. Although 
the core elements of family law remain within the competence of Member States, 
Article 9 has a general application in all fields where these rights may be indirectly 
affected. One can distinguish several areas of often overlapping competences where 
 
485 Art 16 UDHR. A similar provision is found in Art 23(1) ICCPR. 
486 The UDHR was adopted in 1948, whilst the ECHR was drafted in 1950 and entered into force in 
1953. 
487 On this topic, see among others, Lisa Pine, Nazi Family Policy 1933-1945 (Berg Publishers 1997).  
488 Bart van der Sloot, ‘Between fact and fiction: an analysis of the case-law on Article 12 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 26 Child and Family Law 397, 399. 





indirect development of these concepts takes place, such as: (1) equal treatment and 
protection from discrimination, (2) the cross-border recognition of marriages, 
partnerships and parenthood, and the impact it has on the free movement of EU citizens 
and their TCN family members, and (3) admission of non-EU family members within 
the framework of the Citizenship Directive or the Family Reunification Directive.490 
The Explanations to the Charter state that Article 9 is based upon Article 12 of 
the ECHR, yet the right to marry and to found a family are clearly separated. The 
wording is said to be modernised to cover cases where national legislation recognised 
arrangements other than marriage for founding a family. It is also specified that Article 
9 ‘neither prohibits nor imposes the granting of the status of marriage to unions 
between people of the same sex’.491 Hence, whilst the scope of those rights under the 
Charter may be wider than under the ECHR, if the national law so provides, it is also 
made clear that they should always fall within the ambit of the minimum protection 
level guaranteed under Article 12 of the ECHR.492 
Up to the present date, the CJEU has delivered several judgments indirectly 
addressing the issues linked to Article 12 of the ECHR – most notably, LGBT rights 
in the area of non-discrimination and the right to reproductive care within the field of 
free movement of goods and services. However, a claim based specifically on Article 
9 of the Charter is yet to be considered. At present, the scope of Article 9 is principally 
determined by the ECtHR jurisprudence on Article 12 and, to a certain extent, Article 
8 of the Convention, where the issue in question falls within the scope of both articles, 
such as LGBT rights and the right to adoption.493 
 
b) The right to respect for private and family life  
 
Although the areas of their application frequently overlap, the scope of Article 
12 ECHR is quite distinct from Article 8 of the Convention. Whilst the former deals 
exclusively with those who wish to enter into marriage and found a family, the latter 
 
490 For an analysis, see Shazia Choudhry, ‘Article 9 – Right to Marry and Right to Found a Family’ in 
Steve Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart/Beck 2014), 
268-71. 
491 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17 (Explanations to 
EUCFR).  
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guards over individuals seeking authorisation based on the already existing family 
relationship.  
Article 8 ECHR accordingly stipulates:  
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.494 
 
The wording of its first paragraph is nearly identical to that of Article 7  of the 
EUCFR which provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private 
life, home and communications’.495 Although a limitation clause set out in Article 8(2) 
of the ECHR is absent from the corresponding article of the EUCFR, an equivalent 
provision is found in Article 52(1) of the latter which lays down the scope and general 
principles for the Charter interpretation. Article 52(3) of the Charter and its 
Explanations further specify that the meaning and scope of Article 7 are the same as 
those guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR, including the limitations set out in its 
second paragraph. It, therefore, follows that Article 7 of the Charter must be interpreted 
in line with the ECtHR Article 8 case-law,496 although the EU is not precluded from 
granting an individual wider protection.497 Of the four components of both Articles, 
two – namely, private and family life – are of particular importance to this study.  
 
3. Articles 8 and 12 of the ECHR and immigration control  
 
It is a general principle that the state has a power to control the entry and 
residence of foreigners into its territory, subject to its obligations under international 
 
494 Similar provisions are also found in Art 17 ICCPR. In addition, Art 23(1) ICCPR stipulates that 
‘[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society 
and the State’. 
495 Except for the word ‘correspondence’ in Art 8 ECHR, which is substituted by ‘communications’ in 
Art 7 EUCFR to reflect technological developments. See Explanations to EUCFR.  
496 Such an interpretation of Art 7 has also been confirmed by the CJEU. Case C-400/10 PPU [2010] 
ECR  I-08965, para 53. Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and 
Hartmut Eifert [2010] ECR I-11063, paras 51-52. 





law.498 Further, governments are not obliged to guarantee a non-national the right to 
settle in the country.499 Notwithstanding that, the state power to exercise immigration 
control may be limited in some situations where an individual concerned has 
developed a family and/or private life in the host state.  
To be able to invoke the family life limb of Article 8 of the ECHR in the 
migration context, the individual, first, must show that their respective ties constitute  
a family life within the meaning of the Convention. When determining the scope of 
Article 8, the ECtHR has privileged two forms of relationships by recognising them as 
families without requiring any further functional tests: (a) married couples and (b) 
minor children born of a marital or non-marital relationship, whereby the latter are 
regarded as ipso jure part of that family from the moment of their birth, even if their 
parents have separated.500  
In addition, the Court extends its protection to de facto families, such as 
unmarried couples, on the condition that they can demonstrate the existence of close 
personal ties. The factors employed by the ECtHR in its assessment include 
cohabitation (although this is not a requirement),501 the length of the relationship, the 
fact of having children together or the ability to demonstrate their commitment by 
other means.502 A mere desire to found a family would not be sufficient to trigger the 
application of Article 8.503 The only exceptions to this rule are a potential relationship 
which could be developed between a child born out of wedlock and  their biological 
father,504 or parties to a ‘lawful and genuine’505 marriage if the family life ‘has not yet 
to be fully established’.506 
Nevertheless, the recognition of the existence of family life by the ECtHR, 
taken alone, does not protect an individual from removal. The Court has recognised 
immigration control as a legitimate ground for derogation under Article 8(2) and 
confirmed that the Convention does not guarantee a foreign national the right to choose 
 
498 See, for instance, Boujlifa v France (2000) 30 EHRR 419, para 42.  
499 Jeunesse v Netherlands (2014) 60 EHRR 17, para 103. 
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the country of their matrimonial residence and/or enjoy family reunion in its 
territory.507 Article 8 claims from individuals who have developed family life in the 
host country but do not have a valid residence status there are thus typically rejected 
by the Court, save for exceptional situations508 – most notably, where the applicant has 
shown that there are ‘insurmountable obstacles’ to enjoying family life in their country 
of origin.509 Further, if at the point of creation of the family life, the couple was aware 
that it could be obstructed due to the foreign national party’s insecure residence status, 
the removal of the latter would be regarded as a violation of Article 8 only in ‘the most 
exceptional circumstances’.510 The only factor overriding the restrictive approach is 
the best interests of any minor children involved. As stipulated by the Court, these 
must be given sufficient weight when deciding upon the proportionality of the non -
national parent’s removal by virtue of Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.511 As noted in Chapter 3, the Commission Handbook also specifies that, 
before deciding to remove a party to an alleged marriage of convenience, the state 
authorities must consider the best interests of any children involved.512  
Notwithstanding the above, family life is not the only Article 8 component that 
a non-national may invoke to challenge the state’s authority in exercising immigration 
control. In early ECtHR case-law, certain elements of private life were only addressed 
as part of family life considerations.513 The Court, however, has since altered its 
original approach and made a clear distinction between these concepts. The notion of 
‘private life’ within the meaning of Article 8 accordingly covers personal relationships 
(such as those between the individual and their extended family or adult children who 
normally do not fall within the concept of ‘family life’),514 as well as economic and 
social ties. To establish the latter, the Court may take into account such factors as the 
length of residence, education, employment, and the fact of marriage or giving birth in 
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the host state.515 The threshold set up by the ECtHR, nonetheless, is high; before one 
can successfully invoke the ‘private life’ grounds, the individual concerned must 
normally have lived in the host state for many years and even decades.516 
Irrespective of the distinction between the scope of Articles 8 and 12 ECHR, 
when addressing the issue of immigration control, the Court has approached both 
provisions in a similar manner. Under the ECtHR case-law, the states are equally 
permitted to impose far-reaching restrictions of the right of foreigners to marry and to 
found a family. The first key principle established by the Convention institutions is 
that the ECHR does not guarantee the right to marry in a particular country. In A v 
United Kingdom,517 a disabled UK citizen living on benefits sought to challenge the 
refusal of the British authorities to grant entry clearance to his Filipino fiancée whom 
he had only corresponded with but never met.  
The ground of refusal was that she had limited means to  support herself, 
whereas the relevant domestic rules permitted entry in order to marry only in cases 
where the third-country national would not create an extra burden on public funds. The 
EComHR pointed out that Article 12 ‘does not, in principle, include the right to choose 
the geographical location of the marriage’, and that there was no evidence of any legal 
obstacles preventing the applicant from marrying his fiancée in the Philippines. 
Furthermore, the limitation of the right of entry only to those who would definitely be 
able to survive without assistance from public funds was not considered unreasonably 
discriminatory under Article 14. In the view of the EComHR, whilst this requirement 
did not apply to existing dependent spouses, their situation was different from the one 
where the applicant was ‘seeking to establish a new relationship with a foreign person 
whom he has never actually met’. The complaint was consequently rejected.  
The same principle was upheld in App No 10914/84 v Netherlands.518 In 
contrast to the previous case, both applicants were present in the Netherlands and 
complained that they would be prevented from marrying there because of the decision 
to expel the prospective husband to Morocco. The EComHR held this did not 
 
515 Ibid, paras 96, 123.  
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constitute a breach of Article 12, for it did not guarantee the right to marry in a 
particular country or under a particular legal system.  
 
4. The legality of targeting marriages of convenience for 
immigration purposes 
 
4.1 Marriages of convenience in ECtHR case-law 
 
A separate line of Strasbourg case-law deals with the issue of marriages of 
convenience for immigration purposes. First, the Convention institutions have 
confirmed that states may subject proposed marriages involving foreign nationals to 
scrutiny to establish whether they would be ones of convenience, and, if necessary, 
prevent them. Three judgments, delivered in the context of pre-marriage controls, are 
of relevance in this respect.  
In Sanders v France,519 a Turkish-French couple who lived together in Turkey, 
complained of delays encountered in a French consulate general in Istanbul in 
obtaining a certificate of capacity to marry as required under French law. The aim of 
such a certificate, to be issued by the French authorities, was to make sure the intended 
marriage was not one of convenience. The EComHR found the complaint manifestly 
ill-founded. In particular, it was held that the issue concerned substantive rules, the 
purpose of which was inter alia to preclude marriages of convenience between French 
nationals and foreigners, a limitation which did not violate Article 12. In the view of 
the Commission, the delay, although regrettable, did not impair the very essence of the 
right to marry. It therefore follows from the judgment that national authorities are 
authorised to delay an intended marriage between a national and a foreigner for a 
reasonable period to examine its nature.  
Likewise, in Klip & Krüger v Netherlands,520 a Dutch-German couple living in 
the Netherlands sought to challenge a Dutch law on addressing marriages of 
convenience. The respective Act sought to establish a systematic examination of all 
intended marriages where one of the parties did not hold Dutch nationality, and to that 
end required completion of a standard questionnaire. Apart from their personal details, 
the foreign national would be asked to provide information as regards to the period 
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they had already resided in the Netherlands and their residence status. Dutch 
authorities would then verify their immigration history. Only where the authorities had 
reasonable suspicions that the intended marriage was one of convenience, would the 
parties be checked against more detailed criteria. The public prosecutor was, therefore, 
able to oppose a marriage where the primary purpose of one or both parties was to 
obtain entry into the Netherlands.  
The applicants complained that the exercise of their right to marry was unjustly 
delayed on discriminatory and humiliating grounds, i.e., an investigation into the 
motives of their marriage. The EComHR rejected their claim. In its view, prevention 
of marriages of convenience for immigration purposes served a legitimate aim, 
because the Netherlands immigration policy was ‘clearly related to the economic well-
being of the country, in particular to the authorities’ concern, given the population 
density in the Netherlands, to regulate the labour market’. Hence, it was argued that 
the applicant’s obligation to submit a statement did not amount to a breach of Article 
12. Furthermore, it was considered that the resulting difference in treatment between 
Dutch nationals who wished to marry another Dutch national and those who wished to 
marry a foreign national had ‘an objective and reasonable justification’ and therefore 
did not violate Article 14. In other words, the Commission upheld its previous decision 
in Sanders v France, essentially authorising systematic scrutiny of intended marriages 
with a view of establishing their motives.  
Yet the most recent and relevant case in this respect has been the ECtHR 
judgment in O’Donoghue v United Kingdom,521 delivered in late 2010 and specifically 
addressing the Certificate of Approval (CoA) scheme, which was in force in the UK 
from 2005 to 2011.522 At the time of the application, the scheme had already been 
revised several times, but the final appeal at the domestic level was still pending. The 
case brought before the ECtHR concerned a Nigerian national who wished to marry 
his partner, a dual Irish-British national. At the time they became engaged in May 
2006, the TCN party had no valid leave to remain and for this reason , could not qualify 
for a CoA (permission from the Home Office to marry). After the scheme was revised 
to include this group, he did apply for a certificate but meanwhile asked for a waiver 
of the £295 fee, an amount that he could not afford. After the Home Office dismissed 
the latter request, the applicants lodged a complaint with the ECtHR. Although the 
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couple eventually managed to borrow the money from friends and successfully 
obtained the Certificate of Approval, the Strasbourg court decided to rule on the 
compatibility of the scheme with ECHR anyway.  
The Court began its assessment by confirming that, according to the previous 
case-law, the states may be entitled to prevent marriages of convenience, entered solely 
to secure an immigration advantage. Consequently, the national authorities will not 
necessarily breach Article 12 if they subject marriages involving foreign nationals to 
scrutiny – e.g., by requiring them to notify the authorities of an intended marriage, and 
if necessary, asking them to submit information relevant to their immigration status 
and the nature of the marriage. Hence, it was held that the requirement fo r non-EU 
nationals to obtain a CoA before being permitted to marry in the UK was not inherently 
objectionable.523 
Notwithstanding that, the Court reiterated that such interference must meet the 
criteria of proportionality and must not otherwise deprive a person or a category of 
persons of full legal capacity of the right to marry with partners of their choice.524 It 
then went on to remark that the first two versions of the CoA scheme imposed a blanket 
prohibition on the exercise of the right to marry by all persons having a short-term or 
irregular residence status, irrespective of the nature of the proposed marriage and 
without any attempt to investigate it. The Court considered such limitations unjustified 
and falling outside the margin of appreciation granted to the states under ECHR – 
‘even if there was evidence to suggest that persons falling within these categories were 
more likely to enter into marriages of convenience for immigration purposes’.525 
Furthermore, it was held that a sizeable fee which a needy applicant could not afford 
could impair the essence of the right to marry.  
Provided that by the time the judgment in O’Donoghue came out, the CoA 
scheme was already declared unlawful by the House of Lords, the ECtHR ruling did 
not have a significant impact on the rights of foreigners to marry in the UK. 
Nevertheless, the importance of this case cannot be underestimated. Whilst the 
Strasbourg court ruled that national authorities are entitled to carry out pre-marital 
checks on bi-national couples (including those of systematic nature), it also made clear 
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that migrants with an irregular or short-term status, already present in the state, cannot 
be automatically banned from marrying there.  
Meanwhile, the permission granted to the state to carry out checks to attest the 
‘genuineness’ of the marriage is not confined solely to pre-marital situations. The 
ECtHR jurisprudence on Article 8 suggests that already married couples involving 
foreigners may equally be subjected to scrutiny. Although the Court has recognised 
parties to a marriage as de jure families, it has repeatedly emphasised that the concept 
of family life protects only those marriages that are ‘lawful and genuine’,526 and 
excluded marriages of convenience from the scope of Article 8. For instance, in 
Schembri v Malta, it upheld the decision of the national authorities that the marriage 
concerned was one of convenience and ‘there was not a committed relationship which 
was sufficient to attract the application of Article 8’.527 In examining the facts of the 
case, the ECtHR concluded that it did not appear that the couple ‘genuinely wished to 
cohabit and to lead a normal family life’.528 
 
4.2 Methods of investigation and human dignity  
 
Another issue bearing a direct relevance to the subject of this study is the human 
rights constraints on investigation methods employed by the authorities to determine 
the nature of a marriage. Whilst governments are allowed to carry out such checks, 
this power is not unlimited. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Commission Handbook 
grants Member States substantial discretion over the choice of investigation 
techniques, yet refers to Article 4 of the EUCFR (Article 3 of the ECHR) to emphasise 
that these must not subject the individuals to degrading treatment.529  
This point is elaborated in more detail in the CJEU judgment in A, B & C which 
deals with methods for determining the sexual orientation of asylum-seekers whose 
claims are based on the fear of prosecution on the grounds of homosexuality.530 First, 
the Court held that the applicant’s declaration on their sexual orientation alone m ight 
not appear sufficient and thus can merely serve as a starting point in the assessment 
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process.531 Yet, it then proceeded to stress that the assessment techniques employed 
by the authorities must respect the fundamental rights protected by the EUCFR – 
namely, the right to respect for human dignity (Article 1) and the right to respect for 
private and family life (Article 7).532 According to the CJEU, detailed questioning as 
to the applicants’ sexual practices would violate these principles and should be 
prohibited;533 likewise, the Court declared the illegality of personality tests aimed to 
determine their homosexuality, as well as the use of visual evidence of applicants 
performing sexual acts, even if these are provided of their own free will.534   
Although the case was delivered in a different context, it can be argued that its 
findings may well be applicable to marriage investigations. This view was first 
expressed by Betty de Hart, who draws parallels between the homosexuality checks 
and methods of assessing the ‘genuineness’ of the marriage. She observes that both 
are exercised in the context of immigration control and ‘involve the investigation of 
private matters, subjective feelings, as well as sexual and relational behaviour’.535 The 
author of this thesis concurs with this opinion. Highly intrusive and degrading 
questions, such as those of  a sexual nature, would, hence, arguably amount to a 
violation of fundamental rights and should not be used in marriage investigations.  
 
5. ECtHR case-law on marriages of convenience vs EU free 
movement law  
 
The ECtHR case-law on marriages of convenience may have serious 
implications for (prospective) marriages between (mobile) EU citizens and non-EU 
nationals. The principal issue is a very wide margin of discretion left by the ECtHR to 
national authorities, who are now free to impose on couples their own understanding 
of how a marriage of convenience may look like.  
First, it should be remembered that, for the purposes of family reunion under 
the Citizenship Directive, marriage has been accepted as a central organising principle 
acting as a proxy for a stable, long-term commitment. Accordingly, the Directive 
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guarantees protection only to spouses of mobile EU citizens, whereby treatment of 
their unmarried partners entirely depends on the laws of the host Member State. 536 
‘Durable partners’ seeking to benefit from residence rights under the Directive are 
normally subject to close scrutiny537 and need to comply with certain requirements. 
Yet even if the couple intended to enter into marriage, the authorities of the host 
Member State would enjoy absolute discretion in this matter. Among other things, this 
would also mean the absence of the EU safeguards the Member States should respect 
when addressing the issue of marriages of convenience. It is thus somewhat confusing 
that the Commission Handbook refers to the judgment in O’Donoghue538 but fails to 
mention that the safeguards provided by the Handbook do not apply to (yet) unmarried 
couples. 
One of the problematic issues involves defining marriages of convenience that 
are yet to be contracted. Whilst in O’Donoghue, the ECtHR referred to a marriage of 
convenience as one ‘entered solely for the purpose of securing an immigration 
advantage’,539 this passage appears rather vague. Consequently, when investigating 
prospective marriages, Member States may employ a broader definition, potentially 
targeting unions where, e.g., residence is not the sole but primary purpose. Secondly, 
states may systematically examine all intended marriages involving foreigners, a 
measure that cannot be applied to already existing marriages under EU law. As the 
author will show in Chapter 5, the UK authorities indeed conduct systematic checks 
on almost all couples involving non-EU nationals who give a marriage notice at a 
register office. 
The right of EU citizens to marry may be further obstructed by detention and 
removal of their TCN partners prior to the wedding due to their irregular immigration 
status. Chapter 5 will show that such practices are not uncommon in the UK and are 
principally aimed to stop the non-EU national from regularising their situation via 
marriage. Yet the compatibility of such measures with the ECtHR is questionable, 
provided that irregular migrants cannot be automatically precluded from marrying in 
the respective state. It is true that Member States, subject to certain conditions, may be 
entitled to expel a non-EU national without valid leave to remain.540 Notwithstanding 
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that, as long as the non-EU national does not leave the territory of Member State, he 
or she should still be allowed to solemnise their marriage according to the domestic 
rules. To the present date, the ECtHR has not directly addressed this matter; yet such 
a conclusion can be inferred from its case-law which inter alia states that the fact of 
being in detention per se cannot prevent an individual from marrying.541 Soon-to-be-
expelled detainees, however, may not always be provided with such an opportunity, 
for a marriage to their EU partner would automatically enable them to stay in the 
country – a rather unwelcome scenario for the national authorities who strive for the 
opposite outcome.  
Finally, excessive formal requirements may also create additional barriers to 
the solemnisation of marriages involving migrants. For instance, irregular migrants 
and asylum-seekers may arrive in Europe without the relevant identity documents, 
such as a birth certificate and/or passport. They may also be asked to present proof of 
their address, a requirement particularly difficult to satisfy for those irregularly present 
in the state.  
Overall, the possible implications of the ECtHR approach for unmarried 
couples involving EU citizens and non-EU nationals cannot be underestimated. Due 
to the lack of protection guaranteed to their married counterparts under the Citizenship 
Directive, restrictive national measures aimed at preventing marriages of convenience 
may eventually result in the separation of yet unmarried couples or prompt them to 
move to another country. This, in turn, would seriously obstruct the exercise of free 
movement rights by EU citizen parties and hence run contrary to the logic of the CJEU 
expressed inter alia in Metock. Likewise, the human rights law provides little 
protection to already married couples whose marriage is found to be one of 
convenience. Although they may still seek protection on the basis of Article 8 of the 
ECHR, their claim does not have much of a chance to succeed, particularly where the 
authorities had previously disqualified the relationship as not ‘genuine’.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has demonstrated that human rights instruments provide married 
couples with much weaker protection than EU free movement law. In contrast to the 
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latter, the ECtHR jurisprudence neither precludes governments from subjecting 
foreigner-involved marriages to systematic checks, nor obliges them to observe any 
other safeguards concerning targeting perceived marriages of convenience (with 
highly intrusive questions as the only exception). Married EU citizens exercising their 
Treaty rights, therefore, may find themselves in a privileged position compared with 
static nationals of a particular Member State.   
By contrast, the (yet) unregistered partners of EU citizens do not qualify for 
the protection reserved to ‘direct family members’ under the Citizenship Directive. 
Admission of this group is subject to the discretion of national authorities who may 
require unmarried couples to comply with certain conditions and undergo an extensive 
examination of their personal circumstances. The insecurity associated with their 
status may prompt them to enter into marriage, a legal construct that is priv ileged in 
EU law over non-marital relationships. Yet, although the right to marry is protected by 
both the ECHR and the EUCFR as a fundamental right, its exercise may appear 
difficult, particularly where national authorities suspect the couple seeks to enter into 
a marriage of convenience for residence purposes.  
When deciding upon the legality of state-imposed restrictions for non-nationals 
to marry in the country, the Strasbourg court has attempted to strike a balance between 
protecting fundamental rights and acknowledging the state prerogatives in respect of 
immigration control. In its landmark judgment in O’Donoghue, the ECtHR has 
stressed the fundamental nature of the right to marry, prohibiting Member States from 
imposing blanket prohibitions on marriages by persons with an irregular residence 
status. In the meantime, however, the Court upheld the right of the national authorities 
to prevent alleged marriages of convenience from being celebrated, granting the state 
nearly absolute discretion in this matter. As the author will show in Chapter 5, this 
approach, along with lack of protection offered to prospective spouses at the EU level, 
creates hardship for a substantial number of mobile EU citizens and their TCN partners 
in the UK – particularly if the latter have entered the country irregularly, outstayed 
their visas, or are (failed) asylum-seekers. Given the hostile policies pursued by the 
British state coupled with an extremely low level of protection guaranteed to foreigners 
under Article 8 of the ECHR, many unmarried couples involving mobile EU citizens 
risk separation, which in turn, may prompt them to move to another country where 
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CHAPTER 5. Closing the ‘Massive Loophole’: The Concept of 
Marriages of Convenience in UK Law  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Chapter 4, the author has shown that the ECtHR provides national authorities 
with a very wide margin of discretion when it comes to addressing the issue of 
perceived marriages of convenience. The Citizenship Directive affords couples much 
stronger protection from state interference, which is not enjoyed by those (yet) 
unmarried. Consequently, the author argues that mobile EU citizens who meet and 
wish to marry their non-EU national partners in the host Member State may find 
themselves in a disadvantaged position compared to their married counterparts. The 
inability to lawfully live with their close ones in the country of their choice may even 
prompt them to relocate, with their free movement rights seriously obstructed.  
The UK has a long history of reverse discrimination, subjecting its own 
nationals to more restrictive family reunification provisions than EU citizens. Over the 
past two decades, the British government has grown increasingly suspicious towards 
in-country marriages between mobile EU citizens and third-country nationals with an 
unstable or irregular residence status. In a widespread climate of Euroscepticism, the 
rights of family reunion protected by the Citizenship Directive are openly denounced 
in the UK as a ‘loophole’ that enables dishonest individuals to enter into marriages of 
convenience and circumvent restrictive national immigration provisions.  
This Chapter explores how, and in which context, the concept of marriages of 
convenience is reflected in UK law, as far as it concerns EU citizens exercising their 
free movement rights. The Chapter is structured into five parts. The first part provides 
a brief historical overview of the development of UK domestic family reunification 
provisions with a focus on the perceived abuse of law. The following parts offer a 
contemporary perspective on the legislation covering intended and existing marriages 
between EU citizens and their TCN partners. First, the author observes how the UK 
deals with the limitations of EU law concerning pre-marriage controls. With this aim, 
the author discusses the implications of the ‘referral and investigation scheme’, 
introduced as part of the then ‘hostile environment’ policy in 2014, and shows how it 




and assessing if and how EU law protects the families of mobile EU citizens from 
antagonistic policies of the host Member State. To answer this question, the author 
performs an analysis of the implementation of relevant provisions of the Citizenship 
Directive into UK law. Following that, the author describes Home Office practices in 
selecting and investigating suspicious marriages, as well as evaluating their 
compatibility with EU law. Finally, the Chapter briefly explores the relevant 
developments in the UK after Brexit.  
 
2. Historical development of family reunification provisions in 
UK law  
 
2.1 1948 – 1977: The end of free movement for Commonwealth nationals  
 
To better understand the rationale behind the UK approach to perceived 
marriages of convenience involving mobile EU citizens, one needs to look at the 
historical development of the country’s domestic family reunification provisions, 
largely shaped by Britain’s heritage as a postcolonial state. The roots of the present 
legislation date back to the 1940s, a period that was marked by growing calls for 
independence in British colonies. The principal legal instrument in this context is the 
British Nationality Act 1948, which classified all previous subjects of the Crown – 
nationals of the United Kingdom and Colonies and nationals of independent 
Commonwealth countries – as British subjects, and consequently, de facto reaffirmed 
their right to enter and settle in the UK (along with their family members). At the time, 
however, no one expected them to do so. Rather, the Act pursued two interrelated aims: 
(a) to provide a uniform basis for nationality and to consolidate the piecemeal 
citizenship law that had developed after acquisition of different territories by the 
colonial power, and (b) to reassert Britain’s leading role within the Commonwealth.542  
Yet, over the following years, a greater number of Commonwealth citizens 
exercised their right of entry into Britain than had ever done before, most of them 
looking for labour opportunities.543 The first wave of immigration from the Caribbean 
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was followed by a large number of entrants from the Indian subcontinent, whose 
annual rate of entry by the 1960s began to exceed that of the former group. The 
increased migration was met with hostility both by the public and the government: 
non-white migrants were widely perceived as a cause of social and economic 
problems. It was soon concluded at the cabinet-level that there was a need to end the 
‘open-door policy’, which eventually led to the adoption of  the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act in 1962 which introduced a work voucher scheme for Commonwealth 
migrants. 
The imposition of controls on this group can be regarded as a point after which 
family migration became an issue. The adoption of the work voucher scheme  
effectively eliminated the so-called rotating migration where male Commonwealth 
migrants came to the UK to work for a while before returning home again. 544 The 
removal of the ability to leave with a possibility of a later return effectively meant that 
many men chose to stay and call on their wives and children to join them in the UK. 
Given that the Act did not provide any restrictions on the right to be joined by one’s 
family members, this subsequently led to a vast increase in family migration. 
Furthermore, children of migrants over time became of age to marry and started to 
look for a spouse in the country of their ancestors.545  
As a consequence, the focus of British immigration control soon turned from 
primary to secondary immigration, i.e., the entry of family members. As early as 1965, 
family migration was perceived as a problem. The entry of husbands and fiancés 
caused particular suspicion due to the fears that men were entering the UK for work, 
using marriage as a pretext.546 In 1969, instructions were issued to immigration officers 
to limit the admission of husbands and fiancés from the Commonwealth to those 
‘presenting special features’.547  
The process of transforming the status of Commonwealth citizens into that of 
migrant workers was completed with the adoption of the Immigration Act 1971, which 
officially brought an end to primary immigration from the Commonwealth.548 The Act 
effectively created five new categories of British subjects, of which only one, the 
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‘patrial’ citizen, had a ‘right of abode’ in Britain. This category comprised of all those 
having a British grandparent – thus preserving ties to the Old Commonwealth,549 
where larger numbers of British persons had emigrated in the first place. 550 Their 
descendants retained an opportunity to return to Britain, unlike New Commonwealth 
citizens whose status was now increasingly equated with that of foreigners. 
Meanwhile, husbands and fiancés of female Commonwealth citizens could still not be 
admitted, unless ‘special features’ were present. By 1974, due to the pressure for 
reform, the Labour government lifted the ban, so that the position of foreign husbands 
was equated to that of foreign wives.551  
 
2.2 The ‘primary purpose rule’ (1977-1997) 
 
Yet, this liberal turn proved to be short-lived – efforts to prevent the migration 
of husbands took a new turn already in 1977 with the introduction of the so -called 
‘primary purpose rule’, later described as one of the most controversial components of 
historic immigration control. The new system, which developed out of the notion of 
marriages of convenience, eventually had the double effect of reducing the numbers 
of entry clearances granted to applicants and of introducing new but not necessarily 
subtler forms of discrimination.552  
The concept of marriages of convenience seems to have been known in the UK 
since the Second World War. For instance, Ian MacDonald refers to some earlier cases 
of marriages for immigration purposes, mostly involving alien women seeking to settle 
in Britain.553 A reference to such marriages, apparently, was first introduced into 
British immigration law in 1970. The relevant instructions provided that a husband of 
a British woman could be admitted in the UK if inter alia the immigration officer was 
satisfied ‘that the marriage is not one of convenience, entered into to obtain a 
lodgement here’.554 
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Whilst the early case-law on the validity of marriages of convenience 
concerned women, in the 1970s the emphasis gradually shifted to men. The idea that 
many men from the subcontinent would readily arrange a marriage with a British-
settled woman only to be able to live in Britain clearly came into prominence during 
the immigration debates in 1976.555 In 1977, stricter rules were re-imposed on 
husbands. The new measures required the applicant to show that the primary purpose 
of the marriage was not for the husband to obtain admission in the UK, as well as 
introduced a probationary period of 12 months.556  
In 1980, after the election of a Conservative government, a new set of 
immigration rules came into force. First, a slight change was made to the ‘primary 
purpose rule’ which allowed British citizen women born in the UK and with one parent 
born in the UK to sponsor husbands. As Sanjiv Sachdeva argues, this introduced a 
‘two-tier citizenship’ and was clearly designed to allow white British women to 
sponsor husbands while still preventing most non-white women from doing so. The 
new rules also laid down a requirement that the parties should have met. The main idea 
behind these provisions was to reduce the number of women entering into arranged, 
as well as proxy marriages, although there was no founded reason to doubt that parties 
to such marriages genuinely wished to establish a family lif e.557 
Given its restrictive nature, it is rather unsurprising that the ‘primary purpose 
rule’ was eventually challenged before the ECtHR. In its decision of Abdulaziz in 
1985, the Court nonetheless found that UK authorities had not violated Article 8 of the 
ECHR, since there was no obligation on contracting states to respect the choice by 
married couples of the country of their residence.558 With regards to Article 14, the 
Court, in principle, accepted the UK argument that the ‘primary purpose rule’ had the 
legitimate aim of protecting the domestic labour market.559 It nonetheless held that the 
UK had not provided weighty enough reasons to differentiate between men and women 
and therefore was in breach of the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
sex.560 The response of the British government was not to amend the rules so that the 
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more stringent requirements would no longer be applied to husbands and fiancés, but 
to extend them so that they applied equally to wives and fiancées as well.561  
 
2.3 After the ‘primary purpose rule’: Focus on pre-wedding controls 
 
The ‘primary purpose rule’ was ultimately abolished after the election of a 
Labour government in 1997. For the party, this step represented a win-win situation: 
it enabled it to gain credit by resolving a matter of high symbolic value without 
significantly affecting the total immigration numbers.562 The positive effects of the 
denouncement of the discriminatory provision, however, were soon offset by new 
restrictive measures countering perceived marriages of convenience, an issue that 
began to play an increasingly prominent role in public debates.  
At the heart of the government’s concerns was the same old perception of the 
widespread abuse of British immigration rules by men predominantly from the Indian 
sub-continent. With the alleged aim to prevent abuse, the government adopted a 
number of measures effectively making family reunification in the UK more difficult 
and putting obstacles to secondary migration. The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 
introduced a broad definition of a ‘sham marriage’563 and placed a significant focus on 
pre-wedding controls, aimed to prevent such marriages from taking place. In contrast 
to the prior measures that foresaw a possibility for civil registrars to submit reports in 
case of suspicions, section 24(1)(da) of the Act imposed a duty on them to report to 
the Home Office if they have ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that the marriage will 
be a sham marriage’.564 It was also provided that parties to a prospective marriage had 
to give notice of at least 15 days before their planned wedding by personally attending 
the registry office.565 This rule did not apply to those marrying in the Church of 
England.  
The decision to impose a requirement on registrars to carry out immigration 
control functions is problematic. The main task of a civil servant is to assist in the 
registration of a marriage and not to make judgments on the quality of the proposed 
 
561 For an analysis, see, Wray, Regulating Marriage Migration into the UK (n 146), 66. 
562 Ibid 156.  
563 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (IA 1999), s 24(5). For an analysis of the definition, see Section 
3.2 below.  
564 The report form is found in Reporting of Suspicious Marriages and Registration of Marriages 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/3164, sch 1.  




union and determine the motivation of the TCN party. The latter point appears 
particularly controversial since the determination of what should constitute 
‘reasonable grounds’ for suspicion was entirely left to the discretion of the registrar. 
As the author demonstrates below, such an approach not only results in the lack of 
legal certainty for the individuals involved, but also leads to the discrimination of 
certain groups perceived as particularly suspicious. 
  
2.4 Certificate of Approval scheme: Tarring everyone with the same brush  
 
The mid-2000s marked a new phase of targeting alleged marriages of 
convenience via pre-wedding controls. A new piece of legislation, known as the 
Certificate of Approval scheme, introduced blanket measures severely restricting the 
rights of non-EU nationals to marry within the UK. The new Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, which came into force in February 2005, 
explicitly targeted persons with an unstable immigration status. The couples covered 
by the new regime were now required to give notice to a registrar in one of the specified 
registration districts. The registrar, however, would not accept the notice if at least one 
of the prospective spouses was subject to immigration control. All non-EU nationals, 
except those with a fiancé(e) or marriage visit visa566 or indefinite leave to remain, 
were, at considerable cost,567 required to obtain written permission from the Home 
Office to marry.568 The chances for the application to be approved now only depended 
on the residence status of the third-country national. The relevant permission could 
only be granted to those whose initial leave to enter was more than six months long 
and who had at least three months leave remaining. All overstayers or irregular 
migrants, visitors with short-term leave, or those whose leave was about to expire had 
to leave the UK and either marry abroad or apply for a fiancé(e) or a marriage visitor 
visa.569 
The CoA scheme effectively excluded from its scope asylum-seekers still 
waiting for the outcome of their application, as the majority of them did not have leave 
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to enter. If their claim was rejected (and subsidiary status not granted), the permission 
to marry would be denied.570 The only exception from the scheme was granted to those 
getting married in the Church of England: the government argued that there was no 
evidence of marriages of convenience taking place there, since people who wished to 
marry were normally known to the priest of the church.571 
During this period, the public discourse increasingly identified marriages of 
convenience as a serious problem that had reached epidemic proportions, often 
associated with organised crime. This perception seems to be largely fuelled by media 
reports that quoted various estimates that lacked a solid foundation. One claim widely 
reported in the press and later mentioned during parliamentary debates was that one in 
five marriages in London (or around 8,000 marriages per year) was one of 
convenience. The figure was presented by the Superintendent Registrar at Brent 
Register Office, Mark Rimmer, based on the results of the survey carried out amongst 
marriage registrars.572 Yet, this research was never published and was later described 
as ‘impressionistic’,573 which made it impossible to properly evaluate the claims. 
 The intensified focus on marriages of convenience nonetheless resulted in the 
government presenting its scheme to make it ‘more difficult for such marriages to take 
place’.574 It ultimately appeared that its major aim was the reduction of the growing 
number of in-country marriages between third-country nationals and EU citizens, a 
group that was barely mentioned in the early debate but eventually turned out to be the 
principal target of the new policy. During the early 2000s, the UK experienced 
significant growth in applications for asylum, as well as undocumented migration.575 
A number of persons who stayed in the UK without leave married UK-based EU 
citizens, a practice that was increasingly viewed by the government as problematic.  
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In the Lords, Lord Rooker argued that ‘[r]eports from registrars and other 
intelligence sources suggest that fixers of sham marriages are increasingly favouring 
this EEA route’.576 In support of his claim, he quoted the latest Home Office figures 
suggesting that in May 2004, over 60% of all reports submitted by marriage registrars 
involved mobile EU citizens. In his view, this trend emerged because, contrary to TCN 
spouses of British nationals, those married to EU citizens enjoyed an automatic right 
of residence irrespective of their immigration status at the time of marriage. Lord 
Rooker proceeded to note that the investigation of suspicious marriages was ‘a very 
difficult and resource-intensive activity,’ particularly given that in EU cases, the 
burden of proof lay with the Home Office.577 Accordingly, he claimed: ‘[I]f we are to 
stop spouses of EEA nationals abusing immigration law through sham marriages, the 
most effective option is to stop them from getting married in the UK in  [the] first 
place’.578  
The government response to the perceived abuse appeared to be highly 
disproportionate to the proven extent of the problem. Whilst cynically admitting that 
investigating suspicious marriages on a case-by-case basis was too resource intensive, 
the Home Office chose to impose blanket preventative measures, affecting all EU 
citizens who wanted to live in the UK with short-term or irregular migrants. 
Meanwhile, the right of mobile EU citizens to enjoy family life with their intended 
TCN spouses in the country of  their residence was not given any attention at all. By 
ignoring the position of EU citizens as principals and excessively focusing on that of 
their (prospective) family members, the new policies not only prevented couples from 
being together but also arguably ran contrary to the spirit of free movement rights.  
The new regime was strongly criticised by immigrant organisations579 and was 
successfully challenged in courts shortly after its introduction. Already in 2006, the 
High Court found it incompatible with Articles 12 and 14 of the ECHR, a decision that 
was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal, and ultimately, the House of Lords. 
In its judgment in Baiai, the High Court admitted that preventing marriages of 
convenience was a sufficiently important objective to justify limiting the fundamental 
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right to marry;580 yet, it found an infringement of Article 12 of the ECHR due to the 
absence of a rational connection between the scheme and the legislative objective. The 
Court considered the new measures over-inclusive in that ‘all marriages of a party, 
who requires a CoA, are to be regarded automatically as actual or potential marriages 
of convenience’.581 It was further noted that the new scheme did not foresee any 
investigation of the circumstances of the couple, other than the determination of their 
immigration status and any compassionate grounds preventing one or both of the 
parties from returning to their home country and applying for admission into  the UK.582 
Furthermore, the Court found that the exemption for Church of England marriages 
breached Article 14 of the ECHR on the grounds of religion and nationality since 
persons of non-British nationality were less likely to marry in an Anglican religious 
ceremony. 583  
The position of persons who had no valid leave to remain was considered in a 
separate judgment of the Court of Appeal that concluded that the right to marry had to 
be guaranteed to anyone present in the country, irrespective of their immigration 
status.584 Whilst, in theory, the requirement to leave the country and then apply for 
entry clearance from abroad (either with the purpose of marriage or after getting 
married elsewhere) did not prevent the marriage from taking place, this was considered 
a lengthy and complicated process which would become ‘a very strong deterrent to 
exercising marriage rights’, going well beyond the limits permitted by the ECHR.585 
After this view was confirmed by the House of Lords,586 the Home Office considered 
there was no value in continuing to operate the scheme which no longer served its 
original purpose. The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 
2004 and the respective Regulations587 were repealed by a Remedial Order under 
Section 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998,588 thus abolishing the respective measures 
altogether. The CoA scheme officially ceased to exist in May 2011.  
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2.5 The blame misplaced: Citizenship Directive as a ‘loophole’  
 
The period after the abolishment of the CoA scheme was marked by  the 
populist and nationalistic rhetoric of UK policy-makers who placed emphasis on such 
topics as the impact of migration on public finances, potential threats to national 
security, and concerns about the perceived abuse of UK immigration laws.589 The 
Conservative/Liberal coalition in power from 2010 to 2015 came up with a pledge to 
reduce net migration from above 200,000 to ‘tens of thousands’ a year by attracting 
only ‘the brightest and the best’, an aim set up in the Conservative party’s 2010 
manifesto.590 Given that migration of EU citizens to the UK did not fall within its 
competence, the government focused its attention on non-EU nationals. Over the 
preceding few years, spouses of both UK nationals and settled persons and EU citizens 
constituted the largest category amongst this group.591  
In July 2011, the government launched a public consultation on family 
migration, which was followed by significant legislative changes for spouses and 
unmarried partners of static British citizens or settled persons. In 2012, the Home 
Office increased the probation period before indefinite leave to remain could be 
granted from 2 to 5 years, as well as introduced the requirement for the relationship to 
be ‘genuine and subsisting’.592  
The most far-reaching measure, however, was the introduction of the onerous 
financial requirements for British citizens who wished to live in the UK with their 
TCN spouses. To sponsor a foreign national, one now had to earn at least £18,600 per 
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15/10, August 2010) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/11
6016/hosb1510.pdf> accessed 22 August 2020, 87. 
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year (plus extra for sponsoring children), a threshold that has been impossible to meet 
by a large part of the adult working population.593 Apart from that, the couples 
continued to be subject to the already existing domestic family reunification rules 
which required them to show (1) their intention to live together permanently as 
husband and wife, (2) that they have met, and (3) their ability to maintain and 
accommodate themselves without recourse to public funds. The burden of proof in 
these cases remained on the applicant. Furthermore, the ‘no-switching rule’, 
introduced in 2002 with a view to tackling marriages of convenience involving UK 
nationals,594 prohibited non-EU nationals with leave to remain of up to six months 
from switching to the marriage category within the UK and required them to leave the 
country and apply from abroad.595 
The new measures created a significant dichotomy between the treatment of 
UK nationals and EU citizens, further deepening the reverse discrimination of the 
former group. In the official discourse, EU citizenship was increasingly portrayed as a 
threat to British sovereignty and a ‘loophole’ enabling the circumvention of domestic 
immigration laws via marriage migration.596 This perception was fuelled, not least, by 
the CJEU judgment in Metock in 2008, after which the UK had to renounce its 
discriminatory provision which put obstacles to EU citizens who wished to live in the 
UK with their TCN spouses with a short-term or irregular status.597 The two issues 
identified as the most problematic in this respect were the reliance of British citizens 
on the Surinder Singh route to bring themselves within the scope of EU law, and 
perceived marriages of convenience between mobile EU citizens and third -country 
nationals. 
The latter, inter alia, found its reflection in the perception of the problem by 
civil registrars. In 2012, nearly 60% of section 24 reports involved nationals of another 
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EU Member State, the rest being British nationals.598 Among the TCN spouses of EU 
citizens, the main focus was placed on men coming from former British colonies. In 
2012, the top nationals most frequently identified by registrars as suspicious were 
Pakistani, Nigerian and Indian, who collectively accounted f or two-thirds of the total 
number of section 24 reports that year.599 Along with foreigners with short-term or 
irregular status, students became another group viewed with particular suspicion. In 
2012, nearly half of all section 24 reports involved non-EU nationals studying in the 
UK. The Home Office linked this development with the tightening of rules on 
extending student leave which non-EU nationals attempt to bypass by entering 
suspected ‘sham marriages’.600 
In addition to elements of racial, class and gender profiling of non-EU 
nationals, the discourse of suspicion also expanded to certain categories of their EU 
partners, effectively turning them into ‘second class’ EU citizens. The first such group 
involved naturalised EU citizens marrying migrants from their countries of origin, such 
as Nigeria, Ghana, and Pakistan, all former British colonies.601 Particular suspicion 
was cast on those married by proxy.602 Such marriages are not allowed in the UK but 
are legal in some countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria, provided that the ceremony 
with the participation of the appointed proxy takes place in that country with regards 
to the necessary formalities. Although in this case the marriage is recognised in the 
UK as valid,603 the UK authorities began to consistently associate proxy marriages 
with abuse. For instance, as part of the evidence of the perceived abuse of free 
movement, provided to the European Commission in 2013, UK authorities noted that, 
in a selected sample of residence card applications, 16% involved marriages by proxy, 
a number that was considered disproportionate. It was suggested that such marriages 
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were used to avoid the scrutiny of civil registrars who may raise concerns about the 
nature of the intended marriage.604  
The second group of EU citizens treated with particular suspicion were female 
nationals of EU-8 Member States marrying men from African countries and the Indian 
Subcontinent who the women met when the men were already in the UK. Among 
mobile EU citizens, the top nationalities referred by the registrars to the Home Office 
in 2012 were Hungarians, Lithuanians, and Polish.605 In this context, the UK 
authorities started to frequently express concerns about ‘a pattern of East European 
brides matched with men from very different cultures’, most notably Pakistani, Indian, 
Bangladeshi, Ghanaian and Nigerian nationals,606 and often link this trend with human 
trafficking.607  
During this period, the Home Office strategy at the pre-marriage stage 
continued to involve liaising with civil registrars and preventing perceived ‘sham 
marriages’. Immigration officers appeared in the registry office before the ceremony 
and interviewed suspicious couples. In case it was concluded that their intended 
marriage was not ‘genuine’, it was not allowed to proceed; parties with no valid leave 
in the UK were issued removal notices. Such operations were normally conducted on 
an ad hoc basis following a section 24 report by a registrar.608 As an example, under 
the ‘Operation Mellor’ initiative, which ran in the first nine months of 2013, the Home 
Office carried out 500 enforcement operations which lead to 334 arrests and 78 
removals.609 In total, there were over 650 arrests made in 2013 as a result of marriage 
abuse enforcement visits.610  
The practice of aggressively disrupting intended weddings may have targeted 
many couples in a close relationship. Not least due to the time restraints, the decisions 
on the nature of a marriage were made hastily and without due care, which provided a 
reason to seriously doubt their credibility. This can be best illustrated by paradoxical 
situations where non-EU nationals were first prevented from getting married but were 
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then granted a residence card on the basis of a durable relationship with an EU 
citizen.611  
 
3. Pre-marriage controls: ‘Referral and investigation scheme’ 
 
3.1 Immigration Act 2014: ‘Sham marriages’ and ‘compliant 
environment’ 
 
The Immigration Act, adopted in 2014, marks the most recent phase of 
targeting persons with a precarious residence status. The government’s preoccupation 
with irregular migrants allegedly abusing the system resulted in creation of the so -
called ‘hostile environment’ – a set of wide-ranging exclusionary measures with the 
overall aim to ‘reduce illegal immigration and to take a tougher approach to dealing 
with those who have either entered the country illegally or overstayed their visa’. 612 
Whilst welcoming ‘the brightest and the best’, the government intended to make the 
life of those who were deemed unwanted more difficult, ‘encouraging them to  
depart’.613 The provisions of the new Immigration Act inter alia denied irregular 
migrants the right to access to basic services, such as rented accommodation,614 bank 
accounts615 or issuance of driving licenses.616 Landlords were required to check the 
residence status of their prospective tenants, facing considerable civil penalties for 
non-compliance.617 In addition, the Act introduced a new scheme aiming to prevent 
‘sham marriages’,618 increased the powers of authorities to identify persons without 
leave and remove them,619 and limited appeal rights to only those who had made an 
asylum or human rights claim.620 Many of these measures were further reinforced by 
the Immigration Act 2016.  
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Rather unsurprisingly, the ‘hostile environment’ policy has long been subject 
to considerable criticism.621 The growing discontent over the adverse impact of such 
measures reached its peak in late 2017 to early 2018, amidst the scandal concerning 
the treatment of the so-called ‘Windrush generation’ – the term commonly referred to 
Commonwealth citizens who had arrived in the UK prior to 1973.622 In response to 
public and opposition pressure,623 the government launched a scheme aiming to 
confirm the right of such individuals to live in the UK,624 as well as suspended or 
reduced the scope of some of its ‘hostile environment’ measures. The government also 
softened its language and substituted the term ‘hostile environment’ with ‘compliant 
environment’.625 The strategy suffered another major defeat in March 2019 when the 
High Court outlawed the scheme forcing landlords to check the immigration status of 
prospective tenants, declaring it incompatible with Article 14 of the ECHR.626  
Nevertheless, softening or abolishing its most controversial measures does not 
mean that the whole policy has come to a complete stop. So far, for instance, the Home 
Office has announced no plans to review its provisions targeting suspected sham 
marriages which form three separate chapters of the 2014 Immigration Act. Similarly 
as with the CoA scheme, the government places its main focus on pre-wedding 
controls, focusing on non-EU nationals without indefinite leave to remain. The new 
‘referral and investigation scheme’ significantly altered the prior system and 
introduced systematic checks of all intended marriages involving foreigners who, in 
the view of the government, could gain from the union ‘an immigration advantage’.627 
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The pressing need for change was repeatedly explained by the growing number 
of section 24 reports since the abolishment of the CoA scheme and the lack of Home 
Office capacities to act thereupon. According to the Home Office, there were 1,891 
reports received in 2012, an increase of 8.6% from 2011, and 110% from 2010,628 
whereby over half of them involved EU citizens. Meanwhile, it was argued that the 
15-day notice was too short for the Home Office to assess the information and act 
before the marriage took place – e.g., arrange a home visit or register office 
attendance.629 The registrars also believed that there was significant underreporting of 
suspected marriages of convenience since they did not interview the couples in-depth. 
630 
Against this background, the numbers provided by the Home Office in support 
of their initiative deserve closer attention. To begin with, there was a lack of 
comprehensive and reliable statistics of marriages identified as ‘sham’ by immigration 
authorities. The respective determinations on individual cases were not aggregated in 
national reporting systems and were only held with paper case files or within the notes 
sections of the Home Office databases. However, manual case searches to collate the 
data would, in the view of Home Office, be ‘disproportionately expensive’.631 In the 
meantime, the obviously more easily obtained estimates of the occurrence of sham 
marriages appear inaccurate, misleading, and largely unfounded.632 First, it should be 
noted that the rise in section 24 reports is not necessarily linked to the real-life increase 
in the number of sham marriages, as suggested by the Home Office. Rather, we should 
be talking of the growing perception of such an increase by civil registrars and the 
development of ‘risk profiles’ where certain combinations of nationality or 
immigration status of a non-EU national were seen as particularly suspicious. 
Furthermore, it is quite likely that the very fact of a TCN partner having an irregular 
status frequently resulted in section 24 reports,633 whilst the CoA scheme, in force from 
2005 to 2011, effectively banned irregular migrants from marrying in the UK. It should 
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be noted that in 2004, immediately prior to the introduction of the scheme, the Home 
Office received 3,578 such reports, nearly twice as many as in 2012.  634 
Another figure frequently quoted by the Home Office was that 4,000 to 10,000 
applications a year to stay in the UK were made on the basis of  sham marriages.635 
However, the calculation methodology used by the Home Office is highly questionable 
at best.636 Yet, despite the lack of reliable statistical evidence that sham marriages 
indeed pose a significant threat to immigration control, the Home Office estimates 
have been used as a foundation for new rules which came into force in March 2015.  
Part 4 of the 2014 Immigration Act imposed a duty on civil registrars to refer 
to the Home Office, all proposed marriages involving non-EU nationals without a 
permanent immigration status or a valid marriage visitor or fiancé(e) visa.637 All 
couples involving non-EU nationals irrespective of their residence status,638 are now 
required to give notice of a marriage at one of the ‘designated’ register offices 
(DROs).639 Ecclesiastic marriages are also included in the scope of the Act: the right 
to marry following banns or by common license is now only reserved to nationals of 
the UK and EU Member States. All other couples are now able to marry in the Church 
of England only after completing civil preliminaries, similarly to those using other 
religious services. The rationale for this was that civil registrars would be better 
equipped to determine the immigration status of a non-EU national.640  
In addition to the duty to refer to the Home Office, all intended marriages 
covered by the scheme, the registrars continue to be required to submit section 24  
reports. The 2014 Immigration Act extended this requirement to cases where a sham 
marriage is suspected before notice has been given. For example, when the couple 
visits the register office to make an appointment.641 In addition, schedule 6 of the Act 
provides that a civil registrar may disclose any information or supply any document to 
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the Home Office for immigration purposes (e.g., about a foreigner without leave) while 
registering a birth or death. 642 
To provide the Home Office with more time to carry out checks, the new rules 
also extended the marriage minimum notice period from 15 days to 28 for all couples 
undergoing a civil ceremony within the country, irrespective of their immigration 
status.643 The Home Office will then consider whether there are ‘reasonable grounds’ 
for suspecting that the intended marriage is a sham and whether to investigate the case. 
If the Home Office decides not to investigate, it will notify the register office, and the 
couple will be able to marry once the 28-day notice period has expired.  
In contrast, if the marriage is to be investigated, the notice period will be 
extended to 70 days, during which the couple may be required to undergo an 
investigation. If the parties, without ‘reasonable excuse’, fail to comply with the 
investigation, e.g., by not attending the interview or not providing the 
documents/information requested, they will be unable to marry and will need to give 
notice again should they still wish to do so.644  
Where the Home Office is satisfied that the parties have complied with the 
investigation, they will be allowed to marry, even where the Home Office believes that 
their marriage is a sham. However, in this case, the Home Office may take enforcement 
action against either relevant party, or both of them, before or after the end of the 70-
day period.645 Yet even if the enforcement decision is not taken and the alleged 
marriage of convenience is allowed to proceed, the Home Office would normally 
refuse any subsequent residence application made by the relevant non-EU national on 
the basis of marriage.646 This approach signalled a shift of emphasis from disrupting 
alleged sham marriages to preventing a non-EU national from obtaining leave to 
remain on this basis. The Home Office claimed that the new scheme would act as a 
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significant deterrent against such unions, as well as help disrupt organised crime 
groups who arrange sham marriages for profit. 647 
 
3.2 Definition of a ‘sham marriage’ 
 
In contrast to the Citizenship Directive, UK domestic immigration law 
continues to employ the term ‘sham marriage’ to designate marriages contracted for 
immigration purposes. The 2014 Immigration Act amends the definition of a ‘sham 
marriage’ under the existing legislation to cover those seeking to obtain the right of 
residence based on the Citizenship Directive, as transposed in UK law. The new 
definition reads as follows: 
 
A marriage (whether or not it is void)648 is a ‘sham marriage’ if— 
a) either, or both, of the parties to the marriage is not a relevant national,649 
b) there is no genuine relationship between the parties to the marriage, and 
c) either, or both, of the parties to the marriage enter into the marriage for 
one or more of these purposes — 
i.avoiding the effect of one or more provisions of United 
Kingdom immigration law or the immigration rules;650    
ii. enabling a party to the marriage to obtain a right conferred by 
that law or those rules to reside in the United Kingdom.651 
 
 
Apart from supplementing the earlier definition with the additional provision 
(ii) with an apparent reference to EU Treaty rights, the 2014 Act also specified that, 
for a marriage to qualify as a sham, there should be no ‘genuine relationship’ between 
the parties. The wording of this definition is similar to the one provided by the 
Citizenship Directive and the Commission Handbook, yet the two do not exactly 
match. Two key differences can be distinguished: (1) in the reference to the purpose 
of the marriage under the Immigration Act, the word ‘sole’ is omitted, and (2) the EU 
law definition does not include a specific provision as to the genuineness of the 
relationship. It should be remembered, however, that, marriages that are yet to be 
 
647 Home Office, ‘Tackling Sham Marriage: Impact Assessment’ (n 600), 1. 
648 For an analysis of the concept of ‘sham marriages’ in UK family law, see section 4.7 below. 
649 A ‘relevant national’ is defined here as a UK, EEA or Swiss citizen. IA 1999, s 24(6). 
650 ‘UK immigration law’ is defined here to include EEA Regulations. See Immigration Act 2014, 
Explanatory Notes s 55(320).  
651 IA 1999 s 24(5) as amended by IA 2014 s 55(2). A similar definition is provided for ‘sham civil 




contracted escape the ambit of EU law; hence, Member States are entitled to define 
marriages for immigration purposes without having regard to the definition provided 
in the Citizenship Directive. As explored in Chapter 4, the ECtHR has equally left the 
contracting states wide discretion in this matter; therefore, choosing their own 
definition of ‘sham marriages’ does not result in the breach of Article 12 of the ECHR. 
Notwithstanding that, the definition of ‘sham marriages’ found in national immigration 
law may lead to important implications for prospective marriages involving EU 
citizens and their TCN partners. 
First, it is regrettable that the Immigration Act definition omits the word ‘sole’  
and only refers to the ‘purpose’ instead. Taken alone, such wording may cover 
situations where securing residence rights for the TCN spouse is not the sole but the 
primary purpose of the marriage. However, this flaw is mitigated by the requirement 
of the absence of a ‘genuine relationship’ between the parties. Indeed, if the couple is 
in a relationship but wishes to get married to enable the TCN partner to stay in the UK 
with their spouse, their situation would not fall within the ‘sham marriage’ definition. 
It should, however, be stressed that the absence of the relationship between the 
parties alone does not necessarily suggest that they do not intend to lead a family life. 
It must be recalled that the definition of ‘marriages of convenience’ provided in the 
Citizenship Directive is narrow and, in principle, does not require the couple to have a 
relationship at all – neither before, nor after the marriage.652 What needs to be 
established is only that the sole purpose of the couple on the wedding day is to enable 
the TCN party to settle in the respective EU Member State. The situations where there 
is no relationship between the parties before the marriage may include arranged 
marriages or any other cases where parties refrain from having pre-marital 
relationships and/or cohabiting – e.g., due to religious or other beliefs. Hence, under 
the Immigration Act, couples in such situations enjoy less protection than guaranteed 
by the Citizenship Directive should it apply at the pre-marriage stage.  
Moreover, given that arranged marriages are often entered into by EU citizens 
with foreign roots, an increasing suspicion towards this group may result in disguised 
discrimination on the basis of race and religion. The author’s principal concern, 
however, relates to the interpretation of the concept of the ‘genuine relationship’, given 
 
652 Although the Commission Handbook makes a puzzling reference to the ‘predominant purpose’ 




a wide variety of relationship patterns and behaviours in the increasingly globalised 
world. 
 
3.3 Compliance with an investigation 
 
If the Home Office decides to investigate a case, the couple may be required to 
contact its staff to arrange an interview.653 The parties must be given at least three 
working days written notice of the date, place and time of the interview.654 If the parties 
are unable or no longer able to attend the interview at the date proposed by the 
investigation officer, they may set an alternative time for it to take place.655 It is, 
however, stressed that the Home Office will not normally agree to rearrange an 
interview more than once, and failure, without reasonable excuse, to attend the 
interview at any of the dates proposed to the parties may be regarded as a failure to 
comply with the investigation.656 A short interview notice and limited flexibility in 
accommodating the parties’ preferences may create difficulties for couples, for 
example, due to their work and travel arrangements.  
Notwithstanding the above, the most problematic issue in this context is the 
pattern of excessive demands for additional documentary evidence at the interview 
stage. The solicitors interviewed complained about the standard Home Office letters 
containing a list of documents their clients are asked to bring with them on the 
interview day, a practice which is described as widespread.657 Those unable to do so 
risk being considered non-compliant with an investigation.658 In their letters, the Home 
Office requires both parties to provide the following:  
 
1) Passport(s) current and previous – covering the relationship duration; 
2) Birth certificates for any dependant(s); 
3) Marriage/divorce certificate and details of previous marriages; 
 
653 Proposed Marriages Regulations, reg 5. Immigration practitioners interviewed reveal that not all 
couples whose notices have been extended to 70 days are called for an interview, yet are nonetheless 
considered compliant with an investigation. Interview with David Tang (n 1); Interview with Nath 
Gbikpi, immigration solicitor at Wesley Gryk Solicitors (London, 21 February 2019).  
654 Proposed Marriages Regulations, reg 5. 
655 Ibid, reg 11. 
656 Home Office, ‘Marriage Investigations’ (Version 3.0, 13 February 2019), 20.  
657 Interviews with David Tang (n 1) and Nath Gbikpi (n 653). 
658 Such concerns were also raised by other legal practitioners quoted in UK media. See Robert Wright, 
‘Crackdown on Sham Marriages Leaves Migrants in Limbo’ (Financial Times, 09.09.2018) 




4) Bank statements to cover the last six months from all accounts held, 
including any that are held overseas;  
5) Details of any credit card(s) the person may have, and statements for 
them for the last six months; 
6) Documentary evidence of tenancy/rental agreement to include named 
person(s) including evidence of payments plus details of their 
Tenancy Deposit Scheme. Mortgage provider if appropriate (if 
renting, full details of landlord/letting agent are required – name, 
address telephone numbers and e-mail address); 
7) Local authority/council tax payments to include the named person(s); 
8) National Insurance card and number(s); 
9) Full or provisional UK driving licence; 
10) Evidence of employment in the form of wage-slips or employment 
contract; 
11) Benefits/council entitlement payment(s); 
12) Photos/family members where relevant; and 
13) Any other evidence, either jointly or separately for consideration of 
cohabitation. 
 
It is further noted that failure to provide the requested documents on the relevant day, 
without a reasonable excuse, may lead to non-compliance action and, consequently, 
the inability to get married.659 
The list above is astonishing in its length, scope and degree of intrusion into 
the couple’s private matters. The applicants are required to reveal all their financial 
details to the authorities on the sole basis that their prospective marriage, for unknown 
reasons, is suspected to be a sham. Furthermore, most of the documents requested are 
particularly difficult to provide for non-EU nationals with no legal right to live in the 
UK. In the view of the ‘compliant environment’ policy, landlords may appear 
extremely reluctant to sign an official rental agreement with someone irregularly in the 
UK, let alone reveal their own names and contact details to the Home Office. The 
parties may also live with their relatives or friends or have other types of informal 
arrangements. For instance, one couple that involved an unauthorised migrant from 
 





Albania was unable to submit his tenancy agreement as he was living rent-free with a 
disabled man he was helping. Their application was consequently rejected. 660 The 
requirement to provide bank statements from all accounts held is also highly 
problematic, e.g., where a person has not used an account for a long time. 661 
Furthermore, irregular migrants who are not authorised to work and use their bank 
account for transactions may be reluctant to reveal it out of fear of having it blocked. 
A solicitor interviewed recalls a case where an investigation officer saw the entry of 
money into a non-EU national’s bank account, despite him not having a valid 
immigration status in the UK. When he confirmed he was working in the UK, the 
officer made a moral judgment about his activity, asking him if he regretted ‘doing 
what he was not allowed to do’.662 In another case, a person was ruled non-compliant 
with the investigation because he failed to provide bank statements covering the last 
six months for an account that was opened only four months earlier.663  
According to the Home Office guidance, a ‘reasonable excuse’ for non -
compliance may exist, for example, where (1) there are compelling, compassionate 
reasons for failure to comply with the requirement; (2) there are reasons beyond the 
control of the relevant parties and (3) there has been an administrative failure by the 
Home Office.664 Yet, immigration practitioners complain that this provision is often 
interpreted too narrowly, which results in couples being rejected for purely 
bureaucratic reasons unrelated to the nature of their planned marriage.  
For those unable to deliver all the documents requested, it is advised to provide 
an explanation of their absence. For example, a letter from a friend the applicants live 
with, giving evidence of that friend’s identity and the right to occupy the property. It 
is reported that in a number of cases, such evidence was accepted by the Home 
Office.665 However, this may not always happen. One example concerns a couple who 
were expecting a baby together but did not have a tenancy agreement as they lived 
 
660 Wright (n 658).  
661 Interview with David Tang (n 1). 
662 Interview with Nath Gbikpi (n 653). 
663 Wright (n 658).  
664 Home Office, ‘Marriage and Civil Partnership Referral and Investigation Scheme: Statutory 
Guidance for Home Office Staff’ (March 2015) (Marriage Investigation Scheme: Home Office 
Guidance), 24. 





with the non-EU national’s sister. Her letter explaining their situation proved 
insufficient, whereby the Home Office did not even attempt to interview the parties.666  
A fundamental problem with the list above is the absence of a direct link 
between the requested documents and the nature of a prospective marriage. According 
to the Home Office Regulations and Guidance, the purpose of an investigation is to 
determine whether a proposed marriage is a sham.667 It is, however, unclear how this 
type of evidence would help the Home Office in reaching such a decision.  
Moreover, excessive and unreasonable documentary requirements, as well as 
the lack of flexibility in arranging interviews amounts to a potential breach of Article 
12 of the ECHR.668 As explored in Chapter 4, the ECHR, in essence, allows a 
contracting state to require parties of the prospective marriage to undergo an 
investigation.669 The ECtHR has not further elaborated on the scope of such a 
requirement; nonetheless, the fundamental nature of the right to marry suggests that 
the concept of lack of compliance must be interpreted narrowly – i.e., confined to a 
refusal to undergo an investigation whatsoever. Hence, preventing someone from 
getting married only because they are unable to attend an interview at offered dates or 
fail to provide bank statements or a tenancy agreement is clearly disproportionate. 
Furthermore, it represents a direct attack on their human rights which, most likely, 
would not stand a court challenge.670  
The next key element that may determine the outcome of an investigation is 
the manner the interview is conducted in. Whilst this issue is extensively discussed in 
Sections 5.1 - 5.6 below, at this point it is sufficient to note that failure to respond to 
any question asked during an interview (or a refusal to answer any further questions 
thereby bringing the interview to an end) may be regarded as non-compliance with the 
investigation.671 In the author’s view, this provision is highly problematic and clearly 
goes beyond what is permitted under the ECHR. As ILPA rightly points out, there are 
many reasons for not answering the question, including confusion and 
 
666 Wright (n 658).  
667 Proposed Marriages Regulations, reg 3(2); Marriage Investigation Scheme: Home Office 
Guidance, 14.  
668 This view is also supported by David Tang (n 1) and Nath Gbikpi (n 653). 
669 Klip & Krüger v Netherlands (n 520). 
670 Indeed, an immigration practitioner the author interviewed has seen cases where marriages have been 
accepted as not sham marriages but were not allowed to proceed because of incompliance with the 
formalities. Interview with Nath Gbikpi (n 653). 





embarrassment.672 The person may also reasonably refuse to answer any highly 
personal or intimidating questions if they are asked by an immigration officer. 
 
3.4 Implications of giving a marriage notice in the UK 
 
The ‘referral and investigation scheme’ subjects couples involving foreign 
nationals to considerable uncertainty. EU citizens whose TCN partners have no valid 
leave to remain face a particularly high risk of being separated. Paradoxically, the very 
fact of giving a marriage notice with the aim to live together lawfully in the country of 
their current residence will automatically mean coming to the attention of the Home 
Office, which may eventually lead to an opposite outcome.  
As demonstrated above, it is compliance or lack of compliance with the 
investigation and not the nature of the prospective marriage that directly impacts on 
the couple’s right to marry. Yet, irrespective of whether or not the couple has complied 
with an investigation and if it has even been started in the first place,673 unauthorised 
migrants may be removed from the UK anytime before their marriage is registered. 
This has been repeatedly emphasised in the relevant Home Office guidance. In 
particular, it is stated that the Home Office may take enforcement action where a 
person meets all of the following criteria: (1) he/she is the ‘genuine unmarried partner’ 
of an EU citizen, (2) he/she does not yet hold an EEA residence card674 issued on this 
basis, and (3) he/she is ‘an immigration offender’. The latter designation includes, 
‘overstayers, illegal entrants, [people who are in] breach of [immigration] conditions, 
and [people who have obtained] leave [to remain] by deception’.675 In this case, the 
Home Office may start a standard administrative procedure under section 10(1) of the 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 which provides for the removal of a person who 
‘requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom but does not have it’. 
Once a person is married to an EU citizen, he or she automatically qualifies as 
a family member under the Citizenship Directive and can be removed only if their 
 
672 ILPA, ‘Comments for the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. Review of Sham 
Marriages’ (31.08.2016).  
673 Immigration practitioners and media report about cases where the couple were informed that their 
relationship would not be investigated but their wedding was still interrupted by immigration officials 
with a view of detention and removal of a TCN partner. See, Diana Taylor and Frances Perraudin, 
‘Couples Face ‘Insulting’ Checks in Sham Marriage Crackdown’ (The Guardian, 14.04.2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/apr/14/couples-sham-marriage-crackdown-hostile-
environment> accessed 24 August 2020.  
674 For more details on EEA residence cards, see Section 4.4 below.  




marriage is found to be one of convenience. The Home Office, however, frequently 
seeks to remove ‘undesirable’ persons before this point, effectively preventing their 
marriage from taking place even if it is accepted as genuine. Paragraph 323(i) in 
conjunction with paragraph 322(5) of the Immigration Rules provide for curtailment 
of migrant’s leave if their conduct, character or associations make it undesirable to 
permit them to remain in the UK but they do not reach the deportation threshold. 
Paragraph 322(5) does not only apply to criminal cases but also to non-EU nationals 
seeking to enter into a ‘sham marriage’. Once the investigation has confirmed that this 
is indeed the case, the file is passed on to the curtailment team who then decides 
whether the curtailment of leave is appropriate. This is done on the basis of the 
evidence provided by the immigration officers, such as the record of the marriage 
interview highlighting discrepancies in responses to their questions. The decision must 
be made on the balance of probabilities, whereby the caseworker must ‘f ully evaluate 
the evidence provided by the ICE team, and any other relevant evidence or information 
about the migrant’.676  
This requirement, however, is difficult to satisfy, given that the decision must 
be already made on the same day as the referral, or the next day if impossible. As 
explained in the guidance, ‘[t]he individuals concerned will usually have been arrested 
by ICE teams. If curtailment is appropriate in the circumstances of the individual case, 
a swift decision may allow them to be kept in detention and removed soon 
afterwards’.677 It is further noted that curtailment should normally be with immediate 
effect.678  
This approach is highly problematic. An erroneous assessment of the couple ’s 
circumstances, followed by a speedy curtailment and/or removal procedure will 
normally result in their separation, as well as deprive them of their fundamental right 
to marry. Yet the capability of curtailment caseworkers to evaluate the evidence is 
questionable, not only due to the time restraints, but also, more generally, because they 
are neither ready, nor expected to perform a thorough review of Home Office decisions 
concerning alleged sham marriages.  
Apart from this category of persons, the prospect of being detained for removal 
at any point either before, during, or after the interview is faced by all non-EU nationals 
 
676 Home Office, ‘Curtailment’ (Version 18.0, 19.12.2019), 19 .  
677 Ibid 18. 





with no valid leave to remain, irrespective of whether their marriage is considered a 
sham.679 Even if the TCN partner is not detained during the interview and has complied 
with an investigation, there is no guarantee that they will not be arrested on their 
wedding day which would effectively prevent them from marrying. Detention of a 
person pending their removal is allowed under paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the 
Immigration Act 1971. 
Yet, where the couple have complied with an investigation, the very fact of 
detention of the TCN partner alone should not preclude them from getting married in 
the UK. There are two main routes of getting married prior to the TCN partner’s 
removal from the state: arranging for a civil ceremony whilst in detention or doing so 
upon their release on bail. According to the relevant Home Office instructions, 
detainees should be allowed to marry, provided that the immigration removal centre 
(IRC) staff escorts the detainee both to give notice of the marriage at the local DRO 
and to the ceremony itself.680 One of the immigration practitioners confirmed in an 
interview that his client was indeed escorted to the ceremony in handcuffs. 681 
Alternatively, the couple can have a wedding ceremony if the detainee has been 
released on bail.682  
Meanwhile, it should be stressed that the foreigner’s options to challenge the 
decision to detain and remove them are limited. At present, the rights of appeal are 
basically confined to (1) refusal of a human rights or asylum claim, (2) refusal of a 
visa and refusal to vary leave to remain in some situations, where the application was 
made before the Immigration Act 2014 was in force, (3) refusal to issue an EEA family 
permit,683 and (4) deprivation of citizenship.684 Unless any of these claims are made, 
an unauthorised migrant or someone whose leave was curtailed does not have a right 
of appeal. An alternative option would be to lodge judicial review proceedings that 
will normally suspend removal685 and enable the couple to gain time, which, in some 
 
679 For instance, according to the facts of Seferi & Anor, R (On the Application Of) v SSHD [2018] 
EWHC 287 (Admin), the Home Office issued a notice stating that the couple had complied with an 
investigation only to detain the irregularly present TCN partner on the very same day. 
680 Home Office, ‘Marriage/Civil Partnership’ (Detention Services Order 06/2015, Version 1.1, April 
2016), paras 2, 5.  
681 Interview with David Tang (n 1). 
682 Under sch 10 of the Immigration Act 2016, the bail may be granted either by the Home Office or the 
First-tier Tribunal, provided inter alia that the person is not intended to be removed within 14 days of 
the bail hearing.  
683 For more details on EEA family permits, see Section 4.3 below. 
684 See Home Office, ‘Rights of Appeal,’ (Version 8.0, 31.01.2020), 6.  





situations, may prove sufficient for them to undergo a marriage ceremony. A claim for 
judicial review, is, however, unlikely to be satisfied, particularly where the only reason 
for detention and removal is the non-EU national’s irregular status. The latter will also 
cover cases where a prospective marriage is found to be a sham. In Seferi & Anor, it 
was held that even where the conclusion about the adverse nature of their intended 
marriage ‘infected’ the Home Office’s decision to remove the applicant, the legal basis 
for it was his adverse immigration status.686  
To protect the position of unauthorised migrants before their marriage, 
solicitors recommend them to submit a human rights (e.g., under Article 8 of the 
ECHR) or protection claim immediately after giving a marriage notice. Even if there 
is no realistic chance to succeed, this type of application will suspend removal. If it 
remains pending until after the end of the notice period, the non-EU national will be 
able to marry in the UK. The Home Office, however, tends to view this practice as a 
step taken by dishonest individuals to avoid removal, rather than a strategy pursued by 
couples who do not wish to be separated.687  
 
3.5 Interplay between the ‘referral and investigation scheme’ and EU law  
 
As explored above, due to the division of competences between the EU and 
Member States, pre-marriage controls escape the ambit of EU law, and Member States 
enjoy nearly absolute discretion in this matter. In the meantime, the UK ‘referral and 
investigation scheme’ has serious implications for (yet) unmarried EU citizens who 
wish to live together with their TCN partners. In the absence of protection reserved to 
married couples under the Citizenship Directive, British authorities use the legal 
lacuna to carry out systematic checks on almost all prospective marriages involving 
foreign nationals, subjecting such couples to considerable inconvenience and 
uncertainty. 
For the purposes of the Citizenship Directive, UK immigration law uses formal 
marital status as a proxy for serious long-term commitment. Accordingly, there are 
very limited opportunities for unmarried couples to stay together on different grounds: 
the non-EU nationals either need to submit a human rights claim under Article 8 of the 
 
686 Seferi & Anor (n 679), paras 33, 34.  
687 See for instance, ICIBI, ‘The Implementation of the 2014 ‘Hostile Environment’ Provisions for 





ECHR with rather low chances of succeeding, or apply for a residence card as an 
extended family member of an EU citizen.688 With respect to the latter, the EEA 
Regulations689 implementing the Citizenship Directive in UK law provide no 
definition of ‘durable partners’, and the Home Office equates them to unmarried 
partners under the Immigration Rules.690 To qualify for admission, the parties normally 
need to have been living together ‘in a relationship akin to marriage or civil 
partnership’ for at least two years691 and present extensive proof of cohabitation, joint 
finances or commitments, evidence of joint responsibility for children, etc. 692 For 
couples who have not lived together for two years, marriage frequently represents the 
only opportunity to stay together in the UK, particularly where the TCN partner has 
an irregular or a short-term status and is unable to acquire an independent right to work 
due to the UK restrictive labour migration policy.693 
It is quite understandable that an EU citizen may wish to regularise the status 
of their partner and stop living in constant fear of separation, which may put a serious 
strain on their relationship. Furthermore, after the marriage, the non-EU national 
spouse acquires the right to work full-time, a key advantage which would enable them 
to support their family, and thereby, further contribute to their integration into the host 
Member State. Hence, by limiting alternative routes to family reunion, the state 
effectively forces such couples into marriage, although they might have preferred to 
postpone such a serious commitment to a later date or, for various reasons, avoid it.  
Yet, rather paradoxically, the ‘referral and investigation scheme’ introduced by 
the Home Office acts as a significant deterrent to couples involving non-EU nationals. 
At present, couples who meet each other in the UK may find themselves trapped 
between the inability to marry, on the one hand, and the impossibility to regularise 
their situation via alternative routes, on the other. It should be remembered that TCN 
 
688 It should be noted that, unlike spouses, unmarried partners do not have an automatic right to join or 
remain with the EU citizen partner in the UK. The respective rights are acquired only after the Home 
Office has granted the applicant an EEA residence card (or family permit) on this basis. An outstanding 
application for an EEA residence card as an extended family member of an EU citizen or an appeal 
against refusal to grant one will not suspend removal. This has been stressed inter alia in Molina v 
SSHD (n 611), para 103.  
689 Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, SI 2016/1052 (EEA Regulations 2016). 
For an analysis see Sections 4.1-4.6 below.  
690 Immigration Rules (25.02.2016), pt 8, para 295A(i)(a)(i).  
691 Ibid.  
692 Home Office, ‘Free Movement Rights: Extended Family Members of EEA Nationals’ (Version 7.0, 
27.03.2019), 14-15.   
693 For a general overview of UK domestic immigration law, see, Ian MacDonald and Ronan Toal, 




spouses of EU citizens do not obtain an independent right of residence but derive it 
from the principal, whereby the right of mobile EU citizens to family reunion is 
regarded as a necessary pre-condition for the exercise of free movement rights. Yet 
instead of enabling EU citizens (and UK nationals) to live together with partners of 
their choice and, for example, providing the latter guarantees against pre-wedding 
removal, the Home Office places the main emphasis on the fight against allegedly 
dishonest foreigners aiming to regularise their stay in the UK by all possible means. 
As a consequence, many unmarried couples involving irregular migrants may prefer 
to live in limbo, rather than risk imminent separation.  
Some couples may be able to overcome these barriers by marrying abroad. 
Provided that their marriage is recognised in the UK, a TCN spouse of a mobile EU 
citizen would then immediately qualify for admission into the country (unless public 
policy or public security grounds apply or their marriage is found to be one of 
convenience). For many, however, this option may not be open for various reasons. 
First, travelling to another EU Member State may be difficult for those UK-based 
short-term or irregular migrants or asylum seekers who require either a national or 
Schengen visa. Second, several countries, including EU Member States, unlawfully 
impose blanket prohibitions on the right of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers to 
marry.694 In addition, this may prove an expensive and unsafe journey for both 
partners, as well as result in significant delays and inconvenience before their possible 
reunion in the UK. A further option is to contract a marriage by proxy if it is legal in 
the country where it takes place. Nonetheless, proxy marriages are treated as 
particularly suspicious when it comes to the application for an EEA residence card.695  
All in all, it is understandable that many EU citizens may wish to marry in the 
UK, the country where they live and where their friends, and possibly family members, 
are. Denying them such an opportunity is not only against the spirit of EU law but also 
prompts them to live in legal limbo. Instead of respecting their partner choice and thus 
contributing to their integration and well-being in the host Member State, the British 
authorities disrupt unwanted families of EU citizens, forcing the latter to look for 
 
694 For instance, Denmark, the Netherlands and Latvia. See, respectively, Ægteskabsloven (Formation 
and Dissolution of Marriage Act), paras 11(a) and (b); Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code), art 1:44; 
Civilstāvokļa aktu reģistrācijas likums (Law On Registration of Civil Status Documents), art 18(1).  





alternative solutions and in some cases, relocate.696 Hence, although formally the UK 
pre-marriage controls do not breach the Citizenship Directive, the free movement 
rights of EU citizens may have nonetheless been seriously obstructed. The same refers 
to British citizens who may wish to relocate to another EU Member State with their 
TCN partners but need to marry them to be able to do so.  
In view of the above, it must be emphasised that the number of detected sham 
marriages under the scheme is remarkably low. In 2019, there were 16,889 marriage 
referrals received by the Home Office which included at least one non-EU national. 
Of these, over one third (6,046) involved mobile EU citizens. Of the latter group, 15% 
(931) of intended marriages were extended for investigation. In over one third (329) 
of these cases, the couples were considered non-compliant and were hence not allowed 
to marry. Yet it was only in 165 cases that the prospective marriage was found to be a 
sham,697 which constitutes as little as 2% from the total number of marriages intended 
to be registered between EU citizens and non-EU nationals.698 These numbers raise 
questions as to the proportionality of the checks, not only from a legal but also from a 
public policy perspective, provided that the government is investing substantial 
resources to tackle a problem that is not found to bear any statistical significance.  
 
4. Post-marriage controls 
  
4.1 Procedures for family reunion with EU citizens in the UK 
 
Once partners have managed to enter into marriage, their situation moves from 
the domain of UK domestic immigration law to the ambit of the Citizenship Directive. 
The latter has been transposed in UK law by the Immigration (European Economic 
Area) Regulations 2016 (as amended) which came into force on 1 February 2017. In 
accordance with the Directive, the Regulations define direct family members as 
 
696 For a discussion on the impact immigration enforcement may have on the lives of couples where one 
of the spouses is subject to removal, see, Melanie Griffiths ‘“My Passport is Just My Way Out of Here”. 
Mixed-Immigration Status Families, Immigration Enforcement and the Citizenship Implications’ 
(2019) Identities.  
697 Although the criteria and methods of investigation employed by the Home Office may target many 
couples who do intend to lead a family life. See Sections 5.1-6 below.   
698 FOI request, see Appendix 2. In 2018, 4% of intended marriages involving EU citizens were found 





including spouses or civil partners of EU citizens or returning British citizens, 699 as 
long as their union is recognised as valid in UK law.700 
As explained in the Regulations, a non-EU national obtains the right of entry 
and residence in the UK, provided that their EU citizen spouse is either (1) entitled to 
reside in the UK for an initial period of three months,701 (2) considered a ‘qualified 
person’ – i.e., a jobseeker, worker, a self-employed person, a self-sufficient person, or 
a student,702 (3) has a right of permanent residence703 or (4) is a returning British 
citizen.704 This also refers to family members who have retained the right of residence 
following the death of or divorce from the EU citizen.705 Although this is not 
compulsory, TCN spouses of EU citizens (including returning British nationals) are 
advised to apply for documentation confirming their right of entry and to stay in the 
UK.706 Having a residence document may prove advantageous not only when dealing 
with government authorities but also with, for example, potential employers.  
Those seeking to enter the UK from abroad are asked to either be in possession 
of a residence card issued by another Member State (if the couple had already lived 
there), or apply for an entry visa, the so-called EEA family permit. For the latter to be 
issued, the EU citizen principal must either already be in the UK, or intend to travel 
there with their TCN spouse within six months of the application date.707 In addition, 
the permit must be granted to family members who have retained the right of residence 
or acquired the right of permanent residence.708 In these situations, the non-EU 
nationals possess residence rights in a personal capacity and do not need to show that 
they will be joining or accompanying an EU citizen. 
The Regulations confirm that non-EU nationals are not obliged to produce a 
family permit or residence card upon arrival, and the immigration officer must allow 
the person to prove their family member status by other means.709 In practice, however, 
 
699 EEA Regulations 2016, regs 7(1)(a) and 7(4).  
700 Unless an otherwise valid marriage is found to be one of convenience, see below. On recognition of 
marriages contracted abroad see Immigration Directorate Instructions (July 2012), ch 8, s 1, Annex B.  
701 EEA Regulations 2016, reg 13. 
702 Ibid, regs 6(1) and 14. 
703 Ibid, reg 15(1). 
704 Ibid, reg 9. 
705 Ibid, reg 10. 
706 See for instance, Home Office, ‘EEA(FM): guidance notes’ (Version 4.0, February 2020), 
1<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8
64755/EEA_FM__guide-to-supporting-documents_v4_2020.pdf> accessed 27 August 2020..  
707 EEA Regulations 2016, reg 12(1).  
708 Ibid, reg 12(3). 





the decision will be subject to the discretion of an immigration officer, and spouses of 
EU citizens may be denied entry into the UK without the relevant permit.710 
An EEA family permit is issued free of charge ‘as soon as possible’ and is valid 
for six months, during which the TCN spouse can leave and enter the UK multiple 
times. Upon its expiry, the non-EU national may continue to reside in the UK, provided 
that they still meet the conditions under the Regulations. In this case, they may apply 
for a residence card which must be issued no later than six months after the application 
is received and is valid for five years,711 following which, the foreign national may 
qualify for permanent residence. 
 
4.2 The concept of marriages of convenience in the EEA Regulations  
 
When referring to marriages for immigration purposes, the EEA Regulations 
use different terminology from that of the Immigration Act, designating such unions 
as ones ‘of convenience’, the term used in the Citizenship Directive. The Regulations 
accordingly stipulate that the concepts of ‘spouse’, ‘civil partner’, and ‘durable 
partner’ of an EU citizen do not include a party to a marriage, civil partnership and 
durable partnership of convenience, respectively.712 The reference to the ‘durable 
partnership of convenience’ is made in the Regulations for the first time: this 
designation is particularly puzzling, provided that the couple will normally need to live 
together for two years before the TCN partner may qualify for residence, as well as 
submit extensive evidence to prove that their relationship is subsisting. Furthermore, 
given that there is no equivalent concept in domestic statutes relating to unmarried 
partners of static UK nationals, the new provision arguably violates the principle of 
non-discrimination in EU law. The definition of the relevant terms reads as follows:  
 
‘[M]arriage of convenience’713 includes a marriage entered into for the 
purpose of using these Regulations, or any other right conferred by the 
EU Treaties, as a means to circumvent –  
 
710 This has been confirmed by David Tang (n 1) and Nath Gbikpi (n 653). 
711 EEA Regulations 2016, regs 18(1), 18(3) and 18(6)(a). 
712 Ibid, reg 2(1). No corresponding provision exists in the Citizens Directive, although art 35 suggests 
the same. 
713 The same wording is used to define a civil partnership or durable partnership of convenience, 





(a) immigration rules applying to non-EEA nationals (such as any 
applicable requirement under the 1971 Act to have leave to enter or 
remain in the United Kingdom); or  
(b) any other criteria that the party to the marriage of convenience 
would otherwise have to meet in order to enjoy a right to reside under 
these Regulations or the EU Treaties.714 
 
It is likely that the definition was originally drafted to cover the same situations 
as the one provided in the Citizenship Directive. This is suggested, for example, by the 
relevant Home Office guidance which specifies that there should be ‘no genuine 
relationship between the parties’,715 thus equating the definition found in the 
Regulations to the one of a ‘sham marriage’ provided in the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999. Yet the absence of the word ‘sole’ from the relevant hard law instrument is 
crucial and may have wide-ranging consequences for couples involving EU citizens. 
When interpreted literally, the scope of the definition appears to be significantly 
broader than foreseen in EU law – i.e., limited only to marriages contracted for the 
sole purpose of securing the right of residence for the non-EU national. Moreover, it 
is also broader than the ‘sham marriage’ definition found in the Immigration Act: 
whilst in the latter, the word ‘sole’ is equally omitted, it expressly provides that there 
should not be a genuine relationship between the parties.  
Conversely, the EEA Regulations refer to marriages of convenience as ones 
contracted for the purpose of enabling the non-EU national to circumvent immigration 
rules, irrespective of whether the couple intended, at least at the point of the wedding, 
to lead a family life. Formally, this definition reminds one of the infamous ‘primary 
purpose rule’, targeting literally every couple where the non-EU national would gain 
an immigration advantage from the marriage, including those who are (or were) in a 
close relationship. The current wording of the definition is, hence, arguably in breach 
of the Citizenship Directive.  
Overall, two different terms (‘marriage of convenience’ and ‘sham marriage’) 
and three different definitions of the same concept ((1) in the Citizenship Directive, 
reiterated in the Commission Handbook, (2) the Immigration Act, and (3) the EEA 
Regulations) are highly confusing and arguably undermine legal certainty.716  
 
714 EEA Regulations 2016, reg 2(1). 
715 Home Office, ‘Marriage Investigations’, 11.  
716 For a concise overview of how different types of pre- and post-marriage situations are covered by 




Further, the EEA Regulations expressly permit the Home Office to verify the 
right of residence of EU citizens and their family members. Regulation 22(3) provides 
that if a non-EU national spouse seeks to avail themselves on Treaty rights on the basis 
of marriage to an EU citizen, the Home Office may invite them to attend an interview. 
A further provision allows the Home Office to draw ‘any factual interferences’ about 
the non-EU national’s right to reside if they, without good reason, on at least two 
occasions, fail to attend an interview717 – an apparent reflection of a similar provision 
in domestic immigration law (see Section 3.3 above). 
 
4.3 Application for an EEA family permit 
 
Although formally family members of EU citizens are not required to apply for 
an EEA family permit prior to their first entry in the UK, most still choose to get an 
entry clearance beforehand, rather than risk being refused entry at the airport. The 
number of EEA family permits issued outside the UK reached its peak in 2018 and 
2019, assumingly reflecting the rise in applications ahead of Brexit and the end of the 
transition period (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1  






 Source: Home Office719  
 
 
717 EEA Regulations 2016, reg 22(4). 
718 Plus 6,690 EU Settlement Scheme family permits, see Section 6.  
719 Home Office, ‘Why do People Come to the UK? (4) For Family Reasons’ (Immigration Statistics, 
year ending December 2018, 28.02.2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-year-ending-december-




Home Office statistics do not specify how many of these include spouses of 
EU citizens, nor provide the rate of refusals. Yet evidence suggests that the Home 
Office pursues an inconsistent approach when processing applications and refuses 
people for reasons that are arguably incompatible with the Citizenship Directive.  
For their application to be considered, the non-EU national spouse must 
complete an online application form,720 which, pursuant to regulation 21(2)(a), must 
be accompanied or joined by the evidence of proof required by regulation 12. The 
relevant Regulation, however, only sets out the categories of persons eligible for an 
EEA family permit without requiring any specific evidence. The list of documents 
required is meanwhile found in the application form. It includes: a valid passport of 
the non-EU national, the passport or EEA national identity card of their principal, 
proof of their relationship (marriage certificate for spouses), and evidence that the 
principal is either living in the UK as a ‘qualified person’ or will be travelling to the 
UK within six months of the application date (for example, flight or hotel bookings). 
These requirements are largely consistent with the Citizenship Directive 721 and 
designed to ascertain the status of a direct family member of an EU citizen and that 
the latter is exercising their Treaty rights. 
However, in addition, spouses of EU citizens are asked to provide further 
details about their relationship, such as: (1) where and when they have lived together 
within or outside the UK and if they cohabit currently; if not, they must provide reasons 
for why not, (2) how they keep in contact (e.g., by phone, email, social media, letters), 
(3) the date when they first met (month and year can be given if unsure of the exact 
date), (4) where they first met (e.g., work, school, social club), (5) when the 
relationship began (month and year can be given if unsure of the exact date), (6) how 
often they usually see (meet) their partner (for example, weekly, monthly, three times 
a year), and (7) the date when they last saw their partner.722 It follows that answering 
all these questions is mandatory since the EEA Regulations require all applications to 
 
720 Online application form is available at <https://visas-immigration.service.gov.uk/country-
selection> accessed 26 August 2020. 
721 Although there are some concerns as to the excessive requirements to demonstrate the ‘qualified 
person’ status. See Parliament, ‘Obstacles to the right of free movement and residence for EU citizens 
and their families' (n 281).  





be ‘complete’ to be accepted as valid.723 Indeed, one cannot proceed with the online 
application if the relevant fields are not completed.  
At the end of the form, it states that non-EU nationals ‘can also send in’ other 
documents ‘to help support’ their application, including evidence proving their 
relationship. For example, documents (such as bank statements, utility bills, rental or 
mortgage agreements, etc.) addressed to them jointly, in both names, or individual 
names, to the same address. Partners currently not living together can provide evidence 
of having lived together in the past, as well as plans to marry or live together in the 
future. Although from the wording it follows that sending in these documents is not a 
requirement, the relevant Home Office guidance for entry clearance staff suggests 
otherwise. First, it is noted that an applicant can be requested to provide evidence about 
the relationship or attend an interview if it is suspected that their marriage is one of 
convenience.724 However, this contradicts the next passage, which states that when 
submitting their application, spouses and civil partners of EU citizens must provide 
proof that their relationship ‘is genuine and subsisting’, e.g., evidence of cohabitation 
such as joint tenancy or mortgage agreements, utility bills, bank statements, or other 
documents, whereby ‘each case must be considered on its merits’.725 
Taken together, this is highly confusing, adversely impacts legal certainty and 
potentially violates not only EU law but also the EEA Regulations. As explored above, 
systematic checks of marriages are prohibited both under domestic Regulations and 
the Citizenship Directive, whilst the burden of proof of establishing marriages of 
convenience must rest with the national authorities.726 Unlike those applying for a 
family visa under UK domestic immigration law, spouses of EU citizens should not be 
asked to demonstrate that their marriage is ‘genuine and subsisting’; hence, the 
relevant provision in the guidance is clearly ultra vires. It is even more confusing given 
that the Home Office guidance on direct family members of EU citizens does rightly 
specify that if a marriage of convenience is suspected, it is for the Home Office to 
prove this.727 
 
723 EEA Regulations 2016, regs 21(2)(b) and 21(4). This is further stressed in the Home Office Guidance 
which state that, in order for an application to be valid, ‘it must be submitted on the  specified application 
form, with all relevant sections completed’. Home Office, ‘Processes and Procedures for EEA 
Documentation Applications’ (Version 8.0, 14.02.2019), 6.  
724 Home Office, ‘EEA Family Permits: Guidance for Entry Clearance Officers’ (Version 2.0, 
13.03.2017), 10. Emphasis added.  
725 Ibid, 11. Emphasis added.  
726 This has also been confirmed by UK courts. See Chapter 6. 
727 Home Office, ‘Free Movement Rights: Direct Family Members of European Economic Area (EEA) 




Moreover, by systematically requiring applicants to provide additional details 
of the relationship in the application form, the Home Office clearly goes beyond the 
Citizenship Directive which only asks them to prove a family relationship through a 
valid marriage certificate. Not to mention that it is unreasonable to ask the couples to 
remember the exact date or month when they first met (particularly if it happened a 
long time ago, e.g., in childhood or adolescence) or began a relationship (there might 
be different perceptions as to how and when the relationship started). Remarkably, the 
Home Office also disregards the domestic case-law: it was already in 2012 when the 
Upper Tribunal explicitly outlawed such practices with regards to applications for an 
EEA family permit.728  
Nonetheless, national authorities continue to frequently violate EU law by 
rejecting EEA family permit applications on the basis that the non-EU nationals have 
not proactively provided evidence that their marriage is ‘genuine and subsisting’. 729 
To reduce the risk of an adverse outcome, couples feel obliged to upload with their 
application, detailed evidence of their relationship; and immigration practitioners often 
advise this.730 The relevant discussions on online forums731 show that the ‘bundle’ 
typically includes screenshots of text messages; phone, WhatsApp and Facebook call 
logs; and chats showing that the couple had stayed in regular contact over a lengthy 
period (e.g., 4 to 6 screenshots per month). As one of the users explains, he chose ‘the 
most normal bits of conversation – boring and silly emails to each other while at work, 
texts reminding to grab lunch that was on the table, sending ideas of cakes for our 
wedding and other wedding planning stuff ’. Another user made screenshots of their 
Facebook chats at different times which included phrases like ‘I love you’ or ‘I miss 
you’, as well as attached screenshots of him searching the phrase ‘I love you’ which 
showed 10,000 results. This type of evidence is often accompan ied by photos 
documenting every stage of the relationship (including pictures of travel, engagement, 
wedding, family events, etc.). In addition, applicants frequently submit a cover letter 
explaining how their relationship developed, including, e.g., how they planned their 
 
728 Papajorgji (EEA spouse - marriage of convenience) Greece [2012] UKUT 38 (IAC).  
729 This has been confirmed by David Tang (n 1) and Nath Gbikpi (n 653). See also Ussenbai v Entry 
Clearance Officer [2019] UKUT 00472 (IAC); Conrad Duncan, ‘Man refused UK visa to visit newborn 
grandson because he did not send photo of 1975 wedding’ (The Independent, 14.09.2018) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-visa-wedding-photo-russian-grandson-
refused-home-office-marriage-eea-family-permit-a8537946.html> accessed 26 August 2020.  
730 Interview with Nath Gbikpi (n 653).  
731 Most notably Immigrationboards.com and the Facebook group ‘EU and Family Members EEA 




wedding and why they preferred a small ceremony without families. Further evidence 
provided included proof of trips taken together or to see each other (hotel bookings, 
airplane tickets), or proof of cohabitation (tenancy agreement and utility bills). 
The practice of submitting excessive levels of documentation gives reason for 
serious concern. In addition to violating EU law where the applicants enjoy the 
presumption of innocence, it puts pressure on couples who feel obliged to reveal 
intimate details about their relationship. This alone may act as a significant deterrent 
for couples involving non-EU nationals, potentially keeping them apart and prompting 
them to choose another place of residence, which undeniably, negatively impacts the 
exercise of free movement rights by EU citizens.  
 
4.4 Application for an EEA residence card  
 
Where a non-EU national is already in the UK, they may wish to apply for a 
residence card as a confirmation of their right of residence (including the right to work) 
under EU law. To qualify for a residence card, the non-EU national is asked to 
complete an application form,732 whereby regulation 21(2)(a) further notes that all 
applications must be accompanied or joined by the ‘evidence of proof required by this 
part’. The relevant part, however, does not contain any description as to what such 
evidence entails, which seems somewhat confusing. The evidential requirements are 
nonetheless specified in the application form and accompanying guidance notes. Apart 
from their own and their principal’s personal details; date and place of their wedding; 
and details of their status, former and existing spouses of EU citizens must answer 
inter alia the following questions:  
 
1) When and where did you first meet your sponsor?  
2) When did your relationship begin?  
3) Do you and your sponsor currently live together? If yes, when did 
you start living together? Were you in a relationship with each other 
when you started living together?  
4) If you’re not currently living together, why do you not currently live 
with your sponsor? Please include information on how often you 
 
732 UKVI, ‘Application for a registration certificate or residence card as the family member of a 
European Economic Area (EEA) or Swiss national’ (EEA(FM), Version 03/2019) (EEA residence card 
application form) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78




meet, when you last saw each other, how you keep in touch and if 
you plan to live together in future.  
5) Have you ever lived with your sponsor within or outside the UK? If 
yes, please provide details of when and where you previously lived 
with your sponsor.  
6) When did you decide to marry or form a civil partnership with your 
sponsor? 
7) Were you and your sponsor both present at the ceremony? If you 
were not, or your sponsor was not, present at the ceremony, please 
say why and explain where you were/your sponsor was at the 
relevant time. 
8) Do you or your sponsor currently have another spouse or civil 
partner, or an unmarried or a same-sex partner with whom you or 
they are in a durable relationship? If yes, please give details of all 
other current or previous marriages/civil 
partnerships/relationships.733  
 
Section 20 of the application form sets out the list of documents that must be 
submitted together with the application. With respect to spouses, these include identity 
documents for both the non-EU national and their EU citizen principal, marriage 
certificate as a proof of their relationship,734 proof of the principal’s status as a 
‘qualified person’, as well as evidence of their marriage – e.g. marriage certificate, 
evidence of living together, evidence that any previous marriage or civil partnership 
has legally ended – e.g. divorce certificate. It is, however, noted that the full list of 
documents is available in the relevant guidance. The latter specifies that, for those who 
are living together, it is advised to provide at least six items, from three different 
sources, that ‘clearly show’ that the spouses live, or have lived, at the same address.735 
Those living with relatives or friends are asked to provide a letter from the relevant 
person confirming the spouses have been living with them. Those who have not been 
living together are asked to tell the reasons for this and how they stay in contact with 
each other, as well as provide any relevant supporting evidence. According to the 
guidance, suitable evidence includes (but is not limited to):  
 
1) Letters or other documents from government departments or agencies, for 
example, HM Revenue and Customs, Department for Work and Pensions, 
DVLA, TV Licensing;  
 
733 EEA residence card application form, s 5. 
734 Persons who have retained their right of residence must additionally submit the relevant evidence 
(e.g., the principal’s death certificate, decree absolute or evidence of domestic violence).  




2) Letters or other documents from a GP, a hospital or other local health service 
about medical treatments, appointments, home visits or other medical matters;  
3) Bank statements/letters;  
4) Building society savings books/letters;  
5) Council tax, electricity and/or gas, water rates, telephone bills or statements;  
6) Mortgage statements/agreement;  
7) Tenancy agreement(s);  
8) Photographs of the couple together – for example, on holiday or at a family 
celebration; and  
9) Evidence of how they have kept in contact with each other during periods in 
which they have not lived together – for example, letters, printouts of emails 
or contact via social media, mobile phone bills showing they contacted each 
other, printouts of Skype (or similar) logs, etc.736 
 
Whilst applicants are free to choose what type of documents to submit, it 
appears that the option of not providing any such evidence at all is not permitted by 
the Home Office. In particular, it is stated that the applicant ‘must’ send the relevant 
evidence as specified in section 20 of the application form and the guidance notes.737 
The wording makes it clear that a marriage certificate is not accepted as the only proof 
of the relationship, and it needs to be supported by other details. Furthermore, it 
follows that it is compulsory to answer all the relevant questions in the application 
form,738 an apparent reference to the relevant provision in the EEA Regulations.739 
Similarly, as with the application form for an EEA family permit, the Home 
Office requirements are clearly disproportionate and go well beyond what is permitted 
under the Citizenship Directive. This not only amounts to systematic checks explicitly 
prohibited both under EU law and the EEA Regulations, but it also breaches EU law 
concerning the issues of burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. 
Furthermore, by subjecting all applicants to scrutiny, the government is deeply 
intruding into their private matters. In doing so, it places a strong emphasis on 
cohabitation, although CJEU case-law rightly permits couples to arrange their marital 
life as they wish and even live with other partners, as long as a decree absolute is not 
 
736 Ibid. 
737 EEA residence card application form, 2.  
738 In particular, applicants are asked to ‘[c]omplete all relevant sections of the form as directed’. Ibid.  




issued. This raises the question of whether those not cohabiting face an increased risk 
of being treated as suspicious, which, in turn, reduces their chances of a positive 
outcome.  
Another Home Office guidance sets out various stages the caseworkers need to 
follow when assessing applications from direct family members of EU citizens.740 
With respect to spouses, it is first required to assess evidence of their identity and 
nationality, and second, consider the proof of their relationship (a marriage 
certificate).741 Importantly, the caseworker is allowed to proceed with assessing the 
status of the EU spouse only after making sure that the marriage is legally valid and 
not one of convenience.742 If any suspicions arise, the Home Office is open to 
investigating individual cases.743 Interestingly, the guidance further refers to the ‘sole 
purpose’ definition of marriages of convenience as provided in the Citizenship 
Directive, as well as specifies that the burden of proof rests with the Home Office.744 
This is commendable, yet also confusing, given that applicants are required to supply 
extensive evidence of the relationship in advance and that the EEA Regulations use a 
broader definition instead.  
A similar application form needs to be completed if a TCN family member 
seeks to apply for a permanent residence card. The relevant form includes the same 
questions about the quality of the relationship as the residence card application form.745 
It follows that TCN spouses of non-EU nationals risk being accused of entering into a 
marriage of convenience at any stage of their residence, irrespective of whether their 
marriage had been previously investigated and found not to be one of convenience. In 
other words, one may never be confident that the state would not question the nature 
of their marriage, even if it was contracted years ago.  
In this context, the position of those who got married in the UK deserves closer 
consideration, in particular with regards to unlawful detention and the removal of TCN 
 
740 Home Office, ‘Free Movement Rights: Direct Family Members of European Economic Area (EEA) 
Nationals’. 
741 Ibid, 9-10. 
742 Ibid, 11. 
743 Ibid, 37.  
744 Ibid. 
745 UKVI, ‘Application for a document certifying permanent residence or permanent residence card 
under the EEA Regulations’ (EEA(PR), Version 03/2019) (EEA permanent residence application form), 
s 11 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78





spouses. As noted above, a marriage to an EU citizen provides someone with no valid 
leave in the UK an automatic right of residence. This has rightly been confirmed in the 
Home Office guidance to its enforcement staff. The guidance states that ‘where there 
is evidence that a non-EEA immigration offender is now genuinely married to an EEA 
national, you must not serve enforcement papers’ on them, regardless of whether they 
have applied for an EEA residence card.746 This, however, is not always understood 
by Home Office officers who seek to detain and remove the TCN partner even after 
the marriage has been contracted, particularly where they are yet to submit an 
application for a residence card. As pointed out by immigration practitioners, Home 
Office officers wrongly believe that the status of the TCN spouse is not confirmed 
until they have been granted a residence card. In some cases, non-EU spouses were 
discovered in raids on properties and subsequently detained.747 There are also cases 
where yet unmarried non-EU nationals, detained because of their irregular status, were 
escorted to the register office and brought back to the detention centre after marriage. 
These types of cases have been successfully challenged in courts, with plaintiffs able 
to win damages for unlawful detention.748  
 
4.5 Non-suspensive appeal rights  
 
A Home Office decision that the marriage to an EU citizen is one of 
convenience bears serious repercussions for their non-EU spouses. In this case, they 
are not considered family members for the purposes of the EEA Regulations, and their 
applications for a residence card or an EEA family permit will be refused.749 For those 
applying for a residence card, this will normally be followed by the curtailment of the 
existing leave to remain750 (if any) and a standard non-EEA removal procedure.751 In 
case an EEA family permit, residence card or a permanent residence card has already 
been issued, e.g., where the Home Office previously recognised an EU right based on 
 
746 Home Office, ‘Marriage Investigations’, 24.  
747 See for instance, ILPA, ‘Comments for the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. Review of 
Sham Marriages (n 672). 
748 Interview with David Tang (n 1). 
749 See Home Office, ‘Marriage Investigations’ 23; Home Office, ‘EEA Family Permits: Guidance for 
Entry Clearance Officers’ 10.  
750 Similarly as with those whose intended marriage is found to be a sham prior to its conclusion, the 
Home Office caseworker may curtail the non-EU national’s leave under paragraph 323(i) of the 
Immigration Rules. 





the marriage but later found it to be of convenience, the person may be removed under 
an administrative procedure foreseen by the EEA Regulations 2016. The latter 
provides for removal if the relevant person ‘does not have or ceases to have a right to 
reside’ under EU law,752 which automatically invalidates the existing residence card. 
In addition, they may become subject to a criminal investigation.753  
One of the major issues with the Home Office decision on the nature of the 
marriage is that an appeal against the refusal of an EEA residence card, in most cases, 
will not suspend removal. In 2015, the Upper Tribunal delivered a rather puzzling 
judgment in Bilal Ahmed754 which concerned a Pakistan national in the UK on a 
student visa who was married to a Romanian national. After interviewing both parties 
separately, the Home Office concluded that the marriage was one of convenience and 
subsequently refused the TCN spouse’s application for a residence card. By this point, 
his student leave had already expired, and he was detained and served with a removal 
notice. The applicant sought judicial review of the removal decision, as well as 
appealed against the refusal of an EEA residence card.  
The main issue in the proceedings was whether the right of appeal against the 
EEA decision is suspensive of removal. With this respect, the UT argued that, since 
the executive found the marriage to be of convenience, the TCN party was not a 
‘spouse’ for the purposes of the EEA Regulations and thus fell outside the protection 
of EU law. Consequently, according to the court, he was not entitled to an in-country 
appeal right even if it was provided by Article 31 of the Citizenship Directive.755 In 
the view of the UT, the latter was not the case, for the respective article does not 
expressly preclude the Member State from removing the person concerned while their 
appeal is pending but only permits the latter to submit a ‘defence in person’, subject to 
public policy exceptions.756 Yet even if it did provide suspensive appeal rights, the 
applicant would not be considered a family member and therefore excluded from its 
 
752 EEA Regulations 2016, reg 23(6)(a).  
753 See Home Office, ‘Marriage Investigations’, 16.   
754 Ahmed, R (On the Application Of) v SSHD IJR [2015] UKUT 436 (IAC). 
755 Ibid paras 28-29.  
756 Art 31 reads: ‘(1)The persons concerned shall have access to judicial and, where appropriate, 
administrative redress procedures in the host Member State to appeal against or seek review of any 
decision taken against them on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health’, and ‘(4) 
Member States may exclude the individual concerned from their territory pending the redress procedure, 
but they may not prevent the individual from submitting his/her defence in person, except when his/her 
appearance may cause serious troubles to public policy or public security or when the appeal or judicial 





scope. As the UT put it, Article 31 ‘has nothing whatsoever to say about a person who 
is not being expelled as a Union citizen or family member but who is appealing a 
decision that he or she is not such a family member’757 and ‘[t]here is no principle of 
law, whether purely domestic or European, that confers a right on an individual to 
remain within a jurisdiction, regardless of his or her status, in order to pursue an 
immigration appeal’.758  
This reasoning is obviously problematic. First, if the UT had any doubt as to 
the existence of general in-country appeal rights under Article 31, the correct way 
forward would be to refer the case to the CJEU for clarification. Secondly, and most 
importantly, the UT decision essentially means that a person who is refused a residence 
card is not considered a spouse for the purposes of the Directive. As Elspeth Guild 
reasonably argues, by this logic, non-EU nationals should not have appeal rights 
provided by the Directive, at all.759 This is absurd, particularly given that non-EU 
nationals who have been successful in obtaining residence cards would rarely need an 
appeal. Further, by withdrawing EU procedural rights from a non-EU national solely 
because their marriage is believed to be one of convenience, the UT wrongly shifts the 
burden of proof to the individual concerned, although their marriage is perfectly valid 
under UK family law.760 In this light, it is even more regrettable that the UT decision 
was later upheld by the Court of Appeal. In its ruling, the Court confirmed that, if a 
non-EU national does not have leave to remain, they may be removed pending their 
appeal against the refusal of a residence card.761  
 
4.6 Deporting EU citizen spouses: Public policy test  
 
An accusation of being involved in a marriage of convenience may have serious 
implications not only for non-EU nationals but also for EU citizens who exercise their 
Treaty rights. Under regulation 23(6)(b) of the EEA Regulations 2016, an EU citizen 
 
757 Ahmed (n 754), para 28. 
758 Ibid para 26. 
759 This, however, is not the case, since they can still appeal a gainst a negative EEA decision, which, in 
the author’s view, contradicts the logic adopted in Bilal Ahmed and thus makes it even more puzzling. 
Elspeth Guild, ‘Reflecting EU law faithfully? R (Bilal Ahmed) v SSHD IJR [2015] UKUT 00436 
(IAC)’ (Free Movement, 14.09.2015) <https://www.freemovement.org.uk/reflecting-eu-law-faithfully-
r-bilal-ahmed-v-sshd-ijr-2015-ukut-00436-iac/> accessed 29 August 2020.  
760 Ibid. 





or their family member can be removed from the UK inter alia on public policy 
grounds. The relevant Home Office guidance confirms that it also covers persons 
‘involved’ in a marriage of convenience: these are ‘subject to a public policy decision’ 
and ‘can be removed from the UK by means of a time-limited deportation’.762 Removal 
on these grounds is also foreseen for non-EU nationals who, in spite of being ‘genuine 
family members’ of EU citizens, facilitate marriages of convenience for someone 
else.763 This also follows from paragraph 6(a) of schedule 1 of the Regulations which 
states that it is consistent with public policy requirements to refuse, terminate or 
withdraw EU citizens’ rights in cases of ‘entering, attempting to enter or assisting 
another person to enter or to attempt to enter, a marriage, civil partnership or durable 
partnership of convenience’. According to regulation 23(8), a person deported from 
the UK on the grounds of public policy or public security will be prohibited from 
entering the UK until the deportation order is revoked or for the period specified in the 
order. The relevant Home Office guidance indicatively provides that ‘facilitating 
immigration abuse where there is no criminal conviction, for example, marriages of 
convenience’ may result in a re-entry ban of three years.764 
The public policy approach towards this group765 raises serious concerns. First, 
there is no definition of public policy neither in the Citizenship Directive, nor the EEA 
Regulations. The position of the UK is that, since there is no uniform scale of public 
policy values imposed on Member States, the government enjoys considerable 
discretion to define the relevant standards.766 As noted in Chapter 1, the Directive 
nonetheless provides several safeguards that need to be observed when deporting EU 
citizens on public policy grounds. The relevant principles are found in regulation 27(5) 
and schedule 1 of the Regulations. The former inter alia provides that (1) the decision 
must comply with the principle of proportionality and (2) the personal conduct of the 
 
762 Home Office, ‘Marriage Investigations’, 25. An ‘involvement’ is broadly understood here as 
entering, or attempting to enter a marriage of convenience, or facilitating it.  
763 Ibid, 6. 
764 Home Office, ‘EEA decisions on grounds of public policy and public security’ (Version 3.0, 
14.12.2017), 37. 
765 Under regulation 19(3)(c) of the previous version of the Regulations (Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1003), an EU citizen found to be involved in a marriage of 
convenience could be removed from the UK via an administrative removal procedure on the grounds of 
abuse of rights. In the author’s view, this provision contradicted the Citizenship Directive. Unlike non-
EU nationals, EU citizens enjoy an independent right of residence and do not obtain any advantage by 
marrying someone. The author therefore argues that in this situation, no abuse of free movement rights 
could occur on the part of an EU citizen.  





person must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one 
of the fundamental interests of society. Under paragraph 7(a) of schedule 1, 
‘preventing unlawful immigration and abuse of the immigration laws’ is considered 
one of the fundamental interests of society in the UK. The relevant Home Office 
guidelines further specify that this interest includes marriages of convenience, human 
trafficking, and facilitating the circumvention of the immigration system.767  
This evaluation, however, is highly subjective and therefore speculative: it is 
not known how many UK residents would agree that preventing marriages of 
convenience is fundamental. When considering whether an individual poses a threat, 
the Home Office may take into account such factors as the nature of the offence, the 
length of sentence and rehabilitative efforts. Yet, according to the guidelines, a public 
policy or security decision can be made even if the person has not received any 
criminal convictions ‘if there is sufficient, corroborated law enforcement evidence to 
underpin a decision’.768  
Although a criminal investigation is normally required for the public policy test 
to apply, EU citizens can be deported under regulation 23(6)(b) even in the absence of 
any referral for prosecution,769 on the sole basis that some Home Office officers 
believe that their marriage is one of convenience. Worse still, EU citizens can be 
deprived of their Treaty rights for the mere attempt to exercise their human right to 
marry. In the author’s view, this is hardly consistent with the CJEU jurisprudence on 
the subject. As explored in Chapter 1, the CJEU has stressed that the public policy 
derogations must be interpreted strictly and in compliance with the proportionality 
criteria. In addition, the ‘fundamental threat’ test is forward-looking.  
As the author has demonstrated above, marriages found to be ones of 
convenience are normally disrupted by the Home Office and/or result in the removal 
of the TCN party. Thus, in the author’s view, UK authorities will need to show that an 
 
767 Home Office, ‘EEA decisions on grounds of public policy and public security’, 19 .  
768 Ibid, 22. 
769 In the UK, there is no specific criminal offence of entering into a sham marriage or marriage of 
convenience but there are other offences for which a person could be prosecuted for involvement in 
one. Parties to sham marriages/marriages of convenience can be charged with conspiracy under s 1(1) 
of the Criminal Law Act 1977, whilst those organising such marriages can be charged with assisting 
unlawful immigration (known as facilitation) under s 25 of the Immigration Act 1971. For more details, 
see Home Office, ‘Criminal Investigations: Sham Marriage’ (Version 2.0, 12.11.2019). Whilst a  
detailed analysis of these provisions falls outside the scope of the thesis, it should be noted that  
EEA caseworkers will refuse an application for a residence ca rd if there has been a criminal 
investigation into a marriage that resulted in a conviction for any of the parties involved. See Home 





EU citizen, once found to be involved in a marriage of convenience, is highly likely to 
repeatedly attempt to enter into one with someone else. This is, however, a very high 
threshold to meet. Furthermore, as the author will show below, the Home Office 
interprets the concept of marriages of convenience rather arbitrarily, frequently 
disregarding EU law and, as a consequence, targeting couples in a close relationship. 
A mere Home Office assessment of the quality of a couple’s marriage is very shaky 
grounds to rely on in depriving someone of their fundamental rights. The author, 
therefore, argues that a criminal offence should be made a condition not only for the 
expulsion of the EU party to the perceived marriage of convenience but also of those 
allegedly facilitating it.  
Another point of serious concern is that an appeal against the decision to deport 
an EU citizen on public policy grounds can only be exercised from outside the UK. As 
in the case of non-EU nationals, regulation 37 applies.770 To cover the express 
provision under Article 31(4) of the Citizenship Directive, the EEA Regulations only 
permit their temporary admission in the UK if they wish to make submissions before 
the tribunal in person.771 As argued in Section 4.5 above, this represents an arbitrary 
attack on EU citizens’ free movement rights. By depriving a person of a suspensive 
right of appeal solely because the Home Office believes their marriage is one of 
convenience, the Regulations wrongly shift the burden of proof to the EU citizen. 
Taken together, any EU citizen who wishes to live with their TCN partner in the UK 
risks being deported from the country for up to three years with no right to challenge 
the decision whilst still in the country. This is not only an unacceptable interference 
with the right to free movement, but may also deter EU citizens from marrying their 
TCN partners in the UK, and consequently, prompt them to move elsewhere.  
 
4.7 Marriages of convenience and UK family law  
 
Another aspect worth closer inspection is the link between the concepts of a 
‘sham marriage’ and ‘marriage of convenience’ and UK family law. As briefly noted 
above, marriages not involving non-EU nationals are subject to much less scrutiny by 
the British state. For a marriage to be valid, both parties must have reached a certain 
 
770 Provided that the Home Office has certified that removal pending the final determination of an appeal 
would not be unlawful under s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 





age, not be related within prohibited degrees, not be lawfully married to someone else, 
and comply with marriage formalities.772 
In contrast to marriages involving third-country nationals, the nature of 
marriages between persons who are not subject to immigration control is never 
examined – neither before, nor after the ceremony. Indeed, there is no concept of a 
‘sham marriage’ or ‘marriage of convenience’ in other areas of UK domestic law. In 
this respect, the British state obviously attributes to immigration control, much higher 
value than other domains where a marriage may equally confer on couples a number 
of advantages, such as inheritance773 or tax law.774 Although, in theory, some couples 
may also enter into marriage solely to obtain a certain benefit (for example, to claim a 
marriage allowance), they will only need to provide a marriage certificate to prove 
their status.  
Moreover, the refusal of the Home Office or the courts to recognise a perceived 
marriage of convenience for immigration purposes does not result in its annulment in 
family law. Under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, governing marriages in England 
and Wales, a marriage may be declared null and void if either it was not validly 
contracted from the start (a so-called ‘void’ marriage)775 or it possesses some ‘flaws’, 
although it was validly contracted (‘voidable’ marriage).776 In the first case, the 
annulment of a marriage may be demanded by any interested party, including the state, 
whilst in the second scenario, this option is exclusively reserved for the parties to the 
marriage. Provided that marriages of convenience or sham marriages are normally 
understood as validly contracted, the state has no legal grounds to ask for their 
 
772 The full marriage procedure is set out in the Marriage Act 1949 (for England and Wales), the 
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 and the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003. 
773 For instance, under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, if one of the 
spouses dies without making a will, the surviving spouse inherits all or some of their estate. By contrast, 
the unmarried partner may not automatically inherit, unless the property was jointly owned. A broader 
discussion of the distinction between the rights of married and unmarried couples is outside the scope 
of this study.  
774 Chs 3 and 3A of the Income Tax Act 2007 provide tax relief for married couples and civil partners.  
775 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 11.  
776 Under the Act, a  marriage may be rendered ‘voidable’ on the following grounds: it has not been 
consummated (does not apply to same-sex couples); either of the parties has not validly consented to it; 
either of the parties, at the time of the ceremony, suffered from a mental disorder that rendered them 
‘unfit’ for marriage or a  communicable venereal disease; the wife, at the time of the marriage, was 
pregnant by a person other than her husband; one party  married without knowing that the other party 
had legally acquired a different gender from the one assigned at birth; or either party objects to the other 
party changing their gender during the marriage. Ibid, s 12. For the relevant procedures in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, see the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 and the Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) 





annulment. The validity of a marriage entered into for immigration purposes has also 
been explicitly confirmed in domestic case-law.777  
This creates an odd situation where marriages unaccepted for residence 
purposes continue to be recognised in other domains of British family law, with all the 
legal responsibilities emanating from them. For instance, a married partner with higher 
income may have a legal duty to support the other financially, and under certain 
conditions, continue to do so after divorce.778 In this context, by perceiving foreigners 
primarily as dishonest individuals aiming to regularise their stay in the UK by all 
possible means, the British authorities tend to ignore the fact that marriage is a serious 
commitment which is normally entered into all but lightly – particularly provided that, 
under EU law, one needs to stay married for at least three years before acquiring an 
independent right of residence.  
 
5. Assessing the nature of marriage: Conduct of investigation 
 
5.1 ‘Risk profiles’ and marriages perceived as ‘suspicious’  
 
Under the ‘referral and investigation scheme’, registrars must not only refer 
prospective marriages involving non-EU nationals to the Home Office, but also 
conduct a short interview with the couple to decide if there are any grounds to submit 
a section 24 report. The list of ‘suspicion-raising’ criteria communicated to the 
registrars by the Home Office is not publicly available. Meanwhile, the years after the 
introduction of the scheme saw a significant rise in such reports. In 2018, their number 
reached 2,868, a 40% increase from 2014.779  
All cases referred by the marriage registrars to the Home Office are initially 
assessed by the Marriage Referral and Assessment Unit (MRAU) which, under section 
48(3) of the 2014 Act, must decide whether to carry out an investigation. To determine 
whether there are ‘reasonable grounds’ for suspicions, the MRAU assesses the cases 
against certain agreed ‘risk profiles’. The list of ‘risk factors’ suggesting that the 
marriage is a sham is found in the Home Office guidance. In a nutshell, suspicions 
may be raised if either of the parties to the intended marriage has ever breached UK 
 
777 Vervaeke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145 (HL), paras 145, 152.  
778 For England and Wales, see pt II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  





immigration law, has links to criminality, has been subject to a section 24 report, or 
has previously been sponsored by another spouse to enter or remain in the UK.780 
It is, however, noted that the presence of one or more of these factors does not 
mean that the proposed marriage will automatically be investigated. According to the 
Home Office guidance, ‘[t]he assessment should be informed, but not solely 
determined, by the presence of one or more of the factors mentioned above’. 781 It 
nonetheless follows that the possibility of an investigation is largely determined by the 
immigration history of the non-EU national. With the exception of cases where a 
section 24 report is submitted, or there is intelligence suggesting that the prospective 
marriage is a sham, such information says nothing about its nature.  
A similar approach is used at the post-marriage stage. The guidance to 
European caseworkers does not contain a publicly available list of indicators that the 
marriage may be one of convenience. Nonetheless, the author has been able to have a 
sight of such criteria in an anonymised extract from a Home Office file, obtained by 
an immigration lawyer as part of a subject access request on behalf of their client. It 
contains a list of reasons that might provoke referral to the interview. These include: 
 
1) Proxy marriage; 
2) London issued passport dated near marriage and no evidence of previous 
immigration history; 
3) Child born shortly before/during marriage and the spouse is not the parent; 
4) Bank statements show large unexplained payments near the date of 
marriage; 
5) Applicant immigration history shows history of deception;  
6) Marriage is bigamous; 
7) Reasons to doubt the validity of documentary evidence; 
8) Applicant married at a venue recorded on the Portal;  
9) Sponsor is self-employed or became self-employed following a previous 
refusal on Treaty rights;  
10)  The marriage took place in another EU Member State; 
 
780 Home Office, ‘Marriage and Civil Partnership Referral and Investigation Scheme: Statutory 
Guidance for Home Office Staff’, 7-8.   





11)  Applicant has a poor immigration history; 
12)  Plausibility in question (large age difference, cultural differences); and 
13)  The EU principal commenced employment shortly before marriage.782 
 
Since the file is from 2015, it is unknown if the Home Office continues to 
employ the same criteria and which of them are relied on most frequently. Nonetheless, 
the document provides a valuable insight into the Home Office perception of 
‘suspicious’ marriages. The indicators provided are very similar to the ones found in 
the 2014 Commission Handbook and give various reasons for concern. First, similarly 
to the pre-marriage cases, the main emphasis is placed on the non-EU national’s 
immigration history. The applications from those having no long-term leave are thus 
more likely to be investigated and accordingly refused. Quite strikingly, applicants 
may fall under suspicion even for marrying at a particular venue, or where their EU 
spouse is self-employed or started employment shortly before marriage. This indicator 
is highly discriminatory, for it targets a broad category of EU citizens who exercise 
their Treaty rights as self-employed persons, or whose plans to marry have coincided 
with them getting a job in the host Member State. The same refers to a large age 
difference between spouses, which notably has not been included in the list of hints in 
the Handbook due to its over-inclusive nature.783 
Second, whether a marriage will be considered suspicious will depend on its 
type. Rather unexpectedly, one may be referred to the interview because their marriage 
took place in another Member State. This approach is puzzling, not least because it 
covers all the cases where the EU citizen had already lived with their TCN spouse in 
another (including their home) Member State, a group that is traditionally construed 
as the least suspicious.784 Furthermore, an EU citizen may, quite understandably, wish 
to celebrate their marriage in their home Member State in the company of their family 
and friends. Alternatively, many couples may be forced to seek another Member State 
where they can undergo the marriage procedure more easily than in the UK, without 
facing the risk of separation before the ceremony. It seems, however, that the Home 
Office perceives this strategy as suspicious, albeit it is precisely the state that is 
responsible for its development.  
 
782 Extract from an anonymised Home Office file, completed in 2015 (on file with the author).  
783 COM(2014) 604 final, 33. 




The same considerations apply to proxy marriages that continue to be construed 
as suspicious. The Home Office guidance even goes as far as requiring proxy 
marriages in EU applications to be referred for a full marriage interview as ‘standard 
practice’.785 Further, although the Home Office does not officially practise nationality 
profiling, the factor of ‘cultural differences’, found in the Home Office file, is 
apparently used as a covert attempt to target the nationals of countries that are 
considered ‘high risk’. It is no coincidence that a significant number of the Upper 
Tribunal judgments the author has analysed in Chapter 6 involve female nationals of 
Eastern European Member States married to male nationals of countries such as 
Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Algeria, or Albania. Overall, male migrants from the Indian 
Subcontinent, African countries, or Albania are disproportionately represented 
amongst non-EU spouses of EU citizens appealing against adverse decisions of the 
Home Office and the lower courts. Immigration lawyers have also noted in the 
interviews that their clients whose marriages are considered to be ones of convenience 
predominantly involve nationals of Islamic countries who meet their EU citizen 
partners whilst already in the UK. In contrast, couples involving nationals of countries 
belonging to the Global North786 are rarely examined.787  
 
5.2 Criteria of marriages of convenience  
 
If there are factors suggesting that the marriage may be one of convenience, 
the couple may be referred to an interview. The interview assessment criteria are not 
publicly available;788 however, another Home Office guidance states that an important 
factor in a marriage of convenience is that there is ‘no genuine relationship’ between 
the parties. The caseworkers are then advised to refer to the Immigration Rules to 
assess whether the relationship is ‘genuine and subsisting’.789 The relevant instructions 
 
785 Home Office, ‘Marriage Investigations’, 13. 
786 The designation ‘Global North’ is typically employed to refer to developed economies with high 
living standards, such as the EU, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. For a critical 
discussion on the division between ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’, see for instance, Matthew 
Sparke, ‘Everywhere But Always Somewhere: Critical Geographies of the Global South’ (2007) 1 The 
Global South 117. 
787 Interviews with David Tang (n 1) and Nath Gbikpi (n 653). 
788 See Home Office, ‘Free Movement Rights: Direct Family Members of European Economic Area 
(EEA) Nationals’.  





provide the list of factors associated with ‘genuineness’ and ‘non-genuineness’ of the 
relationship (see Table 2):790 
 
Table 2 
Factors associated with genuineness Factors associated with non-genuineness 
The couple are in a current, long-term 
relationship.  
Section 24 report.  
Cohabitation.  Evidence of forced marriage. 
The couple have children together.  Inability to provide information about their 
intended living arrangements in the UK. 
The couple share financial responsibilities. The circumstances of the wedding ceremony and 
reception, e.g., no or few guests and/or no 
significant family members present.  
The couple have visited each other’s home 
country and family. 
Inability to provide accurate personal details 
about each other (e.g., name, age, nationality, 
employment, parents’ names and place of 
residence), provide inconsistent evidence, or do 
not have a shared understanding of the core facts 
of their relationship, e.g., how and where they met 
for the first time. 
The couple, or their families acting on their 
behalf, have made definite plans concerning the 
practicalities of the couple living together in the 
UK. 
Inability to communicate in a  language 
understood by both. 
 
Evidence of money having been exchanged for 
the marriage to be contracted – other than dowry.  
 
Lack of appropriate contribution to the 
responsibilities of the marriage, e.g., lack of 
 
790 Immigration Directorate Instructions. Family Members under Appendix FM of the Immigration 




shared financial or other domestic 
responsibilities. 
 
Matrimonial cohabitation is not maintained, 
except where one party is working or studying 
away from home. Or there is no evidence that they 




Previous sham marriage. 
 
Previous evidence of unlawful residence in the 
UK or elsewhere. 
 
The applicant has applied for leave to enter in 
another category and been refused. 
 
The reference to the ‘genuine and subsisting’ relationship test is plain wrong 
and highly confusing. As explored above, Immigration Rules do not apply in the EU 
context. In contrast to the UK national immigration law, what matters with respect to 
EU citizens is only the purpose of the marriage and not its substance. For their marriage 
to be accepted as not one of convenience, their relationship does not need to be 
‘genuine and subsisting’: in fact, as long as the marriage was not contracted only for 
the purpose of enabling the TCN party to enjoy Treaty rights, there does not need to 
be any relationship, at all.   
As the author has noted in Chapter 3, the Commission Handbook lists similar 
hints of a marriage of convenience as the ones found in the Home Office guidance on 
a ‘genuine and subsisting’ relationship. Although referring to the wrong test, the Home 
Office rightly specifies that the burden of proof in EU cases lies on the authorities. It 
is nonetheless noted that ‘[u]nlike in criminal cases you do not need to prove beyond 
all reasonable doubt before you refuse an application’.791 The standard of proof is the 
balance of probabilities where evidence shows that it is more likely than not that the 
marriage is one of convenience. The Home Office guidance, however, notes that the 
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decision must not purely be based on the number of discrepancies. Accordingly, if ‘a 
significant number of answers were the same and the couple were able to show an in-
depth knowledge of each other, this would outweigh evidence that led to doubts about 
the relationship’.792 This is largely in line with the Commission Handbook.  
Yet, the list of factors associated with ‘non-genuineness’ of the marriage is 
deeply disturbing. Similarly to the criteria provided in the Handbook, most of them 
disadvantage couples involving non-EU nationals with an unstable status or those 
whose relationship has started only recently, as well as reflecting a stereotypical view 
of an ‘ideal’ marriage. For instance, many couples may choose to have a small wedding 
ceremony with very few or no guests, not to cohabit for a great variety of reasons, and 
not make what is normatively perceived as ‘appropriate contributions to the 
responsibilities of the marriage’, e.g., not share their finances. Lastly, the practice of 
assigning immigration officers the role of language experts is more than questionable. 
Yet there are cases where the marriage was found to be one of convenience inter alia 
because Home Office officers believed the parties did not speak English well enough 
and consequently could not communicate.793 
 
5.3 Interview questions: Focus on discrepancies and cohabitation  
 
The Home Office guidance specifies that, during the interview, the partners 
may be asked about:  
 
1) The background to, history of and subsistence of their relationship; 
2) Their general background and the immigration history; 
3) Their living arrangements; 
4) The arrangements for the proposed marriage; and 
5) Their future plans.794 
 
 
792 Ibid, 42.  
793 See, e.g, Bello v SSHD [2017] UKUT 09346 (IAC), para 8; Raza v SSHD [2019] UKUT 03566 
(IAC), para 6. 
794 Home Office, ‘Marriage and Civil Partnership Referral and Investigation Scheme: Statutory 





The evidence obtained suggests that marriage interviews may frequently last 
for several hours, with applicants being asked well over 100 detailed questions.795 
These often relate to such matters as to when and how the couple first met, how their 
relationship developed, the marriage proposal, the wedding day, what they knew about 
each other’s backgrounds, and recent events.796 A record of a post-marriage interview 
of a Bulgarian-Algerian couple obtained by the author includes questions such as how 
they spend their free time, when and what time they last went to a restaurant together, 
what TV programmes they watch together, what hobbies or interests they have, if the 
husband has a best friend, when and how they met and began living together, who paid 
for the wedding, and what hours they worked each day.797 Yet the practice of 
questioning couples in much detail about their present relationship is problematic since 
according to EU law, the parties are not obliged to spend their time together or be in a 
relationship at all.  
Next, immigration practitioners complain that interviewers frequently place 
their main focus on minor discrepancies, rather than questions where the answers  
match. One lawyer commented that interviews appear ‘more designed to get wrong 
answers on trivial things than to test the genuineness of the relationship’.798 Lawyers 
describe cases where applications for EEA residence cards were refused following 
about a dozen minor differences in over 100 questions.799 Couples may be asked to 
remember difficult things or the exact dates of certain events. For instance, recall the 
name of the coffee shop where they met many years previously, recall if the table at 
their wedding ceremony was round or square, and recall what the colour of the walls 
and the shutter in the shop where the wife worked were. Spouses reported being asked 
complex questions about their partner’s religion, education, country of origin that they 
 
795 See, e.g., Virk v SSHD [2018] UKUT 19843 (IAC); ILPA, ‘Comments for the Chief Inspector of 
Borders and Immigration. Review of Sham Marriages (n 674); a marriage interview record from 2011 
obtained by the author. There are also cases when the parties are asked even more questions. In one 
case, the TCN spouse was asked 641 question and her EU citizen husband 248 questions (K v 
SSHD [2017] UKUT 29770 (IAC), para 3). In another case, the EU citizen principal was asked over 
300 questions over a period of nearly three hours (Alex [A] v SSHD [2018] UKUT 04343 (IAC), para 
12). There is also a case where the couple was asked about 1000 questions ([B S] v SSHD [2017] UKUT 
16879 (IAC), para 9).  
796 See, e.g., K v SSHD (n 797), para 3; A U v SSHD [2017] UKUT 00052 (IAC). 
797 See marriage interview record (n 795).  
798 See ILPA, ‘Comments for the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. Review of Sham 
Marriages (n 672). 





had never visited, and the exact ages of their parents-in-law whom they had never 
met.800  
In addition, couples are normally expected to know the exact date of their 
(proposed) marriage, whether their partners had been married before, as well as each 
other’s financial affairs, as well as remember when they last went to the cinema or 
restaurant. It should be noted, however, that many couples in a close relationship may 
not recall or choose not to share such details with each other. EU citizens are also 
typically asked about their TCN partner’s immigration history. A couple who later 
gave birth to a child was considered to be one of convenience inter alia because the 
EU spouse could not recall the exact date of their marriage, as well as did not know 
that her Egyptian husband had entered the UK using a false name and put forward an 
asylum claim as a national of Palestine.801  
Moreover, in some of the interviews, couples are asked questions that are 
confusing, vaguely formulated or can be interpreted in many different ways. One 
lawyer reports his clients being asked when their relationship became serious, although 
the parties may perceive the word ‘serious’ differently: for some, it may mean kissing 
for the first time, for others – becoming intimate, moving in together, or deciding to 
get married.802 Couples were also asked, for example, about each other’s favourite 
colour,803 although a person may not have one, and what plans they have for the future, 
although their answers will most likely differ. For instance, in one marriage interview, 
the husband said he wished to start his own business, whilst his wife wanted to have a 
baby.804 Such an approach is even more problematic given that the parties are obliged  
to answer every single question to be considered compliant with the investigation. 
Further, when interviewing couples, the Home Office places a significant focus 
on cohabitation, asking the parties to provide a detailed description of their claimed 
marital home. For instance, one marriage interview included 15 questions under the 
section ‘home’, including how many bedrooms the flat had, what floor was it on, what 
was in the bedroom, if they had a bath or shower in the bathroom, and what they could 
see when looking out of their bedroom window.805 One couple was asked to give the 
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801 See Abouelhasaan v SSHD [2019] UKUT 04931 (IAC), para 10. 
802 Interview with David Tang (n 1).  
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number of pictures on the wall of their sitting room;806 another marriage was 
considered to be one of convenience inter alia because the husband described the 
electric toaster as white and the wife as silver.807  
It must be recalled that, according to the Commission Handbook, Member 
States are first advised to look for the hints that the marriage is not one of convenience. 
Yet, it appears that this is not the approach pursued by the Home Office. Overall, the 
analysis above shows that the aim of the executive is not to avoid disproportionate 
intrusion into the lives of genuine couples who may be erroneously deprived of their 
fundamental rights, but to uncover perceived marriages of convenience even where 
there is no basis to believe one exists. Indeed, although the majority of couples 
interviewed are determined to be genuine,808 Home Office officers still question the 
nature of their marriage and believe that offenders are simply too well-prepared to get 
caught.809 The focus of the government, therefore, appears entirely misplaced.  
 
5.4 Hostile interviewing style 
 
Although Home Office officers are not permitted to ask inappropriate 
questions, such as about the couple’s sex life,810 there are numerous examples of 
personal and aggressive questioning. Such practices arguably amount to a violation of 
the rights to respect for human dignity and for private and family life (Article 1 and 7  
of the EUCFR respectively).811 In a number of cases, immigration officers have asked 
the parties about their intimate relationships, including details about sexual positions 
and contraception.812 In other situations, interviewees were threatened with arrest and 
removal from the UK. For instance, in one case, the Home Office officer set the tone 
of the interview by advising the principal that the penalties for an EU citizen entering 
into a marriage of convenience can include up to 14 years imprisonment. The 
 
806 See ILPA, ‘Comments for the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. Review of Sham 
Marriages (n 672). 
807 Ibid. 
808 n 698. The Home Office has nonetheless declined to disclose statistics on detected marriages of 
convenience amongst applicants for EEA family permits and residence cards. See Appendix 2.    
809 See for instance ICIBI, ‘The Implementation of the 2014 “Hostile Environment” Provisions’ (n 687), 
6.  
810 Home Office, ‘Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, Chapter 30: sham marriages / civil 
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interviewer further warned her that her husband could be taken to a detention centre 
and then removed from the UK. The interrogation then proceeded to 125 questions and 
continued after the pregnant principal stated at question 112 that she wanted to stop 
the interview because she felt nauseous. The interviewer nevertheless continued to ask 
questions.813  
Another case involved an EU citizen principal who could not answer the 
questions properly because she felt physically unwell during the interview due to her 
sugar levels dropping as she was diabetic. Overall, she was asked over 300 questions 
for nearly three hours. From question 180, she began to feel confused, and the officer 
had to repeat the questions. However, the officer did not stop the interview or change 
her intimidating style of questioning. At question 200, the interviewer aggressively 
asked how often the couple spoke on the phone in the period when their relationship 
developed saying: ‘Which was what? Was it weekly? Was it daily? Was it fortnightly? 
How regular’s regular to you?’ It was only at question 206 when she apparently 
realised that the EU principal was unwell, asked if she needed to check her blood sugar, 
and issued a break, following which the interview continued. The principal was given 
food at question 219 and another break at question 229. The questioning then went on 
in spite of her indicating that she did not feel well enough to continue. The marriage 
was ultimately found to be one of convenience.814  
 
5.5 Cases involving pregnancy or childbirth  
 
A particularly problematic category of cases involves situations where one of 
the spouses is pregnant, or the couple already has a child. As the author has argued in 
Chapter 3, the very fact of pregnancy and/or childbirth alone signifies that the couple 
has been in a relationship, which is inconsistent with the restrictive definition of a 
marriage of convenience.  
Evidence, however, suggests that the Home Office frequently designates 
marriages involving pregnancy and children as ones of convenience.815 In a number of 
cases, the Home Office concluded the marriage in question was of convenience despite 
 
813 See Virk v SSHD (n 795), para 6.  
814 Alex [A] v SSHD (n 795), paras 12, 20. 





the pregnancy of the EU citizen principal.816 Lawyers interviewed claim that Home 
Office officers tend to either not believe that the biological father of the child is the 
TCN husband, or claim that parties of marriages of convenience try to give birth to a 
child only to increase the opportunities of the TCN spouse to stay in the UK.817  
Such assumptions are striking for a number of reasons. First, by questioning 
the paternity of the child, the Home Office is ignoring the presumption in English 
family law that states that the husband is considered to be the father of any child born 
in wedlock.818 Secondly, as noted above, the very fact of pregnancy is inconsistent 
with the definition of marriages of convenience. Thirdly, having children is a serious 
commitment, and it is difficult to imagine that many would use it solely to obtain an 
immigration status. Last but not least, whilst attacking couples with children, the Home 
Office does not seem to give any consideration to the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. 
 
5.6 Home visits  
 
The Home Office practices also suggest that immigration officers are often 
unaware of the CJEU judgments in Diatta and Ogieriakhi, which do not require the 
couple to live together under one roof. In several cases, an application for a residence 
permit was refused, or the existing residence permit revoked, following a single visit 
to the couple’s indicated home address where the spouses were not encountered. By 
doing so, the authorities have failed to discharge the burden of proof, and hence, 
clearly breached EU law. 
In one case, the officers noted that there was no furniture or signs of 
cohabitation at the property, and the bins were empty. It was thus believed the TCN 
applicant had provided the Home Office with a false address, thus preventing the 
authorities from verifying the nature of her marriage.819 In another case, the refusal 
 
816 See for instance, ILPA, ‘Comments for the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. Review of 
Sham Marriages (n 674); Virk v SSHD (n 797); Khan v SSHD [2019] UKUT 03191 (IAC); Resul [M] v 
SSHD [2019] UKUT 07602 (IAC). 
817 Interview with David Tang (n 1). 
818 Child Support Act 1991, s 26(2). For Scotland and Northern Ireland see, respectively, Law Reform 
(Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986, s 5 and The Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, N.I.2 
1995/755, s 5.  
819 See SSHD v Okofor [2016] UKUT 42725 (IAC), para 3. See also, Agho v SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 





followed an immigration visit that took place two months after the couple had moved 
out, the Home Office having been informed of the new address. The officers claimed 
that ‘a man said they had never lived there’.820 In a line of other situations, neighbours 
have similarly struggled to recognise the couple or reported that one of the spouses 
lived there alone.821 The heavy reliance by immigration officers on such accounts is 
all the more puzzling, since, especially in large cities, neighbours may not know each 
other, and in any event, should not be considered a credible information source. 
An application may also be refused where only one of the spouses is absent 
from their claimed marital home. In one case, the Pakistani national husband was 
present at the time of the visit but said that his Slovenian wife was visiting her sister 
in her home Member State. The immigration officers observed there was scant 
evidence of a woman’s presence at the house and there was lack of photographs and 
phone records. This made them conclude that their marriage was not ‘genuine and 
subsisting’, and, hence, was one of convenience.822 In a similar case, the Home Office 
raided the TCN husband’s sister’s home where the couple claimed to live. The EU 
citizen wife was absent, but her Cameroon national husband was found hiding in a 
cupboard, which, in the view of the officers, indicated that his marriage was one of 
convenience.823 Later at the court hearing, he said he was simply scared, an explanation 
that was accepted by the FtT judge who eventually allowed his appeal.824  
On the other hand, a number of judgments show that the mere fact of 
cohabitation is deemed insufficient for a marriage to be considered not one of 
convenience. For example, in one case, immigration officers encountered the spouses 
in a bedroom and observed the presence of both male and female clothes and 
photographs of the couple on a bedside table. Yet, there were some sheets laid out on 
the floor which, in view of the officers, suggested they were sleeping separately. This, 
together with the fact that the spouses could not remember the exact place where they 
married, made the officers believe their marriage was one of convenience.825 In its 
decision, the Home Office not only failed to discharge the burden of proof and wrongly 
placed its main focus on cohabitation but also discussed their sleeping arrangements, 
 
820 See ILPA, ‘Comments for the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. Review of Sham 
Marriages (n 674). 
821 See, e.g., De Vera v SSHD [2017] UKUT 07000 (IAC), para 2; Saeed v SSHD [2017] UKUT 09715 
(IAC), para 2; Muhammad [M] v SSHD [2019] UKUT 07160 (IAC), para 8. 
822 See SSHD v Kashif [2016] UKUT 19663 (IAC), paras 3-5.  
823 See SSHD v Lekeate [2019] UKUT 08363 (IAC), para 5. 
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a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s right to respect for human dignity 
and private and family life.  
 
6. What happens after Brexit? 
 
In March 2017, nine months after the Brexit referendum held on 23 June 2016, 
the UK formally notified the European Council of its decision to leave the EU. This 
officially triggered the withdrawal procedure prescribed in Article 50 of the Lisbon 
Treaty. The latter provides that the leaving Member State and the EU should agree on 
the departure terms within two years after the notification date unless an extension is 
negotiated. In October 2019, following a slow and turbulent negotiation process and 
several extensions, the contracting parties approved a revised version of the EU-UK 
Withdrawal Agreement, a legally binding instrument of international law establishing 
the conditions for UK’s exit from the Union. The Agreement was accompanied by a 
non-binding Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship 
between the UK and the EU.826 On 23 January 2020, the UK Parliament passed the 
Withdrawal Agreement Act incorporating the Withdrawal Agreement into UK law.827 
This was done because the UK is a ‘dualist state’ which gives effect to an international 
treaty only after it is incorporated into its domestic law. Following this, the Agreement 
was signed by the UK and EU representatives, approved by the European Parliament, 
and ratified by the EU Council. Both the Agreement and the Act entered into force at 
11 p.m. GMT on 31 January 2020, marking the official end of the British membership 
in the EU.  
The Withdrawal Agreement covers a number of areas, including citizens’ 
rights, the financial settlement, border arrangements and judicial and administrative 
 
826 Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom (TF50 (2019) 65 – Commission to EU 27). 
827 WA 2018 as amended by European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. The Act also 
implements the Agreement on arrangements between Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the 
Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland following the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the EEA Agreement and other agreements 
applicable between the United Kingdom and the EEA EFTA States by virtue of the United Kingdom’s 
membership of the European Union [MS No.1/2020] (EEA EFTA Separation Agreement) and 
Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Swiss 
Confederation on citizens’ rights following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European 
Union and the free movement of persons agreement [CS Switzerland No.5/2019] (UK-Swiss Citizens’ 
Rights Agreement) which protect the rights of citizens between the UK and  Norway, Iceland and 




procedures. Two of these, namely, EU citizen’s rights and dispute resolution 
mechanisms, are of particular relevance to this thesis. To allow the parties time to 
negotiate a new trade deal, the Agreement provides for a transition period running 
from the Brexit day to 31 December 2020. During this time, free movement continues 
to operate as normal, the UK remains in both the single market and the customs union, 
and the CJEU continues to have jurisdiction over the UK.  
In its part entitled ‘Citizens’ rights’, the Agreement provides residence 
guarantees to EU citizens living in the UK and British nationals living in the EU. Both 
groups retain residence rights on the same terms as under the Citizenship Directive, 
provided that the individual already lives in or moves to the respective state before the 
end of the transition period (although British nationals in the EU lose their ability to 
move freely between the Member States). The same rights are reserved for their (non-
EU national) family members as defined under Articles 2 and 3(2) of the Citizenship 
Directive, provided that they already live in the host state on the basis of the Treaty 
provisions by 31 December 2020 and continue to do so thereafter. Direct family 
members who do not reside in the relevant country by this date have a right to later 
join the principal on the condition that their relationship (e.g., marriage or registered 
partnership) began before 31 December 2020 and still continues to exist.828 These 
criteria should also be met in order for the host state to facilitate admission of durable 
partners after the cut-off date. EU citizens, UK nationals and their family members 
who have lived in the host state for a continuous period of five years obtain the right 
of permanent residence. The principle of non-discrimination will continue to apply to 
all the aforementioned groups.829  
The position of EU citizens and UK nationals who relocate to the host state 
after 31 December 2020 or establish a relationship with their family members after 
this date is not covered by the Agreement; the relevant rules will be determined by the 
domestic immigration laws of the UK and EU Member States830 and, where applicable, 
 
828 The only exception are Swiss citizens who are eligible for family reunion with their spouses or civil 
partners if the marriage or civil partnership was registered by 31 December 2025. UK-Swiss Citizens’ 
Rights Agreement, art 10(1)(e)(iv). 
829 WA 2018, art 12.  
830 On 18 March 2020, the Commission published a Draft text of the Agreement on the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK. In line with the Political Declaration, it inter alia states that 
the parties shall provide for reciprocal visa -free travel for EU citizens and UK nationals for short-term 
visits. Draft text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom UKTF (2020) 4 
(18.03.2020), a rt MOBI.4. The position of TCN family members is not specifically addressed in the 





EU law on third-country nationals, such as the Family Reunification or Long Term 
Residents831 Directives.  
In the UK, the residence guarantees to EU citizens and their family members 
are not provided automatically. All beneficiaries of the Withdrawal Agreement (and 
correspondingly the Withdrawal Act) are required to apply for a new status online 
under the so-called EU Settlement Scheme, introduced as an Appendix EU to the UK 
Immigration Rules. Applications are to be accepted for a further six months after the 
end of the transition period, with 30 June 2021 set out as the final deadline. Under the 
scheme, those who can prove they have lived in the UK for five continuous years 
obtain the so-called ‘settled status’, or formally, indefinite leave to remain (ILR). 
Conversely, those who have relocated to the UK prior to 31 December 2020 but have 
not yet reached the five-year residence threshold are granted ‘pre-settled status’ or 
limited leave to remain (LLR) for five years. Once the five-year continuous residence 
requirement is satisfied, the ‘pre-settled status’ can be upgraded to the ‘settled status’. 
Under the settlement scheme, residence cards already granted to family members of 
EU citizens will cease to be valid after 31 December 2020. EEA family permits 
continue to operate alongside the newly introduced EU Settlement Scheme family 
permits (EUSS family permits). The difference between the two routes is that the 
EUSS family permit is only available to direct family members of EU citizens who 
already hold either settled or pre-settled status, whereas EEA family permits cover any 
family members of EU citizens resident in the UK or returning British nationals. Both 
types of permits are valid for six months; family members who wish to stay in the UK 
will need to apply to the settlement scheme after arrival.  
Although the holders of pre-settled or settled status will continue to enjoy the 
core rights guaranteed under the Citizenship Directive, the new scheme effectively 
transforms EU citizens into foreigners who need to comply with certain conditions to 
retain residence rights. One of the key differences between the EU citizenship and the 
settlement scheme is that the ‘settled status’ is lost after being outside the UK for over 
five years in a row, whereas an upgrade from the pre-settled status becomes impossible 
after spending two continuous years abroad. Those who do not meet residence 
requirements are expected to be excluded from the scheme and fall within the domain 
of UK immigration laws. The residence requirements hardly bear any resemblance to 
 
831 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third -country 




EU free movement law which provides for the possibility of freely leaving, moving to, 
or returning to any EU Member State at any time.  
Yet, notwithstanding its obvious limitations, the rights reserved for EU citizens 
who move to the UK by 31 December 2020 sharply contrast with those envisaged for 
nationals of EU Member States arriving in the UK after the deadline. From January 
2021, the UK intends to introduce a ‘points-based immigration system’ under which 
EU citizens will be treated equally to third-country nationals.832 Moreover, EU citizens 
belonging to this category will no longer benefit from the rights to family reunion 
guaranteed under the EU Settlement Scheme; neither will holders of settled or pre -
settled status whose relationship started (e.g., marriage was registered) after 31 
December 2020. To enjoy family life with their close ones in the UK, these groups 
will need to comply with the restrictive national family reunification rules described 
in Section 2.5 above. In addition, refusal of the UK authorities to admit their family 
members will no longer be subject to appeal, unless an Article 8 ECHR-based claim 
is lodged as part of the application.  
One group that may be particularly disadvantaged by the new system are 
unmarried couples involving EU citizens and non-EU nationals with a short-term or 
irregular residence status. Even where they are resident in the UK before the end of 
the transitional period, such couples may not be able to marry by this date due to the 
hurdles created by the ‘referral and investigation  scheme’ or suspension of marriage 
registration because of the coronavirus outbreak. It should also be stressed that after 
the cut-off date, the new rules are expected to cover not only non-EU nationals but 
also EU citizen family members who could previously enjoy residence rights on their 
own capacity. The Surinder Singh route for UK nationals will also effectively be 
abolished.833 
Returning to the EU citizens who do fall within the scope of the Settlement 
Scheme, one aspect bearing particular relevance to this thesis is the extent of protection 
offered to this group from marriage checks aimed to identify perceived marriages of 
convenience. Article 20(3) of the Withdrawal Agreement stipulates that the host state 
 
832 Home Office, ‘The UK’s Points-Based Immigration System: Policy Statement’ (19.02.2020) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uks-points-based-immigration-system-policy-
statement/the-uks-points-based-immigration-system-policy-statement> accessed 30 August 2020. 
833 Under the Immigration Rules, family members of returning UK nationals whose relationship started 
before the Brexit day must return and apply to the EU settlement scheme by 29 March 2022; those 





may adopt measures to combat fraud or abuse on the same conditions as set out in 
Article 35 of the Citizenship Directive and with respect to the same procedural 
safeguards listed in this document. The UK Immigration Rules correspondingly 
provide that, for the purposes of family reunion under the EU Settlement Scheme, the 
terms ‘spouse’ and ‘civil partner’ exclude marriages or civil partnerships of 
convenience. These concepts are defined there as marriages or civil partnerships 
entered into to circumvent: 
 
a) Any criterion the party would have to meet in order to enjoy a right 
to enter or reside in the UK under the EEA Regulations; or 
b) Any other provision of UK immigration law or any requirement of 
the Immigration Rules; or 
c) Any criterion the party would otherwise have to meet in order to 
enjoy a right to enter or reside in the UK under EU law; or 
d) Any criterion the party would have to meet in order to enjoy a right 
to enter or reside in the Islands under Islands law.834 
 
This definition is potentially problematic, for it contains neither the word ‘sole’ 
as provided under the Citizenship Directive, nor the passage that there should not be a 
‘genuine relationship’ between the parties as stipulated in the Immigration Act 1999. 
Literally read, it covers not only marriages entered into only for the purpose to secure 
an immigration advantage for the foreign spouse and having no other content apart 
from an immigration motive, but also situations where couples wish to lead a family 
life and residence status is only one of the motives for marriage. As noted in Chapter 
3 and Section 4.2 above, this interpretation is arguably in breach of Article 35 of the 
Citizenship Directive, and consequently, the Withdrawal Agreement and Act.  
As stated in the Withdrawal Agreement, its provisions must be interpreted and 
applied ‘in accordance with the methods and general principles of Union law’, 
including the relevant CJEU case-law handed down before the end of the transition 
period which retains binding force in the UK.835 Accordingly, when addressing 
perceived marriages of convenience within the framework of the EU Settlement 
 
834 Immigration Rules Appendix EU, Annex 1. 
835 Withdrawal Agreement, art 4(3). It is nonetheless stipulated in s 6 of the WA 2018 that the Supreme 
Court can depart from the retained CJEU case-law in the same exceptional circumstances in which the 
court would depart from its own case-law. Moreover, the UK government is granted significant powers 
to enact secondary legislation to determine how and to what extent the courts may depart from the 
retained EU case-law. For an analysis, see, Steve Peers, ‘The Withdrawal Agreement Act: Implementing 
the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement in the UK’ (EU Law Analysis, 17.02.2020) 





Scheme, UK authorities may continue to consult the Commission Handbook 
addressing the issue. Further, the UK will continue to be bound by the relevant 
constraints imposed by the CJEU, such as the prohibition of systematic checks and the 
absence of the cohabitation requirement. Notwithstanding that, the Withdrawal 
Agreement expressly provides that the host state is entitled to remove individuals 
whose applications are considered fraudulent or abusive, even where their appeal is 
still pending.836 This is a worrisome development that may seriously impact the 
position of couples whose marriages are erroneously found to be ones of convenience. 
Moreover, as the author has argued in Section 4.5, such a rule is rather questionable 
from the perspective of the Citizenship Directive.  
As a general rule, the UK will no longer be obliged to comply with any CJEU 
judgments handed down on or after 31 December 2020, unless the case is brought 
before the Court before this date.837 When interpreting the Agreement provisions, the 
UK courts may nonetheless have regard to the subsequent CJEU jurisprudence (or any 
other EU legislation) if they wish to do so.838 Further, British courts will be able to 
request from the CJEU, preliminary rulings on the position of EU citizens resident in 
the UK for a further eight years from the end of the transition period. In such cases, 
CJEU decisions will be binding upon the UK.839 
The correct application of Part 2 of the Agreement (EU citizens’ rights) in the 
UK shall be safeguarded by the newly established Independent Monitoring Authority 
(IMA). The new entity will be empowered to conduct inquiries regarding possible 
breaches of the relevant provisions by the UK authorities – both on its own initiative 
and following complaints from EU citizens and their family members – and to bring 
legal action before a competent UK court.840 In addition to this procedure, EU citizens 
and their family members covered by the Settlement Scheme will also be entitled to 
directly claim their rights under the Withdrawal Act in UK courts.841 The IMA shall 
work closely with a Joint Committee comprising of representatives of the EU and the 
 
836 Withdrawal Agreement, art 20(4).  
837 Ibid, art 86(1). 
838 Ibid, art 4(5). 
839 Ibid, art 158. Other EU Member States will also be able to refer to the CJEU cases concerning the 
position of UK nationals resident in their territory.  
840 Ibid, art 159. 
841 Under the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, SI 2020/61 which 
came into force on the Brexit day, EU citizens and their family members have a right to challenge a 





UK, which will be responsible for resolving any issues related to the implementation 
and application of the Withdrawal Agreement.842  
To maintain legal continuity in areas where the UK has not (yet) changed EU 
legislation, the Withdrawal Act provides that all UK legislation derived from EU law 
continues to have effect after the exit day. The UK Parliament, however, has already 
begun preparing legislation that will amend or repeal EU law and apply after the 
transition period. It is, for instance, expected that the EEA Regulations 2016 will be 
repealed by the forthcoming Immigration and Social Security Co-Ordination (EU 
Withdrawal) Bill 2020.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Over the past decade, the excessive preoccupation of the UK authorities over 
the perceived abuse of EU law via marriages of convenience has resulted in the 
adoption of several legislative measures, disproportionally and arbitrarily targeting 
couples involving mobile EU citizens.   
First, this Chapter has demonstrated that human rights are too weak to protect 
yet unmarried couples from the hostile policies of the UK government. Under the 
Citizenship Directive, spouses of EU citizens automatically acquire the right of 
residence, irrespective of their previous immigration status. To prevent allegedly 
dishonest non-EU nationals from benefitting from more generous Treaty rights, the 
UK introduced systematic checks of all intended marriages involving persons without 
indefinite leave. The relevant rules go well beyond targeting couples whose 
prospective marriage would fit the legal definition of a ‘sham marriage’. Although 
formally one is allowed to register marriage even if it is found to be a sham, in practice, 
many couples in a close relationship may face numerous hurdles depriving them of 
this fundamental right. Now, every couple not exempt from the scheme may be 
required to endure another 70 days of anxiety and undergo an intrusive investigation 
with an unknown outcome.  
The respective rules are highly confusing and provide little legal certainty for 
EU citizens (or UK nationals) and their TCN partners, particularly where the latter has 
a short-term or irregular status in the UK. First, the couple may be denied the right to 
 




marry for non-compliance with the investigation for purely bureaucratic reasons, 
unrelated to the nature of their marriage, which potentially amounts to a breach of the 
ECHR. Second, their prospective marriage may be erroneously considered a sham, a 
decision which is likely to lead to the couple’s separation. Third, and most importantly, 
by giving a marriage notice, the foreigner automatically comes into the attention of the 
Home Office: this is particularly risky for those irregularly present in the UK who may 
be removed at any point before their marriage is registered. Therefore, instead of 
respecting their partner choice and protecting the family life of UK-based EU citizens, 
the government seeks to disrupt their families, prompting the couples to live in legal 
limbo or even relocate, which in turn, seriously obstructs the free movement rights of 
EU citizens. In the meantime, the number of detected sham marriages under the 
scheme is very low, which raises a question about the government’s rationale in 
continuing operating the scheme not only from a legal perspective but also  a public 
policy one.  
In contrast to UK domestic law, the Citizenship Directive prohibits systematic 
checks of marriages involving EU citizens. However, even at the post-marriage stage, 
the UK measures targeting perceived marriages of convenience go well beyond what 
is permitted under the Citizenship Directive and CJEU case-law. First, to obtain an 
EEA Family Permit or residence card, the TCN spouses are required to submit 
excessive details about their relationship, although they do not need to do so under EU 
law. Yet, refusal to grant the non-EU national a residence card bears serious 
implications for the couple, particularly since an appeal against the relevant decision 
will not suspend removal. This is further aggravated by the fact that an EU citizen, 
allegedly involved in a marriage of convenience, can be deported from the UK on 
public policy grounds, an arbitrary and unprecedented measure that equally violates 
EU law.  
Next, some of the Home Office practices of investigating marriages do not 
easily comply with the Citizenship Directive or the Commission guidance on the issue. 
During the interviews, Home Office officers do not seek to reduce the risk of an 
erroneous assessment by looking for hints that the marriage is genuine; rather, they 
focus on discrepancies in responses to prove that the marriage is one of convenience. 
Furthermore, the executive wrongly approaches the issue of the burden of proof, 
requires the relationship to be ‘genuine and subsisting’, designates marriages involving 




an excessive focus on the present state of the relationship and requiring the couple to 
live under one roof. In addition, some of the investigation techniques are particularly 
hostile and arguably violate the EUCFR. Further, the author’s empirical research 
suggests that the Home Office measures disproportionately target men from the Indian 
Subcontinent, West Africa and Albania, as well as female nationals of EU-12 Member 
States and naturalised EU citizens. 
One of the major issues with the UK approach is the co-existence of two 
different legal terms (‘marriages of convenience’ and ‘sham marriage’) and various 
definitions of the same concept. This is highly problematic in terms of clarity and legal 
certainty. As the author will show in Chapter 6, the problems created by this approach 
are best evident in interpretations of the concept by UK judges which have led to 
extremely perplexing outcomes. The second important paradox is that the terms ‘sham 
marriage’ and ‘marriages of convenience’ are only used in the domains of immigration 
and free movement law; consequently, a marriage disqualified for residence purposes 
as a ‘sham’ or ‘one of convenience’, continues to be valid under UK family law with 
all the corresponding rights and responsibilities.   
Last but not least, the UK decision to leave the EU will profoundly transform 
the position of UK-resident EU citizens and their family members. EU citizens who 
relocate to the UK or marry a foreigner before 31 December 2020 will be covered by 
the Withdrawal Act and entitled to stay in the UK on the same terms as under the 
Citizenship Directive. Rather disappointingly, however, the UK Immigration Rules 
applicable to this group introduce yet another definition of marriages of convenience 
which is arguably broader than the one found in the Directive. Those who do not fall 
without the scope of the Act will need to comply with UK domestic family 





CHAPTER 6. Legitimising the Illegitimate: Marriages of 
Convenience and the UK Judiciary 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Chapter 5, the author argued that the Home Office frequently disregards EU 
law when designating marriages as ones of convenience and subjects TCN spouses of 
mobile EU citizens to excessive scrutiny. The general climate of suspicion and 
hostility towards this group has resulted in significant interference, and in many cases, 
disruption of the family life of Union citizens involved. In this Chapter, the author 
considers how the UK courts respond to the ‘compliant environment’ practices of the 
executive, how much weight is given to EU-level legislation on the issue, and whether 
or not the relevant domestic provisions implementing the Citizenship Directive are 
interpreted in conformity with EU law. 
To answer these questions, the author conducted an analysis of 110 recent 
Upper Tribunal (UT) Immigration and Asylum Chamber (IAC) decisions in cases 
where TCN spouses of mobile EU citizens were previously refused entry or residence 
in the UK on the grounds that their marriage was found to be one of convenience. The 
cases examined were delivered between July 2016 and July 2019 and selected using 
the keywords ‘marriage of convenience’ or ‘sham marriage’ in conjunction with 
‘EEA’.843 In addition, the author has explored several high-profile cases on the issue, 
delivered by the former Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, the Court of Appeal, the 
High Court of England and Wales, and the Supreme Court.  
With a few exceptions, the cases analysed concern appeals brought by TCN 
spouses against post-marriage decisions made by the Home Office at different stages 
of their residence in the UK. Whilst most judgments involve initial applications for 
residence cards as spouses of EU citizens, many deal with the retained right of 
residence following divorce, applications for permanent residence, or an EEA family 
permit. Pre-marriage cases specifically focusing on marriages of convenience are 
rarely dealt with in courts. This can be explained by the fact that the yet unmarried 
non-EU nationals are removed under section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 
 




1999 as persons without leave, irrespective of the adverse findings about the nature of 
their intended marriage.  
It should be borne in mind that, due to its limitations, the study only focuses on 
First-tier Tribunal decisions brought on appeal. Normally, Home Office decisions that 
are successfully challenged in the FtT are not passed on to a higher instance court 
(except for a few cases where the Home Office appealed against such judgments). In 
the absence of statistics on the relevant FtT decisions that have resulted in a favourable 
outcome for non-EU nationals or have not been further pursued for other reasons, it is 
difficult to provide a full picture of how the FtT courts deal with the concept of 
marriages of convenience. Notwithstanding that, the author argues that the number of 
judgments analysed is sufficient not only to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
UT approach to the issue, but also to identify the most problematic practices of lower 
courts. 
In the first section of this Chapter, the author considers the application of the 
burden of proof, an issue that has been explicitly addressed in the EU-level legislation 
on marriages of convenience. Second, the author explores how the courts deal with the 
executive’s excessive focus on cohabitation and the present state of the relationship. 
Next, bearing in mind the co-existence of different definitions of marriages of 
convenience and terms describing the concept in UK and EU law, the author looks at 
how the latter is defined by UK judges and identif ies problems associated with that. 
The last section is specifically devoted to cases involving pregnancy and childbirth, 
factors which make the finding that a marriage is one of convenience particularly 
problematic.  
 
2. Burden of proof 
 
One of the key issues in cases involving alleged marriages of convenience 
concerns the establishment of the burden of proof. To begin with, it has long been 
confirmed by UK courts that the legal burden of proof in EU cases lies with the Home 
Office. A line of rulings can be distinguished in this regard, starting from the much-
quoted UT decision in Papajorgji,844 delivered in late 2011, and ending up with the 
recent Supreme Court judgment in Sadovska.845  
 
844 Papajorgji (n 728). 




The judgment in Papajorgji concerned an Albanian-Greek couple who had 
been married for 12 years and had two children. Irrespective of this fact, the Albanian 
wife was refused entry clearance to accompany her husband on a visit to the UK on 
the grounds that their marriage was one of convenience. The decision was based on 
the fact that she failed to produce any documentary evidence of the nature of her 
marriage, such as pictures of their wedding or life together, or documents in joint 
names.846 The Upper Tribunal disagreed. The Court first confirmed that the applicant 
was not required to discharge the burden of proof in the absence of reasonable 
suspicions suggesting the marriage was of convenience. The judge rightly referred to 
the 2009 Commission guidelines (the Handbook was yet to be delivered at the time) 
which places the burden of proof on the state, and clarified that although adverse 
inferences may be drawn by a claimant’s failure to address the suspicions, this cannot 
form the sole or decisive reason for the conclusion.847  
 This approach was further endorsed in the subsequent Court of Appeal 
judgment in Agho,848 as well as its decision in Rosa849 and the Supreme Court ruling 
in Sadovska.850 In the latter case, the FtT erroneously claimed that ‘[i]n immigration 
appeals, the burden of proof is on the appellant and the standard of proof required is a 
balance of probabilities’.851 The Supreme Court corrected this error by reiterating that 
the FtT approach would generally be correct in cases involving domestic law yet did 
not apply where EU law came into play.852 
Notwithstanding the line of judgments clarifying the issue, an analysis of the 
Upper Tribunal decisions suggests that FtT judges still frequently place the burden of 
proof upon the applicant,853 even if correctly referring to the EEA Regulations. In 
many cases, however, the FtT wrongly refers to the domestic immigration provisions 
instead and/or requires an applicant to demonstrate that their marriage is ‘genuine and 
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subsisting’, claiming that the burden of proof lies on the non-EU national involved.854 
In such situations, the Upper Tribunal normally allows the appeal by reiterating that 
the burden of proof rests with the Home Office and providing a reference to the 
relevant judgments in Sadovska, Rosa, Agho or Papajorgji. The Commission 
Handbook has meanwhile never been quoted in this context.  
 
2.1 Evidential burden  
 
Even where the judges do show awareness of the relevant case-law, the 
application of the test in practice appears problematic. In a number of judgments, FtT 
considered that in cases of ‘well-founded’ suspicions, the legal burden of proof rests 
with the non-EU national. In several cases, such decisions were set aside by the UT;855 
yet there are disappointing examples when the Upper Tribunal did concur with the 
FtT.856  
Furthermore, the case-law analysis shows that judges rarely follow the ‘double-
lock’ approach described in the Commission Handbook. Instead of first looking for 
the hints suggesting that the marriage is not one of convenience, tribunals tend to 
endorse the position pursued by the executive – i.e., focus on alleged discrepancies 
and other perceived signs of abuse. In doing so, the judges typically rely on their 
stereotypes and highly normative perceptions of how a ‘real’ marriage should look 
like. In this light, their findings that the Home Office has discharged the burden of 
proof are rather questionable. Although the erroneous conclusions of the FtT are 
frequently overturned or set aside by the UT, this is not always the case.  
Rajah is one of the rare cases where the UT explicitly referred to the positive 
and negative indicative criteria listed in the 2009 Commission guidelines (although the 
decision was delivered in 2018, the judge appears to be unaware of the Handbook). 
The FtT previously found the marriage to be one of convenience mainly because the 
applicant was not found at home during the immigration visit, a decision that was 
ultimately rejected by the UT. Following the criteria provided in the Guidelines, the 
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UT inter alia noted that the couple had a relationship before their marriage, the 
appellant already had a five-year UK visa, the couple were consistent about the 
circumstances of their first meeting, they had a common language, and it was not 
suggested that the principal was paid to marry her husband or that either of them had 
a previous history of fraud, abuse, or marriages of convenience.857 Hence, on the 
balance of probabilities, the UT concluded that Home Office had not discharged the 
burden of proof.858 
In one case, the FtT judge endorsed the Home Office’s finding that a marriage 
was one of convenience because inter alia the EU principal had limited knowledge of 
her TCN husband’s academic career.859 The UT, however, noted that the judge failed 
to consider the questions which the partners had answered correctly, as well as 
evidence from family and friends, photos, and evidence of their cohabitation. In this 
light, the UT doubted that the FtT considered whether the evidential burden had shifted 
to the appellant and if it had, whether the appellant had satisfied it, a procedure set out 
in Papajorgji. The decision was consequently set aside.860  
In another case, the FtT judge found that a marriage was one of convenience 
inter alia because she considered the appellant’s lack of knowledge about his wife’s 
family was inconsistent with that ‘normally expected of a husband’.861 This is a highly 
normative and subjective position that was rightly criticised by the UT, particularly 
given that the wife explained that they did not talk about her father or brother due to 
‘abuse issues during her childhood’.862 The appeal was consequently remitted to the 
FtT for re-hearing. In some cases, both tribunals drew adverse inferences from the fact 
that the couple had a joint bank account and bills in joint names, opining that it was 
‘part of a package’ to convince the Home Office that their marriage was not one of 
convenience.863 In Jamil, the UT judge commented that a marriage that lasted for three 
years was ‘on any way brief’.864 This, together with other questionable evidence, made 
him believe it was one of convenience.  
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In a number of cases, the FtT judges dismissed the claims inter alia on the 
grounds of their biased assessments of the photographic evidence. The judges tend to 
complain about the low number of photographs submitted or label them as ‘staged’.865 
As a result, couples may feel pressured to take many pictures together even if they 
would not do so in normal circumstances, and then risk being considered not ‘genuine’ 
because of showing either too much or too little affection.  
Furthermore, some judges placed significant weight on cultural differences 
between the spouses, a highly discriminatory position that is in no way linked to the 
purpose or content of the marriage. As UT reasonably argued in Nasreen, it was 
unclear why the FtT judge doubted that a Bangladeshi-Italian couple developed a 
relationship at a takeaway restaurant where he worked, and she was a customer, and 
they found they had a lot in common despite their different backgrounds.866 Likewise, 
judges tend to follow the approach by the executive and act as language and 
communication experts, evaluating the parties’ language skills and their ability to 
converse.  
In one case, the FtT judge dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the 
appellant’s responses to the questions were ‘incredibly vague’ and the English of the 
principal – ‘wholly inadequate’.867 This led the judge to conclude that the spouses were 
unable to converse, a finding also accepted by the UT. In another case involving a  
Pakistani-Portuguese couple, the FtT found that the marriage was one of convenience 
because the couple gave inconsistent evidence and the wife spoke ‘very little’ 
English,868 a finding that paradoxically outweighed the fact that the couple had a son. 
Although the wife said in evidence that her husband spoke very slowly to her, the judge 
held that ‘the level of the EEA sponsor’s knowledge of English is so low that a 
meaningful communication and conversation cannot be held between them’, as well 
as erroneously relied on the ‘genuine and subsisting’ relationship test.869 The UT 
reasonably argued that it was unclear how the judge proceeded to receive evidence 
from the wife without an interpreter and ultimately held that his analysis was ‘tainted 
by legal error on the grounds of perversity’.870 
 
865 See among others, De Vera (n 821), para 2; Ogbewi v SSHD [2017] UKUT 03381 (IAC), paras 4-5; 
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3. Focus on cohabitation and/or present state of the relationship 
 
The issue of the evidential burden of proof is closely linked to another 
problematic approach adopted by the courts. As observed in Chapter 5, when 
investigating suspicious cases, the Home Office tends to dwell extensively on the 
current nature of the relationship, requiring the marriage to be ‘genuine and subsisting’ 
and placing the main focus on cohabitation as evidence of its genuineness. The courts 
are inclined to support this erroneous position and rarely show awareness of the CJEU 
judgments in Diatta and Ogieriakhi871 which do not require the couple to live together 
under one roof. Meanwhile, there are cases where the tribunals have followed the 
Home Office approach and expressed an opinion that the mere fact of cohabitation is 
insufficient for a marriage to be considered ‘genuine’.872  
In a number of cases, the judges rightly held that the Home Office failed to 
discharge the burden of proof by considering the marriage to be one of convenience 
only because the spouses were absent from their claimed marital home during an 
immigration visit. In one case, the FtT judge endorsed the Home Office finding that 
the marriage was one of convenience which was made following a visit to the couple’s 
address where a neighbour did not recognise either of the parties and claimed they had 
never lived there.873 The UT judge was reasonably concerned that the FtT ignored the 
fact that the wife had meanwhile miscarried.874 Furthermore, it was rightly argued that 
the neighbours’ reports did nothing to illuminate the reasons for the marriage: after all, 
it was possible that the neighbours were misunderstood by immigration officials, did 
not trust them, or were untruthful.875  
In another situation, the Home Office did not believe the TCN husband who 
said his wife had gone to her home Member State for a visit. The couple provided to 
the FtT, extensive evidence of cohabitation, including a return ticket for the principal, 
photographs, and a tenancy agreement in both names. The appeal was subsequently 
allowed, with the finding later upheld by the UT.876  
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The above cases serve as clear examples of the erroneous approach of the 
Home Office in rejecting the applications of couples who were obviously in a 
relationship, without providing them with a fair opportunity to address the suspicions. 
Yet, whilst ultimately coming to the right conclusions, the courts still place the main 
emphasis on the evidence of cohabitation without acknowledging that spouses are not 
obliged to live together in the first place. Likewise, the courts give the main weight to 
the ongoing relationship, regarding it as a condition for the marriage to be treated as 
genuine, thus erroneously focusing on its substance rather than its purpose.877  
For instance, in one case, the UT accepted that the EU principal gave discrepant 
answers during the interview not because her marriage was one of convenience but 
due to her medical condition and the aggressive style of questioning she was faced.878 
In its decision, the UT dismissed the discrepancies as insignificant – e.g., that the 
principal did not know the appellant was staying with a cousin on the very first 
occasion they met and assumed he was staying in a hotel, or that the TCN husband did 
not know why the sponsor moved to the Netherlands in 1980, as this was two decades 
before their relationship began. The UT consequently found, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the marriage was not one of convenience.879 In doing so, the UT 
mentioned many indicators proving this, such as: a consistent account of the 
relationship and the marriage proposal; both parties knowing the names of each other’s 
family members and the different addresses they lived at; both parties knowing the 
practical details of their current property; the description of the principal’s work 
uniform and hours; as well as what they did last Sunday.880  
In another case, the FtT accepted that the parties’ answers to around 200 
questions were largely consistent and that they were cohabiting.881 Nonetheless, other 
factors were held against the appellant – i.e., the ‘haste’ with which the parties 
married882 and the lack of the wife’s knowledge concerning her husband’s finances, a 
factor which, in the view of the FtT, fundamentally undermined the validity of their 
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relationship.883 Furthermore, the FtT gave significant weight to the fact that the 
husband said he did not tell the principal he was living in the UK ‘illegally’, whilst the 
principal said that he told her on their first date.884 This led the FtT to conclude that 
the marriage was one convenience, a finding that was dismissed by the UT. The latter 
underlined that these factors must be viewed in the context of all the evidence as a 
whole, and the UT did not regard them to have a determinative value. In particular, the 
UT noted that the TCN husband did not consider his status ‘illegal’ but simply told the 
principal that he did not have a visa, which matches with the principal’s account.885 
Furthermore, the tribunal rightly emphasised that relationships may ‘take many forms’ 
and ‘[s]pouses have very different degrees of knowledge of each other’s financial 
situation’.886 The appeal was consequently allowed.  
In other cases, however, the UT upheld the decision of the Home Office in 
concluding that the appellant’s marriage was one of convenience. In Gjana, both 
tribunals reached this conclusion because the EU citizen spouse went for a holiday to 
her home Member State. The FtT judge, in particular, considered it ‘noteworthy that 
she went for the month and not a shorter holiday so that she could spend time with her 
husband’ and placed weight on the fact that it happened shortly after the couple moved 
into the same accommodation.887 In the view of the judge, this suggested that ‘her 
family visit was of more importance to her and undermine[d] that claim that this is a 
genuine relationship’.888 This view was also upheld by the UT. Such an approach is 
striking in its subjectivity and clearly breaches EU law – both the evidential burden 
test and the CJEU case-law in Diatta and Ogieriakhi. It should be recalled that the 
spouses are free to arrange their marital life as they wish and it is not for the judges to 
decide whether they can go for lengthy holidays on their own and how much time they 
need to spend together. In another case, the UT correctly noted that cohabitation is not 
a requirement under EU law but nonetheless stressed that the couple did not supply a 
tenancy agreement, evidence from family or friends, photographs, or other evidence 
of an ‘ongoing relationship’.889  
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Another problematic category of cases is those where the relationship has 
deteriorated, or the spouses have chosen to maintain separate accommodation due to 
their work arrangements. In De Vera, the Home Office refused to grant the TCN 
spouse a residence card after not having encountered the couple at their declared home 
address. During the hearing, the FtT judge placed weight on the fact that the appellant 
had said that she lived ‘on and off with her husband’, as well as expressed surprise by 
the fact that she was working in Essex, some distance from their marital home in the 
London borough of Hounslow. Although she did return to Hounslow for four days a 
week, the judge claimed that such an arrangement was ‘wholly inconsistent with the 
appellant and her husband being a young couple who wish to spend their lives together 
in a genuine marriage’, suggesting that she should have been able to find a job nearer 
to where she lived in London.890 This finding was rightly dismissed by the Upper 
Tribunal as purely speculative, particularly in view of the explanation of the appellant 
about the difficulty of finding work and accommodation.891 The marriage was 
ultimately found not to be one of convenience. Yet, although the UT rightly dismissed 
the erroneous conclusions of the FtT by reference to the extensive evidence produced 
by the couple, it did not refer to the CJEU case-law which would have further 
strengthened its argument.  
In a number of cases, a residence permit was revoked on the sole basis that the 
Home Office found that the spouses had separated, but their divorce was still pending. 
In Iqbal, the relevant Home Office decision was subsequently upheld by both the FtT 
and the UT.892 In some cases, however, the UT has rightly confirmed that even if the 
couple is estranged, under EU law, the status of a family member might only change 
with divorce.893  
 
4. Definition of marriages of convenience 
 
The analysis of case-law suggests that very few judges attempt to establish a 
legal definition of marriages of convenience. This, in turn, undermines legal certainty 
and frequently leads to adverse outcomes. Those who do attempt to define a marriage 
of convenience, however, often struggle with providing a correct definition of the 
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phenomenon in the context of the EU free movement law. As observed above, in 
numerous situations FtT judges appeared to be unaware of EU law or the domestic 
EEA Regulations on the issue and erroneously relied on the domestic immigration law 
instead, requiring the marriage to be ‘genuine and subsisting’.894 Yet even where the 
judges rightly focused on the position at the point of entry into marriage, the ‘sole 
purpose’ definition was frequently substituted by the ‘primary purpose’ approach, 
which is inconsistent with EU law.895  
Moreover, in a recent line of high-level cases, the courts adopted a strikingly 
confusing approach, not least due to the apparent misinterpretation of the relevant EU 
guidance caused by its obvious ambiguity. The Supreme Court ruling in Sadovska896 
is an important case where Commission soft-law became national hard-law – in this 
particular situation, however, this has led to adverse implications for EU citizens and 
their TCN family members. The Court first described the phrase ‘marriage of 
convenience’ as ‘a term of art’ which is defined in the Citizenship Directive and 2009 
Guidelines as one contracted for the sole purpose of enjoying Treaty rights.897 Yet, the 
judge then went on to quote a passage from the 2014 Handbook which says that ‘the 
notion of “sole purpose” should not be interpreted literally (as being the unique or 
exclusive purpose) but rather as meaning that the objective to obtain the right of entry 
and residence must be the predominant purpose of the abusive conduct’.898 The Court 
then suggested that the Handbook expanded the definition provided in the Directive 
by stating that the entry and residence in the EU shall be not the sole, but the 
predominant purpose.899 As mentioned in Chapter 5, such an interpretation is deeply 
problematic and arguably violates the Directive.  
In the same month that the decision in Sadovska came up, the High Court 
delivered its judgment in Molina.900 In its reasoning, the court further departed from 
EU law by rather paradoxically suggesting that a couple may enter into a marriage of 
convenience even if they are in a genuine relationship.  
The case involved a Bolivian national who entered the UK in 2007 using a false 
passport and remained in the country since. Six years later, he began a relationship 
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with an Italian national and moved in with her. The couple arranged to be married on 
19 May 2015, but further to a section 24 report by a marriage registrar, they were 
approached on that date by immigration officers and subsequently interviewed. 
Following the interviews, a notice was served on the claimant, which stated that:  
 
[A]lthough there is a relationship going on it does not show that they 
have a relationship akin to marriage. [The claimant] will benefit from 
his union with [the EU citizen] and even though this may not be a sham 
marriage it is definitely a marriage of convenience to gain immigration 
advantage.901  
 
The marriage was consequently prevented and the non-EU national detained. 
After a series of appeals, the FtT judge ultimately held that he was entitled to an EEA 
residence card as an extended family member of an EU citizen, as she was satisfied 
the couple were in a ‘genuine and durable relationship’.902 The Bolivian national 
nonetheless lodged judicial review proceedings, seeking to challenge the decision to 
prevent his wedding from taking place, as well as detaining and removing him.  
The first issue directly dealt with the question of whether an intended marriage 
could be prevented on the grounds that it was a marriage of convenience even though 
the Home Office admitted the parties were in an ongoing relationship. The Court 
pointed out that under section 24(5) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, ‘the 
absence of a “genuine relationship between the parties to the marriage” is a pre -
requisite to the marriage being a “sham marriage”’.903 The judge then went on to 
observe that section 24 did not provide a statutory definition of a ‘marriage of 
convenience’. However, she further noted that a non-exclusive definition was found 
in regulation 2(1) of the EEA Regulations 2016. In the view of the judge, although the 
EEA Regulations 2016 were not yet in force at the time Mr Molina’s marriage was 
prevented, they did show that the underlying purpose of a marriage of convenience 
should be obtaining an immigration advantage.  
In addition, the High Court relied on the case of Baiai, where the judge quoted 
the ‘sole purpose’ definition found in the 1997 Council Resolution.904 Based on the 
above considerations, the judge concluded that ‘there is a difference in principle 
between a “sham marriage” and a “marriage of convenience”. It is clear from the 
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statutory definition that a sham marriage can only be established if there is no genuine 
relationship between the parties’.905 Yet, although ‘a “marriage of convenience” may 
also entail a marriage which is not genuine’, its hallmark is ‘one that has been entered 
into (…) for the purpose of gaining an immigration advantage’.906 The judge then 
stated:  
 
[A] ‘marriage of convenience’ may exist despite the fact that there is a genuine 
relationship and in the absence of any deception or fraud as to its existence. 
The focus is upon the intention of one or more of the parties and, in the present 
context, whether the sole aim is to gain an immigration advantage.907 
 
This made the Court conclude that the immigration officer was right in stating 
that the couple was in a genuine relationship but nevertheless intended to enter into a 
marriage for an immigration advantage, which, in the Court’s view, was consistent 
with the legal definition of a ‘marriage of convenience’. The decision to prevent the 
marriage from taking place was therefore considered lawful.908 
Overall, the ruling is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons. First, since 
the couple were not married yet, their situation did not fall within the scope of the EEA 
Regulations, and the only definition that applied to them was the one of a ‘sham 
marriage’, found in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Therefore, by finding their 
marriage to be one ‘of convenience’, although there was no legal basis to consider the 
given definition as such, the judge clearly erred in law. Second, the in tended wedding 
was supposed to take place a few weeks after the ‘referral and investigation scheme’ 
came into force. Since then, it is compliance with the investigation and not the nature 
of the intended marriage that can impact the individual’s right to marry. Yet neither 
the Home Office nor the High Court showed awareness of the relevant rules.  
Notwithstanding the above, the High Court entirely misinterpreted the ‘sole 
purpose’ principle established for the purposes of the Directive. The key issue here is 
the distinction between the sole and the primary purpose of a marriage in the context 
of both the EEA Regulations 2016 and the 1997 Council Resolution, the two legal 
instruments quoted by the judge. As argued in Chapter 5 above, it is indeed the case 
that the EEA Regulations do not contain the phrase ‘sole purpose’ and may potentially 
cover a broader range of situations contrary to what is envisaged under EU law. This 
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has led to a puzzling conclusion that the definition of a ‘marriage of convenience’ in 
EU law is somehow broader than the one found in the UK Immigration Act, which in 
reality, is not the case. Nonetheless, the High Court also relied on the ‘sole purpose’  
definition provided in the 1997 Resolution, which is formulated quite clearly. In this 
light, the outcome of the judgment is even more confusing. 
The erroneous approach established in Molina was further applied in later case-
law. In its judgment in Seferi & Anor,909 delivered in early 2018, the High Court 
adopted the same line of reasoning by holding that a couple may enter into a marriage 
of convenience if their wedding was planned predominantly for an immigration 
advantage. The facts of the case are similar to Molina. The appellant, Mr Seferi, was 
an Albanian national with no valid leave to remain. In January 2015, he met Ms Zara, 
a Greek national and later started to cohabit with her. In 2017, they gave notice of their 
intention to marry, following which they were invited for an interview. After the 
interview, the Home Office issued a notice stating that they had now complied with 
the investigation. However, on the very same day, the Home Office detained Mr Seferi 
as an irregular migrant with a view to removing him. Mr Seferi issued a judicial review 
shortly before his intended removal date.  
One of the main issues considered by the Court was whether there was a 
reviewable decision about the nature of the proposed marriage. To provide an answer 
to this question, the judge examined the Home Office decision letters relating to the 
removal and detention of the appellant. One of them, with relation to the marriage 
interview, concluded:  
 
Although elements of genuineness to the relationship were demonstrated, the 
overall application for marriage had been contrived, mainly by the sponsor [Ms 
Zara], as a vehicle to allow the applicant to remain in the UK legally. As such 
the relationship is deemed a sham to circumvent immigration officials.910  
 
The High Court concurred with this evaluation. First, the judge endorsed the 
interpretation of the concepts of a ‘sham marriage’ and a ‘marriage of convenience’ 
found in Molina. Having referred both to the Immigration & Asylum Act 1999 and the 
EEA Regulations 2016, he concluded that ‘a marriage of convenience under the 2016 
Regulations may be entered into by a couple in a genuine relationship, and is different 
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from a sham marriage as defined by the 1999 Act’.911 Furthermore, he quoted the 
judgment in Sadovska, where it was stated that the immigration advantage must be the 
predominant purpose of the marriage.912 In relation to the present case, the High Court 
noted that the terminology of the Home Office was somewhat confusing yet the letters 
suggested that ‘the primary purpose of the marriage was to give Mr Seferi an 
immigration advantage’.913 Therefore, in the view of the judge, ‘even if it was not truly 
a sham marriage as defined by the 1999 Act, it was certainly a marriage of convenience 
as defined by the 2016 Regulations’.914 Despite this, the Court concluded that the legal 
basis for the detention and intended removal of Mr Seferi was his irregular status, 
rather than the nature of his prospective marriage.915  
The conclusions reached in Seferi & Anor are very similar to the ones in 
Molina, and the author sees no need to repeat their analysis. In both cases, the High 
Court, first, erroneously placed the pre-marriage situations within the scope of the EEA 
Regulations, and second, expanded the definition of marriage of convenience to the 
one entered into with the primary purpose of obtaining an immigration advantage. It 
is remarkable that in Seferi & Anor, the Court did not refer to the ‘sole purpose’ 
definition found in the 1997 Resolution as it did in Molina, and only quoted provisions 
of the EEA Regulations instead. In Seferi & Anor, the Court saw no need at all to look 
for the relevant definition in EU law. This has led to a regrettable outcome where the 
High Court has explicitly allowed the executive and lower courts to employ a broader 
definition of marriages of convenience and thereby target an increasing number of 
couples leading a family life. The erroneous ‘predominant purpose’ approach set out 
in Sadovska and Molina has meanwhile been followed in the subsequent UT case-
law.916 
Another problematic issue that needs to be considered in this context is the so-
called ‘marriage by deception’. As the author has observed in Chapter 3, the Handbook 
refers to such marriages as falling within the concept of marriages of convenience. 
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WLR(D) 840, para 86 and ZA (Reg 9. EEA Regs; abuse of rights) Afghanistan [2019] UKUT 281 (IAC), 
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Yet, this interpretation hardly complies with the ‘sole purpose’ rule set out in the 
Citizenship Directive and therefore is arguably ultra vires. The confusing approach 
endorsed by the Handbook, however, has been taken up by UK courts and thus become 
hard-law. In Sadovska, the Supreme Court suggested that, in line with the Handbook, 
cases of deceit by the non-EU national were the only type of marriages of convenience 
where obtaining an immigration advantage for the TCN spouse was the purpose of 
only one of the parties.917 In Abouelhasaan, both tribunals argued along the same lines. 
The FtT judge, in particular, considered that the Irish principal married a national of 
Egypt ‘out of genuine love and affection’ because she was only 18 years old, had not 
completed her education, and wanted to start a family of her own.918 With respect to 
her TCN husband, the FtT stated that his position was ‘substantially different’, as he 
had no right to remain in the UK, and in the view of the judge, could do so only by 
marrying an EU citizen. Furthermore, the FtT placed weight on his failure to tell his 
wife that he entered the UK unlawfully, as well as the fact that he was nine years older 
than her and ‘[t]here was no basis for concluding that they had the interests in 
common’.919 In the meantime, the judge placed significantly less weight on their 
cohabitation for 18 months than he would have done in the case of an older woman. 
In the view of the FtT, a more experienced woman would have been expected to 
observe the signs in her husband’s behaviour suggesting that his ‘predominant 
purpose’ was to secure the right to remain in the UK.920  
The UT equally confirmed the Handbook did refer to ‘marriages by deception’ 
and quoted the relevant passage from it describing the concept.921 However, the judge 
then went on to state that the FtT misdirected itself in law, since ‘it was necessary to 
establish not only that the appellant’s sole (or predominant) purpose in marrying was 
to secure an immigration advantage (…) but also that he did not have any genuine 
belief that it would be a genuine and lasting marital life’.922 In the view of the UT, this 
was not met on the facts of the case, for the FtT judge found there was ‘an element of 
genuineness’ in the non-EU national’s intentions towards the EU principal. For 
instance, it was noted that the applicant ‘was of an age when he could be expected to 
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be thinking of marriage’ and that the sponsor was ‘an attractive young woman’. 923 
Furthermore, the UT dismissed the FtT findings with regard to the cohabitation as a 
‘generalisation’.924 
 Irrespective of the fact that the appeal was ultimately allowed, the fundamental 
problem with this judgment is that (a) both tribunals regard ‘marriages by deception’ 
as a concept recognised in EU law and (b) wrongly refer to the ‘primary purpose’ 
instead of the ‘sole purpose’ rule. Likewise, in Arshad, the FtT judge rejected the 
Home Office finding that both parties intended the marriage to be one of convenience 
and concluded that the TCN appellant deceived the EU principal.925 Similarly, as in 
the previous case, the judge stressed the age difference between the sponsor and the 
applicant who were 18 and 30, respectively. The FtT accordingly stated that the 
sponsor was an ‘immature young woman’ exploited by the applicant926 – a highly 
speculative and paternalistic approach at best, provided that, in the author’s view, the 
state should respect the partner choices of its adult residents. The finding that the 
marriage was one ‘of deception’ was also upheld by the UT.   
 
4.1 Literal interpretation of the definition  
 
Section 3 above has shown that judges frequently place the main focus on the 
present state of the relationship, rather than the purpose of the marriage, disregarding 
the CJEU case-law. On the other hand, as the author has argued in Chapter 3, situations 
where a marriage, initially entered into to solely help a non-EU citizen obtain an 
immigration advantage, later transforms into a real relationship, should not be regarded 
as falling within the scope of marriages of convenience. In other words, the author is 
of the view that the ‘sole purpose’ definition must not be interpreted literally but rather 
as covering cases having no other substance both before and after the wedding. Yet, 
the courts do not seem to support this approach. Once they have established tha t the 
original purpose of the marriage has only been an immigration advantage, the current 
state of the relationship is considered irrelevant. The case-law demonstrates how the 
literal interpretation of the definition provided in the EEA Regulations, in ef fect, 
divides established families of EU citizens. Such an outcome strikingly contrasts with 
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the overarching aim of the family reunion provisions in EU law and was most likely 
unintended by the drafters of the Directive.  
It was as early as 2008 when the then Asylum and Immigration Tribunal held 
that a marriage that was one of convenience at its inception shall be regarded as such 
irrespective of the development of a real relationship after the wedding.927 A similar 
position, albeit not as explicitly, was expressed in Rosa, where, by reference to the 
2006 version of the EEA Regulations, Article 35 of the Citizenship Directive, and the 
1997 Resolution, it was suggested:  
 
[T]he focus in relation to a marriage of convenience should be on the 
intention of the parties at the time the marriage was entered into, 
whereas the question of whether a marriage is ‘subsisting’ looks to 
whether the marital relationship is a continuing one.928  
 
This view was further upheld in the later UT case-law. In Raqueeb, the court 
similarly considered that ‘[e]vidence of subsequent cohabitation and/or devotion 
cannot assist the appellant since the question of a marriage of convenience is decided 
on the basis of the parties’ intentions when the marriage was contracted’. 929 Cases 
involving pregnancy or childbirth are particularly problematic in this respect. The 
judgment in A U concerned a national of Pakistan married to a Latvian national whose 
marriage was found to be one of convenience. In rejecting his application for a 
residence permit, the Home Office relied on their numerous conflicting responses 
during the interviews, which in its view, demonstrated that the spouses lacked basic 
knowledge about each other. On appeal, the FtT accepted that the parties lived together 
and were in an intimate relationship. It was undisputed that the wife had miscarried in 
the preceding year. However, looking back at the interview records dating from the 
time of the marriage, the FtT concluded that discrepancies were so fundamental that it 
could not be inferred that the couple was in a genuine relationship at that time. The 
FtT, therefore found that at its inception it was a marriage of convenience and the fact 
that it had later evolved into an actual relationship could not change that.930 This 
finding was later supported by the UT, which confirmed that the interview records 
were sufficient to discharge the evidential burden upon the Home Office. 931 The 
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tribunal also relied on Rosa to confirm that the FtT judge was right to draw a distinction 
between the state of affairs at the date of the appeal and the position at the time of 
marriage.932 The appeal was consequently rejected.  
Likewise, in Abouelhasaan, the FtT judge quoted the relevant passage in Rosa 
and stressed that the principal had become pregnant only after the date of marriage. 
Consequently, he did not find the birth of the child to be a substantial factor pointing 
against the marriage having been one of  convenience,933 a position that was later 
rejected by the UT. In Woguia, however, the UT essentially concluded that it was open 
to the FtT judge not to treat the pregnancy of the non-EU spouse several years after 
the wedding as a fact establishing that the marriage was genuine from the outset.934 
 
5. Cases involving pregnancy or childbirth 
 
In the previous sections, the author has shown that the judges frequently 
support the Home Office approach in designating marriages involving pregnancy or 
children as ones of convenience. Out of the 110 UT judgments analysed, 12 involved 
marriages where the FtT did not accept these factors as evidence of their 
genuineness;935 in four of them, the UT concurred with the FtT assessment.936 This 
section offers a closer look at this group of cases which is particularly controversial – 
not least because (a) in the author’s view, such situations per se must not be covered 
by the concept of marriages of convenience, and (b) the judges seem to give no 
consideration to the rights of the children involved. Below, the author has outlined the 
main examples of the problematic approach employed by UK courts.  
First, it has rightly been held in Papajorgji that a durable marriage with 
children and cohabitation is ‘quite inconsistent’ with the definition of marriage of 
convenience.937 This is, however, one of the very rare cases where the judge drew 
explicit parallels between the fact of childbirth and the perceived genuineness of a 
marriage. As demonstrated in Section 4.1 above, in several judgments, the definition 
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of ‘marriages of convenience’ was interpreted literally, which in effect, deprived 
families with children of their right to be together. In other cases involving children, 
the judges wrongly approached the issue of the burden of proof and applied an 
incorrect definition of marriages of convenience.  
In Rehman, the FtT wrongly stated that there was an evidential burden on the 
claimant to address reasonable suspicions, and also wrongly referred  to the 
‘predominant purpose’ test.938 The judge then upheld the Home Office finding that the 
marriage was one of convenience; in the view of the FtT, the fact of childbirth could 
not alter this conclusion, given the non-EU national spouse’s ‘continued dishonesty’ 
(he was considered not truthful concerning his studies).939 The UT considered this 
reasoning flawed. In Virk,940 explored in Chapter 5, the Home Office concluded the 
marriage in question was one of convenience despite the pregnancy of the EU principal 
who was subjected to intimidating and intrusive questioning. The appeal was 
consequently dismissed by the FtT. The UT held that the FtT judge misapplied the 
burden of proof test set out in Papajorgji and Rosa by failing to address significant 
concerns by the couple as to the conduct of the interviewer and not giving weight to 
their explanations of the discrepancies. The decision was ultimately set aside.  
In general, it is commendable that the UT has given appropriate consideration 
to the pregnancy of the EU spouse with respect to the conduct of the interviewer. At 
the same time, the court did not take the opportunity to explicitly  consider whether and 
how pregnancy falls within the scope of the definition of a marriage of convenience. 
The issue was neither addressed in Collins941 where the UT criticised the FtT for 
rejecting a significant body of evidence, including photographs and evidence of 
cohabitation, and failing to assess it as a whole. In particular, the FtT accepted that the 
couple had a child together but failed to give adequate weight to this fact. Instead, it 
expressed concerns about the credibility of the witnesses related to the principal’s work 
history. Whilst the UT rightly concluded that the marriage was not of convenience, it 
did not state that the fact of having a child is incompatible with the concept. 
In Gjura,942 the FtT went as far as to suggest that the non-EU spouse fathered 
a child solely to obtain an immigration status. This finding seems even more 
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disturbing, provided that the judge did accept that both parties were involved in the 
upbringing of the child. It nonetheless placed weight on other factors, such as ‘scant 
evidence’ of the couple living together, their perceived inability to easily communicate 
when they first met, and the fact that they gave different addresses to the registrar when 
recording the birth of their child. It is remarkable that the FtT findings were upheld by 
the UT, which considered that the ‘main’ purpose of marriage was to obtain an 
immigration advantage. In a similar case of Khan, the FtT accepted that the non-EU 
national involved was a ‘caring and loving parent’ of his child, yet concluded that the 
marriage was one of convenience because of his ‘dreadful’ immigration history and 
several discrepancies identified in the marriage interviews.943 The judge strikingly 
noted that the appellant had ‘further sought to strengthen his position in the UK by 
conceiving a child with the sponsor’ and expressed doubts that his intentions had been 
‘honourable or genuine’.944 The UT rightly concluded that the FtT did not carry out a 
balanced assessment of all the evidence, focusing on the negative and failing to give 
due weight to the positive factors. The decision was, therefore set aside.945 
Moreover, in a number of cases, the judges questioned the paternity of the child 
conceived during the marriage, contrary to the presumption in English family law. The 
judgment in Uddin involved a TCN spouse of a Romanian national whose application 
for a residence card was refused following a home visit by immigration officers. 
Although such a finding was unsupported by evidence and only based on speculations 
(i.e., sheets on the floor suggesting they were sleeping separately, see Chapter 5 
above), it was upheld by the FtT. Moreover, the judge attached no weight to the fact 
that the wife had meanwhile given birth to her husband’s child, despite the DNA 
evidence confirming his paternity. According to the judge, ‘this would have been a 
cogent argument’ if the DNA test provider was approved by the Home Office, which 
as the tribunal believed, was not the case.946 Such reasoning was explicitly rejected by 
the Upper Tribunal, which found that the Home Office failed to discharge the burden 
of proof and the FtT erred in law in accepting their assertions as evidence. The UT 
judge went on to conclude that all this, together with the fact that the couple has a child 
together, was ‘a strong indicator corroborative of a genuine relationship’. 947 The 
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previous finding that the marriage was one of convenience was consequently rejected. 
It should be noted, however, that the applicant, in fact, was not even required to provide 
DNA evidence in order for his child to be treated as such.  
The same approach has also been applied in other cases. In Rajah, the FtT judge 
attached little weight to the EU principal’s miscarriage because he doubted that her 
TCN husband was the father of the unborn child.948 In another judgment, the fact that 
the non-EU citizen was named on the birth certificate as a father was not considered 
as proof of parentage, a position that was not challenged by the UT.949 On the other 
hand, in Resul, both tribunals questioned the paternity of the child because she was 
given her EU mother’s surname on the birth certificate, although the couple was 
married.950  
Furthermore, a significant point of concern is that when examining cases 
involving children, the judges appear to make no reference whatsoever to the principle 
of the best interests of the child. Since a finding that the marriage is one of convenience 
may result in the removal of one or both of the spouses, the Commission Handbook 
specifically provides that in such situations Member States must pay due regard to the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (see Chapter 3). The ignorance of judges is 
even more disturbing given that already in 2008, the UK lifted its reservation on the 
Convention with respect to children in migration situations, which was accordingly 
reflected in section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 . Since 
then, the principle of the best interests of the child has started to play a growing role 
in the domestic jurisprudence on Article 8 of the ECHR.951  
The general guidance on the applicability of this approach in the UK was 
delivered, inter alia, in the landmark Supreme Court case of ZH (Tanzania), which 
concerned the removal to Tanzania, a mother and a primary carer of two UK national 
children. In its judgment, the Court emphasised that the principles set out in Article 
3(1) of the CRC are relevant not only concerning how children are looked after in the 
UK whilst immigration decisions are being made, but also to the decisions 
themselves.952 Consequently, whilst the strength of other considerations may 
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ultimately outweigh the best interests of the child, they must be considered first when 
making the proportionality assessment under Article 8.953  
Although Article 8 jurisprudence is a category distinct from the case-law on 
marriages of convenience explored above, this should not act as a barrier for the 
application of the principles set out in the CRC to the latter group. At the international 
level, Article 3 of the CRC may operate independently of the provisions of the ECHR, 
an approach that has also been acknowledged by UK courts. For instance, the Court of 
Appeal explicitly stated that the relevant statements expressed by the Supreme Court 
in ZH (Tanzania) could not be read as being confined to Article 8 considerations.954 
Last but not least, in cases involving EU citizen children, a paradoxical finding 
that their parents’ marriage is one of convenience may deprive them of the right to 
enjoy family life with their third-country national parent, which would otherwise be 
guaranteed by EU law. As explored in Chapter 1, under the Citizenship Directive , TCN 
parents of EU citizen children may retain a right of residence even in the event of the 
death or departure of the Union citizen, or where the marriage has ended by an 
annulment or divorce. Those accused of marrying for immigration purposes cannot 
avail themselves on these provisions. The only remaining routes for them under EU 
law would be to apply for derived rights of residence as a primary carer of an EU 
citizen child in line with the CJEU ruling in Chen,955 or in exceptional cases, rely on 
the CJEU decision in Zambrano. Yet, in light of the narrow scope of both options,956 
there may certainly be parents unable to benefit from such routes, and as a 




The case-law analysis has shown that the decisions of British courts frequently 
suffer from a lack of consistency and flawed interpretations of the issues related to the 
concept of marriages of convenience in EU law.  
Regarding the application of EU free movement law in general, the situation is 
rather disappointing. Only a minority of judges have expressly referred to the relevant 
EU-level instruments or CJEU jurisprudence on the issue and correctly applied these. 
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In the worst-case scenario, the judges have erroneously considered the cases in the 
context of UK domestic immigration law. In numerous rulings, the FtT wrongly placed 
the burden of proof on the applicant and/or required them to demonstrate that their 
marriage is ‘genuine and subsisting’, an obvious violation of EU law. In such 
situations, the UT typically allowed the appeal by reiterating that the burden of proof 
rests with the Home Office and providing a reference to the relevant domestic case-
law. Furthermore, when examining the nature of marriages, judges tend to place 
excessive focus on cohabitation as the main evidence of its genuineness, rarely 
showing awareness of the CJEU rulings in Diatta and Ogieriakhi.  
Explicit references to the Citizenship Directive in UK case-law are hardly ever 
found. A number of judges, nonetheless, have relied on the relevant EU soft-law 
instruments, thus incorporating their provisions into hard law. For instance, the UT 
referred to the 2009 Commission guidelines to state that the burden of proof rests with 
the Home Office; in another case, the UT considered both positive and negative 
indicative criteria of marriages of convenience listed in the document. In many cases, 
however, the FtT tends to follow the Home Office approach of ignoring the evidence 
that the marriage is not one of convenience and placing the main focus on the alleged 
discrepancies instead. In doing so, the judges rely on their highly normative 
perceptions of how the ‘genuine’ marriage should look like, as well as place weight on 
cultural differences between the spouses and evaluate their language and 
communication skills. Whilst some UT judges condemned such practices as hopelessly 
subjective; others did not raise any objections. Further, when dealing with the 
problematic category of cases involving children, the principle of the best interests of 
the child, highlighted in the Handbook, has been completely ignored.  
Yet, in some cases where the judges did make explicit reference to the 
Handbook, this has adversely impacted the position of the couples involved. In 
particular, the Supreme Court relied on the confusing passage in the Handbook stating 
that ‘the notion of “sole purpose” should not be interpreted literally’ but as the 
‘predominant purpose of the abusive conduct’ to expand the definition of marriages of 
convenience provided in the Citizenship Directive. Another notable example 
illustrating this approach is the problematic concept of ‘marriages by deception’ which 
has been taken up by both the FtT and the UT, as well as the Supreme Court. As the 
author has argued in Chapter 3, the interpretation suggested by the Commission 




Similar issues arise due to the co-existence of different terms and definitions 
of marriages for residence purposes in UK domestic law. Due to the unclear 
terminology, both FtT and UT judges interpret the EEA Regulations as covering cases 
where obtaining an immigration advantage is not the only, but the primary or 
predominant purpose of the marriage. The definition of marriages of convenience 
provided in the EEA Regulations has then been juxtaposed with that of sham marriages 
found in the Immigration Act. In one Supreme Court and two High Court judgments, 
this has led to a paradoxical finding that a marriage of convenience may be entered  
into by a couple in a genuine relationship; an interpretation entirely inconsistent with 
EU law. Further, both the FtT and the UT tend to interpret the definition literally, i.e., 
as applicable inter alia to couples whose marriage did not have any content other than 
an immigration motive at its inception but later transformed into a real relationship. In 
the author’s view, such situations are fully consistent with the overarching purpose of 
the family reunion provisions enshrined in EU law, which aim to facilitate free 
movement of EU citizens and ensure their better integration into the society of the host 
Member State. Therefore, couples whose relationship developed only after the 
marriage should still be able to benefit from Treaty provisions, irrespective of their 
original intentions.  
Overall, the endorsement of the Home Office practices by so many judges is 
deeply disturbing. The adverse decisions, most of which have been delivered in breach 
of EU law, created hardship for couples involving EU citizens, and as a consequence, 
may have seriously hindered the latter in exercising their Treaty rights. Of course, this 
can be partly explained by the lack of education and training of the UK judiciary on 
the relevant aspects of EU law. Notwithstanding that, it also calls into  question the 
good faith of the judges who rely on their biased and discriminatory assumptions to 







The present thesis has purported to answer two interrelated questions. First, it 
attempted to explore how the concept of marriages of convenience is reflected in EU 
free movement law and whether it is compatible with other relevant provisions in this 
area, particularly those of the Citizenship Directive. Second, it sought to examine if, 
and to what extent, the UK domestic measures addressing the issue comply with EU 
law in so far as it concerns the exercise of Treaty rights in the UK by mobile EU 
citizens and their family members. Marriages of convenience are viewed in this study 
as a legal and social construct employed by the state as an immigration control 
technique. Within this framework, the author’s aim was to provide a critical analysis 
of legal grounds that are used or may be used by the state to attack something as 
sensitive and private as marriage, notwithstanding the protection guaranteed to 
families under both international human rights and EU free movement law.  
As observed in Chapters 1 and 2, since the very inception of free movement, 
every beneficiary of Treaty rights was provided the ability to reside in the host Member 
State with his or her family members, irrespective of the latter’s nationality. The 
central logic behind these rules is that the absence of this right would create obstacles 
to EU citizen’s relocation to another Member State, as well as hinder their integration 
into the host society. Over the decades, the scope of family reunion rights has been 
continuously broadened by both Union legislation and the CJEU alongside the process 
of the general expansion of free movement rights. Although Article 35 of the Directive 
permits Member States to derogate from free movement rights in cases of abuse, such 
as marriages of convenience, this concept is defined narrowly , and the relevant 
provision is to be interpreted strictly.  
When performing marriage checks, Member States must respect two key 
principles established by the CJEU. First, systematic checks are prohibited. Second, as 
long the marriage is not officially terminated, the TCN spouse continues to benefit 
from the Directive even where the couple does not cohabit or is no longer in a 
relationship (Diatta and Ogieriakhi). Further, in its landmark ruling in Metock, 
delivered in 2008, the Court overturned an infamous ‘prior lawful residence’  rule 
introduced in an earlier decision in Akrich. This exceptional case was heavily criticised 
due to its unclear reasoning and inconsistency with the prior jurisprudence. In Metock, 




non-EU party qualifies under the Directive irrespective of  their prior residence status 
in the Member State concerned, as well as of the place and time the marriage was 
entered into.  
It is exactly after this judgment that the issue of marriages of convenience 
became the point of considerable friction between the EU and several Member States. 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, several factors seem to have contributed to this 
development. The first and principal one has been the growing dichotomy between the 
generous family reunion provisions under the Directive and restrictive national rules, 
a phenomenon called ‘reverse discrimination’. In the mid-2000s, seeking to limit the 
number of TCN family migrants who could not be selected in the same way as foreign 
workforce, several Western European Member States significantly tightened up their 
family reunification rules, making the admission of family members of their own 
nationals subject to an extensive examination of their personal circumstances and 
several additional criteria.  
Since these could not be applied to family members of mobile EU citizens, 
several governments, most notably the UK and Ireland, began to denounce the 
Citizenship Directive as a ‘loophole’ enabling otherwise undesirable non-EU nationals 
to regularise their status. This discourse is closely linked to the second factor, namely, 
the increase in marriage pairing patterns which are considered ‘highly unusual’, most 
notably male migrants from West Africa and the Indian Subcontinent marrying female 
nationals of EU-12 Member States. The author argues that this trend can easily be 
explained by the overall post-enlargement increase in intra-European mobility and the 
fact that many mobile EU citizens share work and study spaces with non-EU nationals, 
whereby similar social status and education play a significant role in their partner 
choice.  
The governments, however, tend to excessively focus on the perceived ‘large 
cultural differences’ between the partners, strongly associating such combinations of 
nationalities with abuse. This paradigm has been further reinforced by the third factor 
– proliferation of media and political narratives about marriages of convenience as a 
criminal enterprise where vulnerable Eastern European women are exploited by 
marriage ‘fixers’ and third-country national men.  
Over the past decade, the UK, intensely concerned over the perceived abuse of 
Treaty rights, stopped seeing benefits in the delegation of its migration control powers 




criminality; marriages of convenience allegedly contracted between mobile EU 
citizens and third-country nationals remained an important point of contention 
between the UK and the EU during the pre-Brexit years. The UK has long been known 
for treating its own nationals significantly worse than mobile EU citizens with regards 
to their right to live with their TCN family members. The fear of migrants 
circumventing domestic immigration rules became an important public policy tool of 
the British government, used as a justification for attacking undesirable marriages and 
Treaty rights. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, from the very outset of the post-Metock 
debate on marriages of convenience, the British authorities have been very vocal about 
the issue. Together with a few other Member States, the UK has continuously 
attempted to persuade EU institutions to narrow down family reunion rights. The first 
two such initiatives were rejected by the Commission and the rest of the Council, not 
least due to the inability of the British authorities to provide statistical evidence of the 
‘widespread abuse’ they were referring to.  
The Commission nonetheless responded to the pressure of Member States by 
adopting two soft-law instruments aimed at providing them with guidance on how to 
approach the issue. The principal document issued in this context is the 2014 
Handbook on addressing alleged marriages of convenience between mobile EU 
citizens and third-country nationals. The Handbook provides a detailed overview of 
the general principles Member States must pay attention to when exercising marriage 
controls – for instance; it reiterates that checks may only be performed on a case-by-
case basis and that the burden of proof rests with the national authorities.  
The Commission, however, did not limit itself merely to underlining the 
relevant safeguards. In response to the Member State demands to specify what steps 
they can take to tackle perceived marriages of convenience, the Handbook provides its 
own interpretation of the concept, including a lengthy list of normative indicators 
aimed to distinguish ‘genuine’ marriages from those of conven ience. As the author has 
argued in Chapter 3, some of the proposed measures are highly contradictory and go 
well beyond what is permitted under the Citizenship Directive; if applied at the 
national level, this may have serious repercussions for the families of mobile EU 
citizens concerned. 
Notwithstanding the criticism, it must be admitted that at that particular point, 
the Commission still remained committed to its role as the guardian of the Treaties, 




family reunion. It is, therefore, all the more striking that only two years later, the Union 
institutions entirely reversed their position in order to accommodate the same concerns 
voiced by the UK. As part of the EU-UK deal, concluded in early 2016 in order to 
dissuade the UK from leaving the EU, the Commission essentially came up with a 
pledge to act against the long-standing CJEU jurisprudence by adopting a proposal to 
amend the Citizenship Directive. The latter sought to significantly broaden the 
definition of marriages of convenience, as well as exclude from its scope third -country 
nationals who had no prior lawful residence status in a Member State before marrying 
an EU citizen or where the marriage took place only after their relocation to the host 
Member State.  
Although following the outcome of the Brexit referendum, the arrangement 
never entered into force; its significance should not be underestimated. Following the 
poorly justified demands of one single Member State, the EU appeared ready to – for 
the first time in its history – effectively stagger the whole idea of European integration 
by considerably narrowing down free movement, including family reunion, rights. 
This is an unprecedented sacrifice which gives cause for serious concern. As the author 
argues in Chapter 2, there is a danger that other Member States may equally interpret 
this step as a possibility to negotiate the exclusion of unwanted categories of persons 
from the scope of the Treaty rights, should they wish to do so in future.  
Chapters 5 and 6 examined the regulation of the issue of marriages of 
convenience in UK domestic law and the extent to which it complies with the relevant 
EU rules currently in force. Over the past decade, the growing anxieties about the 
perceived abuse of EU free movement law via this route have prompted the UK 
authorities to adopt several legislative measures addressing the phenomenon. Marriage 
controls in the UK are exercised on two basic levels – before and after the marriage is 
entered into. In contrast to the post-marriage stage when Member States are bound by 
EU law restraints in performing checks, pre-marriage controls escape the ambit of the 
Directive. The reason for this is that the latter continues to pursue a conservative 
approach by regarding marriage as a proxy for a serious long-term commitment, and 
privileging spouses (and registered partners) over unmarried couples. Hence, whilst 
spouses of EU citizens automatically become beneficiaries of the Directive without 
any additional conditions, admission of the so-called ‘durable partners’ entirely 
depends on the national laws of the Member State concerned. In the UK, unmarried 




only where the couple can provide extensive evidence of living together in a 
relationship ‘akin to marriage’ for at least two years. For those who have not yet 
reached this threshold, marriage may often represent the only opportunity to stay 
together, particularly where the non-EU party has an unstable or irregular residence 
status.  
The process of entry into marriage, however, is equally determined by the 
national laws of Member States. The only constraints the national authorities are bound 
by when exercising pre-marriage checks are those found in international human rights 
law. Yet, although the right to marry and the right to respect for private and family 
life, are guaranteed by both the ECHR and the EUCFR, these instruments provide 
(either married or unmarried) couples much weaker protection than that reserved to 
spouses under the Citizenship Directive. The relevant legal framework is described in 
Chapter 4. First, according to the ECtHR, the Convention does not guarantee a foreign 
national the right to choose the country of their matrimonial residence. Likewise, the 
recognition of the existence of family life protects an individual from removal only in 
very limited circumstances. As regards to measures targeting perceived marriages of 
convenience, the Strasbourg court precluded the contracting states from imposing 
blanket prohibitions to marry for foreigners with a short-term or irregular status. 
Notwithstanding that, the ECtHR case-law expressly permits governments to prevent 
marriages of convenience aimed to secure an immigration advantage for the foreign 
party. Moreover, national authorities are granted a very wide margin of discretion with 
regards to defining and identifying such marriages; in contrast to the Citizenship 
Directive, the human rights law does not prohibit systematic checks. The only 
constraint the states must observe in this regard is the prohibition of highly intrusive 
and degrading questions that violate the right to respect for human dignity.  
As the author has shown in Chapter 5, the British government uses the legal 
lacuna to carry out systematic checks on yet unmarried couples who have already met 
in the UK. In 2015, as part of its then ‘hostile environment’ policy targeting irregular 
migrants, the UK government introduced the so-called ‘referral and investigation 
scheme’; the respective rules aim to act as a deterrent against marriages for residence 
purposes, referred to as ‘sham marriages’ in the particular legal setting. Under the 
scheme, civil registrars are required to refer to the Home Office, all intended marriages 
involving non-EU nationals without indefinite leave or a valid marriage visitor or 




the marriage is a ‘sham’. If this is the case, the marriage notice period is extended to 
70 days, during which the couple may be required to undergo an investigation. 
Formally, as long as the parties comply with the investigation, their marriage is 
allowed to proceed even if it is found to be a sham. The Home Office, nonetheless, 
would refuse any subsequent applications under the Directive, made by the third-
country national party on these grounds.  
In reality, however, the scheme goes much further than targeting couples who 
do not intend to lead a family life. As noted above, the right to marry is granted only 
to those who comply with the investigation; yet, the couple can be considered non-
compliant purely for bureaucratic reasons unrelated to the nature of their marriage, 
such as failure to provide a tenancy agreement or bank statements. As noted in Chapter 
5, such practices arguably constitute an unjustified restriction of the fundamental right 
to marry and violate the ECHR. Further, irrespective of whether or not the couple has 
complied with the investigation and if  it has even been started in the first place, non-
EU nationals with an irregular status can be removed from the UK at any point before 
the marriage is registered. For such individuals, giving a marriage notice would 
automatically mean coming into the attention of the Home Office. As a consequence, 
couples involving third-country nationals with a precarious residence status may find 
themselves trapped between the inability to regularise their situation via alternative 
routes, on the one hand, and the inability to get married without the risk of being 
separated, on the other.  
By contrast, at the post-marriage stage, UK measures targeting perceived 
marriages of convenience need to comply with the relevant safeguards guaranteed to 
EU citizens under EU law. However, the situation in this area is rather disappointing. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the UK legislator and the executive frequently disregard 
EU law when dealing with the issue. In addition, Chapter 6 has shown that the UK 
courts frequently endorse the hostile and erroneous practices conducted by the Home 
Office. Only a minority of judges have relied on and correctly applied the EU 
legislation and CJEU case-law on the subject; direct references to the Citizenship 
Directive are remarkably rare. Yet in some cases where judges have explicitly referred 
to the Commission Handbook on marriages of convenience, this has produced adverse 
legal effects for the couples involved – largely due to the legally questionable and 
inconsistent interpretation of the concept by the relevant guidance. This serves as a 




adopted by the Commission without the scrutiny of the European Parliament and the 
Council, found its way into domestic hard law.  
One of the most problematic aspects in this respect is the definition of 
marriages of convenience. The crucial constraint on the concept, which is imposed by 
both the Citizenship Directive and the CJEU, is the narrow ‘sole purpose’ test; it 
implies that the acquisition of a residence status must be the only aim of the marriage, 
rather than one among many. Such an approach is reasonable, given that the Directive 
privileges marital relationships over non-marital ones and many couples may wish to 
get married to be able to live together in the respective country.  
The Handbook further reiterates that marriages of convenience are 
characterised by ‘the absence of intention to create a family as a married couple and 
to lead a genuine marital life’.957 Yet, in a subsequent passage, it claims that the notion 
of the ‘sole purpose’ should not be understood as being the exclusive but rather the 
predominant purpose. As underlined in Chapter 3, this interpretation seems to suggest 
that the Commission seeks to arbitrarily expand the definition provided by the 
Citizenship Directive, a step that is arguably ultra vires.  
The confusion is further exacerbated by the fact that there are two different 
terms and definitions of marriages for residence purposes in UK law, none of which 
accurately reflects the wording of the Citizenship Directive. As pointed out above, for 
the purposes of pre-marriage controls, the government uses term ‘sham marriage’, 
defined as a marriage contracted with the aim to obtain an immigration advantage 
where there is no ‘genuine relationship’ between the parties. The EEA Regulations 
implementing the Citizenship Directive, on the other hand, employ the term ‘marriage 
of convenience’; the respective definition equally refers to the marriage purpose but 
does not include the ‘genuine relationship’ clause. The word ‘sole’, meanwhile, is 
absent from both definitions. The co-existence of several definitions of the same 
concept is not a satisfactory state of affairs. Such an approach significantly undermines 
clarity and legal certainty, which is best evident in the findings of several UK judges 
interpreting the concept. Having juxtaposed the definitions of ‘sham marriages’ and 
‘marriages of convenience’ in UK domestic law, as well as referred to the problematic 
passage of the Handbook, the judges ultimately concluded that a marriage of 
convenience might be entered into by a couple in a genuine relationship, a paradoxical 
interpretation that obviously contradicts the Directive.  
 




Aside from the definition of the concept, a number of other UK measures 
targeting perceived marriages of convenience are equally problematic in terms of 
compliance with the Directive and CJEU case-law. First, although the Directive 
prohibits systematic checks and only asks TCN spouses to present a valid marriage 
certificate, the Home Office requires those seeking to benefit from the Treaty rights to 
provide extensive details of their relationship. Second, both the executive and the 
courts tend to place an excessive focus on cohabitation and the quality of the present 
relationship between the spouses, rarely showing awareness of the CJEU rulings in 
Diatta and Ogieriakhi. The criteria used to determine whether the marriage is one of 
convenience largely reflect those provided in the Handbook; it is unsurprising, given 
that the drafting process was significantly influenced by the UK officials who appeared 
ready to share their practices. The hints are normative in nature and typically reflect 
highly stereotypical perceptions of the authorities of how a ‘real’ marriage should look 
like.  
Yet, although the Handbook advises Member States to first look for evidence 
suggesting that there is no abuse, the UK authorities and judges instead focus on the 
alleged discrepancies and other perceived signs of marriages of convenience. In the 
worst-case scenario, FtT judges entirely disregard EU law by erroneously placing the 
burden of proof on the applicant and requiring their marriage to be ‘genuine and 
subsisting’ in line with domestic immigration rules. In addition, some of the 
investigation methods are particularly hostile and intrusive and arguably breach the 
ECHR and the EUCFR. Another important contradiction is that the terms ‘sham 
marriage’ and ‘marriages of convenience’ are only employed in the domains of 
immigration and free movement law. Consequently, a marriage disqualified for the 
purposes of the EEA Regulations continues to be valid in family law, with all the rights 
and obligations emanating from this status.  
When it comes to residence rights, however, a finding that a marriage is one of 
convenience has serious repercussions for both non-EU national and EU citizen 
parties. The former would not be allowed to enjoy Treaty rights on the basis of 
marriage and would typically be liable for removal. Moreover, under the EEA 
Regulations, an EU citizen allegedly involved in a marriage of convenience may 
equally be removed from the UK on public policy grounds, an approach which raises 




Against this background, it must be borne in mind that the overarching purpose 
of the family reunion rights granted under the Directive is to enable mobile EU citizens 
to enjoy family life in the host Member State. Whilst the Directive has enhanced 
protection of TCN family members by granting them an autonomous status in certain 
situations, the rights to family reunion, in essence, remain derivative in nature. The 
principal focus of the Directive, accordingly, is placed on the need to protect the right 
of mobile EU citizens to live with their close ones, which in turn would make it easier 
for the former to exercise their Treaty rights. This, however, does not seem to be a 
perspective endorsed by the British government when exercising marriage controls. 
Rather than attempting to reduce the risk of an erroneous decision and state intrusion 
into the lives of EU citizens, the British executive and courts concentrate all their 
efforts on preventing non-EU nationals with a short-term or irregular status from 
regularising their situation via marriage. The relevant measures, many of which violate 
EU law, disproportionately target couples whose situation does not easily fit into the 
narrow ‘sole purpose’ definition of marriages of convenience. As demonstrated in the 
present study, this frequently results in particularly disturbing outcomes, such as cases 
where marriages involving pregnancies and children are designated as ones of 
convenience.  
Further, instead of protecting the family life of mobile EU citizens by providing 
their prospective spouses guarantees against pre-wedding removal, the UK authorities 
pursue the opposite approach and seek to identify and remove non-EU nationals with 
an irregular status before the marriage takes place. All this creates significant hardship 
for the couples involved and may effectively result in their separation , or alternatively, 
prompt them to live in legal limbo or relocate to another country. The author argues 
that this outcome is hardly compatible with the objective of eliminating all possible 
obstacles to the free movement of EU citizens.  
Last but not least, the profiles of couples most frequently subjected to scrutiny 
suggests that the Home Office measures disproportionately target men from the Indian 
Subcontinent, West Africa or Albania and female nationals of EU-12 Member States, 
as well as EU citizens with a migrant descent whose (prospective) spouses come from 
the countries of their ancestors. Although the Home Office does not officially sanction 
profiling by nationality, evidence of this occurring gives rise to concerns that there is 
disguised discrimination based on nationality which is used as a proxy to justify 




All in all, assessing the purpose of a marriage is an extremely complex and 
controversial task which unavoidably entails a significant interference into the private 
and family life of the EU citizens concerned. Further, given the great variety of global 
relationship patterns, there is a serious risk of targeting a broad range of couples who 
do lead a family life (or intend to do so) but whose behaviour does not conform to the 
normative assumptions of how ‘genuine’ marriages should appear.  
As to the UK government concerns about the perceived exploitation of Eastern 
European women, typically associated with organised crime, such evidence is largely 
anecdotal and lacks a solid statistical basis. Accordingly, the author argues that such 
cases can effectively be addressed by instruments other than marriage controls, such 
as laws on human trafficking or domestic violence. Moreover, evidence suggests that 
the fact of involvement of intermediaries does not necessarily exclude an intention of 
the couple to found a family; indeed, there may be cases where a marriage, initially 
contracted only to help the non-EU national obtain residence rights, later transforms 
into an intimate relationship.  
In this light, given the importance of the fundamental EU rights at stake, this 
thesis argues that governments should attempt to take every precaution to minimise 
the possibility of disrupting families involving mobile EU citizens. In line with this 
aim, the author advocates for a more narrow approach than the one permitted under 
the Directive and the Handbook. In the author’s view, it would be more reasonable to 
define marriages of convenience as those that do not have, and never had, any other 
content apart from the immigration motive. Accordingly, the author argues that a 
marriage should not be regarded as one of convenience in the absence of any reliable 
evidence that it has been a purely artificial arrangement and/or in the presence of any 
elements suggesting there is (or used to be) a relationship between the parties.958  
Finally, it should be stressed that the UK authorities do not collect aggregated 
statistics on identified marriages of convenience amongst those applying for EEA 
family permits or residence cards,959 whilst the number of prospective marriages 
determined to be ‘sham’ under the ‘referral and investigation scheme’ remains below 
5%. These figures raise serious doubts about the justification for existing measures, 
not only from a legal but also public policy perspective, particularly because their 
deterrent effect is also questionable. The number of foreigners who would wish to 
 
958 Emphasis added. 




contract a marriage of convenience but are deterred from doing so is unknown . By 
contrast, the scheme may target many couples in a close relationship who may avoid 
getting married out of fear of separation. Moreover, the author argues that even in the 
absence of any measures addressing marriages of convenience, the number of purely 
artificial arrangements is likely to remain low, not least because marriage is a serious 
commitment entailing a set of obligations and the couple need to stay married for at 
least three years before the TCN party can qualify for an independent status.960 Against 
this background, the need for legal and practical tools aiming to curb the phenomenon 
appears strongly doubtful.  
The post-Brexit developments in the UK, however, give little reason f or 
optimism. In essence, the British government has ultimately succeeded in its 
endeavours to deprive EU citizens of the generous family reunion rights guaranteed to 
them under EU law, making them instead subject to the restrictive national family 
reunification provisions. The end of the transition period on 31 December 2020 will 
effectively create two groups of EU citizens who will be covered by separate sets of 
rights. From then on, those who move to the UK after this date will fall into the scope 
of British immigration law. By contrast, those who relocate to the country before 31 
December 2020 and either marry their TCN partners or already live with their spouses 
in the UK by this date, will be covered by the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, 
incorporated into the British law by the Withdrawal Act. It is foreseen that the latter 
group will continue to enjoy the residence rights in the UK on the same terms as under 
the Citizenship Directive, including EU law safeguards the states must respect when 
targeting perceived marriages of convenience. It, however, remains to be seen how the 
rules are implemented in practice, particularly given that both the UK executive and 
courts have often struggled to differentiate between mobile EU citizens and British 
nationals already long before the UK left the EU. Creating an additional distinction 
between EU citizens benefiting from the Withdrawal Act and those equated to full-
fledged foreigners is likely to add further confusion, eventually resulting in erroneous 
decisions and disruption of the families involved.  
Whilst the present thesis describes the situation up until 30 th June 2020; it can 
be used as a reference source for analysis of the relevant developments in the UK post-
Brexit. In addition, it may serve as an example for future case-studies in the field. 
Apart from the UK, the situation in Ireland clearly deserves closer inspection due to 
 




measures targeting marriages of convenience which have been enacted by the country 
in recent years. As the first case-study in this particular legal setting, this thesis 
provides an innovative set of tools and arguments for examining the issue f rom various 
angles, all of which are crucial for developing a comprehensive understanding of the 
subject. It is hence much hoped that this will simplify the difficult task of other scholars 
who may wish to approach the concept of marriages of convenience f rom a 






Critical analysis of the Home Office methodology used to calculate the estimated 
numbers of perceived sham marriages  
 
Whilst advocating for the introduction of the ‘referral and investigation 
scheme’, the Home Office claimed that 4,000 to 10,000 applications a year to stay in 
the UK could be made on the basis of sham marriages.961 However, a closer inspection 
of the methodology used to obtain these figures reveals serious flaws and deficiencies 
that severely undermine the credibility of the government findings.  
The relevant methodology is described in detail in a Home Office document 
providing background information on the proposed rules,962 as well as in an Impact 
Assessment for the scheme.963 To obtain the lower figure, the Home Office simply 
applied the estimated percentage of foreigner-involved marriages that generated 
section 24 reports in England and Wales (8%) to the combined number of applications 
to stay in the UK on the basis of marriage and civil partnership (50,000).964  
First, it is unclear why only England and Wales were selected since for the UK 
as a whole, the share of ‘suspicious’ marriages is different – namely, 5%.965 Applying 
this estimate to the total number of applications gives us only 2,500, not 4,000 
suspicious applications, as claimed earlier. Second, section 24 reports only reflect the 
suspicions of registrars; it is unknown how many of the reports actually inv olve 
prospective marriages falling within the definition of a ‘sham marriage’ as provided 
under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. 
Furthermore, the percentage of ‘suspicious’ marriages reported by registrars 
cannot simply be applied to the number of applications to stay in the UK. First, not all 
 
961 Home Office, ‘Sham Marriages and Civil Partnerships’ (n 598), 43; Home Office, ‘Tackling Sham 
Marriage: Impact Assessment’ (n 600), 3. 
962 Home Office, ‘Sham Marriages and Civil Partnerships’ (n 598). 
963 Home Office, ‘Tackling Sham Marriage: Impact Assessment’ (n 600). 
964 Ibid, 3. Data from 2011.  
965 To arrive at this figure, the author used the methodology employed by the Home Office and divided 
the total number of section 24 reports (1,741 in 2011) by the entire number of marriages and civil 
partnerships involving non-EU nationals who could potentially benefit from the union in immigration 
terms (35,000 in 2011). It should be noted that the latter figure also includes nationals with settled or 
permanent status in the UK. Therefore, the real number of those potentially able to gain from a marriage 
an immigration advantage was lower. Furthermore, the estimate of 35,000 should be approached with 
caution, since the Home Office did not collect statistics on non-EU nationals marrying in England and 
Wales and borrowed the respective figures from Scotland, adjusting them accordingly. See Home 





intended marriages that generated section 24 reports were allowed to go forward and 
later serve as a basis for an application for leave to remain: a number of prospective 
weddings were disrupted by immigration off icers, frequently leading to the arrest 
and/or removal of TCN parties.966  
Next, it was stated that the total number of applications included both leave to 
remain and EEA residence card applications.967 Yet, it should be remembered that 
TCN partners of British nationals or settled persons are subject to a ‘non-switching’ 
rule which requires them to leave the UK and apply from abroad before they can 
reunify with their family members. Prior to admission, such couples are subject to 
close scrutiny and are required to satisfy the minimum income requirement.  
Further, the criteria used by marriage registrars to identify ‘suspicious’ couples 
may not apply to those TCN partners of British citizens or settled persons who seek 
admission in the UK either on the basis of an already existing marriage or a fiancé(e) 
visa. These groups are equally subject to close scrutiny that acts as a significant 
deterrent for couples who do not satisfy the restrictive criteria, such as those involving 
third-country nationals with adverse immigration history or insufficient knowledge of 
their UK-based partner. It, therefore follows, that the estimate of 4,000 announced by 
the Home Office lacks any reliable statistical foundation and appears exaggerated.  
The above considerations also apply to the higher estimate of 10,000 
applications a year made on the basis of a sham marriage or civil partnership. To arrive 
at this figure, the Home Office asked senior immigration caseworkers to estimate the 
proportion of applications to stay in the UK under the EEA Regulations that were 
based on marriages of convenience, which they considered was around 20 per cent.968 
This number was then applied to the total number of applications made under both the 
Immigration Rules and the EEA Regulations, resulting in 10,000.969 First, it should be 
stressed that the estimate provided by the caseworkers is purely speculative and only 
reflects their perception of the abuse, particularly in light of their admission that the 
higher estimate ‘applied to high risk nationalities only’.970 Second, assuming that not 
all of the respective applicants had their marriages registered in the UK, ‘suspicious’ 
 
966 See for instance, HC Deb 13 February 2014, col 764W.  
967 Home Office, ‘Sham Marriages and Civil Partnerships’ (n 598), 44. 
968 Ibid. 
969 Ibid, 44. 




applications on the basis of marriages that took place outside the UK can hardly serve 
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Appendix 3  
The scope of the existing definitions of ‘sham marriages’/‘marriages of convenience’ applicable to couples consisting of mobile EU citizens 
and non-EU nationals  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Citizenship Directive 
 
‘Marriage of convenience’ 
– a  marriage contracted 
for the sole purpose of 
enjoying the right of free 
movement and residence. 
 
 
Commission Handbook  
 
‘Marriage of 
convenience’- a marriage 
contracted for the sole 
purpose of conferring a 
right of free movement 
and residence under EU 
law on free movement of 
EU citizens to a spouse 
who would otherwise not 
have such a right. 
 
The notion of ‘sole 
purpose’ should not be 
interpreted literally (as 
being the unique or 
exclusive purpose) but 
rather as meaning that the 
objective to obtain the 
right of entry and 
residence must be the 
predominant purpose of 
the abusive conduct. 
Immigration Act 1999 
 
‘Sham marriage’ – a  
marriage where (1) either, 
or both, of the parties is 
not a British, EEA or 
Swiss national, (2) there is 
no genuine relationship 
between the parties and 
(3) either, or both, of the 
parties enter into the 
marriage to avoid the 
effect of UK immigration 
law and/or obtain a right 
to reside in the UK. 
EEA Regulations 2016 
 
‘Marriage of convenience’ 
- a marriage entered into 
for the purpose of using 
these Regulations, or any 
other right conferred by 
the EU Treaties, as a 
means to circumvent —  
(a) immigration rules 
applying to non-EEA 
nationals or;  
(b) any other criteria that 
the party to the marriage 
of convenience would 
otherwise have to meet in 
order to enjoy a right to 
reside under these 
Regulations or the EU 
Treaties. 
EU Settlement Scheme 
 
‘Marriage of convenience’ 
– a  marriage entered into 
as a means to circumvent 
any criterion the party 
would otherwise have to 
meet in order to enjoy a 
right to enter or reside in 




 1 2 3 4 5 
Pre-marriage stage 
Marriage to be contracted 
for the only purpose of 
enabling the TCN to enjoy 
a right to reside, with no 
















Parties in an existing 
relationship but wish to 
contract a marriage for the 
predominant purpose of 
enabling the TCN to enjoy 

















intention to create a family 

















Marriage contracted for 
the only purpose of 
enabling the TCN to enjoy 
a right to reside, with no 
relationship between the 













Marriage contracted for 
the only purpose of 
enabling the TCN to enjoy 



















 1 2 3 4 5 
couple start a relationship 
after the marriage. 
Parties in an existing 
relationship but contracted 
a marriage for the 
predominant purpose of 
enabling the TCN to enjoy 
















*If interpreted literally 
 
✔  The situation is covered by the definition. 
X   The situation is not covered by the definition. 













Appendix 4  
Upper Tribunal decisions in cases involving TCN spouses of EU citizens whose marriages were previously found to be ones of convenience 
(July 2016 – July 2019) (full list) 
N Case number Promulgation date Nationality of the non-
EU national spouse  
Gender of the 
non-EU national 
spouse 
Nationality of the EU 
citizen spouse 
Gender of the 
EU citizen 
spouse 
1 E. C. and Others v SSHD  [2016] 
UKUT 10919 (IAC) 
5 July 2016 India M Slovakia F 
2 SSHD v Kashif [2016] UKUT 
19663 (IAC) 
12 July 2016 Pakistan M Not available F 
3 SSHD v Chami [2016] UKUT 
12375 (IAC) 
20 July 2016 Algeria  M Hungary F 
4 Igwe v SSHD [2016] UKUT 
27335 (IAC) 
26 July 2016 Not available F Not available M 
5 Onwusakah v SSHD [2016] 
UKUT 14926 (IAC) 
26 July 2016 Nigeria  
 
M Bulgaria  F 
6 SSHD v Okofor [2016] UKUT 
42725 (IAC) 
3 August 2016 Nigeria  F Not available M 
7 Rehman v SSHD [2016] UKUT 
16713 (IAC) 




N Case number Promulgation date Nationality of the non-
EU national spouse  
Gender of the 
non-EU national 
spouse 
Nationality of the EU 
citizen spouse 
Gender of the 
EU citizen 
spouse 
8 Iqbal v SSHD [2016] UKUT 
09279 (IAC) 
22 August 2016 Pakistan M Not available F 
9 SSHD v Okpegwa [2016] UKUT 
47227 (IAC) 
2 September 2016 Nigeria  M Portugal F 
10 Singh Cheema v SSHD [2016] 
UKUT 06785 (IAC) 
13 September 2016 Not available M Romania F 
11 Grace [A] v SSHD [2016] UKUT 
04646 (IAC) 
22 September 2016 Nigeria  F Germany M 
12 SSHD v Saleem [2016] UKUT 
19636 (IAC) 
22 September 2016 Pakistan M Portugal F 
13 Bonyface and Magilrajah v SSHD 
[2016] UKUT 08051 (IAC) 
27 September 2016 Sri Lanka M Germany  F 
14 Kaur Butter v SSHD [2016] 
UKUT 27370 (IAC) 
3 October 2016 India  F Czech Republic M 
15 SSHD v Susana [L] [2016] 
UKUT 47733 (IAC) 
4 October 2016 Not available M Portugal F 
16 Gadaev v SSHD [2016] UKUT 
29481 (IAC) 




N Case number Promulgation date Nationality of the non-
EU national spouse  
Gender of the 
non-EU national 
spouse 
Nationality of the EU 
citizen spouse 
Gender of the 
EU citizen 
spouse 
17 Jallow v SSHD [2016] UKUT 
48840 (IAC) 
19 October 2016 Gambia  F Netherlands M 
18 Bismark [B] v SSHD [2016] 
UKUT 50715 (IAC) 
24 October 2016 Not available M Netherlands (and Ghana) F 
19 Aslam v SSHD [2016] UKUT 
14470 (IAC) 
4 November 2016  Pakistan  M Lithuania F 
20 Osorio Leiva v Entry Clearance 
Officer, Bogota [2017] UKUT 
01651 (IAC) 
2 May 2017 Colombia F Spain M 
21 Sonde v SSHD [2017] UKUT 
32338 (IAC) 
3 May 2017 Nigeria  F Poland M 
22 Mazhar v SSHD [2017] UKUT 
14102 (IAC) 
11 May 2017 Not available M Not available F 
23 Uddin v SSHD [2017] UKUT 
27273 (IAC) 
24 May 2017 Not available M Romania F 
24 De Vera v SSHD [2017] UKUT 
07000 (IAC) 
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